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

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THE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

LOUIS FISHER and DAVID GRAY ADLER examine the legislative history and operation of the War Powers Resolution of 1973 and conclude that it fails to satisfy its stated purpose to fulfill the intent of the Framers and to insure that the "collective judgment" of both Congress and the president apply to the use of military force. They argue that the legislation should be repealed.

LAWRENCE R. JACOBS, ERIC D. LAWRENCE, ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, and STEVEN S. SMITH analyze the paradox of previous research findings that public opinion has a strong influence on the collective behavior of Congress but a quite modest one on the substantive policy decisions of individual members. Focusing on the debate over health care reform in 1993 and 1994, they suggest that congressional leaders drive public opinion to resemble the collective decisions of Congress.

JOSEPH LEPGOLD discusses how theories of international relations can be made more relevant to policy makers. He argues that better specified arguments would allow both theorists and practitioners to evaluate competing causal claims more easily.

GARRY RODAN investigates the political implications of the Internet in Singapore, where authorities have embarked on an ambitious attempt to restrain the liberalizing impact of the new technology. His findings contradict popular expectations of the Internet necessarily aiding the erosion of authoritarian rule.

PETER J. ROMAN and DAVID W. TARR review the changes in the Joint Chiefs of Staff that have occurred since the passage of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. They show how the increased authority of the JCS chairman has transformed the dominant JCS norm from service parochialism to a cross-service or joint perspective.

JAMES SHOCH examines the partisan roots of the turn toward a more aggressive U.S. trade policy during the Reagan-Bush years. He argues that Democratic efforts to exploit the trade issue for partisan advantage during this period forced Presidents Reagan and Bush to take tougher trade policy actions than they would otherwise have chosen in order to defuse the threat from the Democrats.

DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY

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The War Powers Resolution: Time to Say Goodbye

LOUIS FISHER
DAVID GRAY ADLER

The War Powers Resolution (WPR) of 1973 is generally considered the high-water mark of congressional reassertion in national security affairs. In fact, it was ill conceived and badly compromised from the start, replete with tortured ambiguity and self-contradiction. The net result was to legalize a scope for independent presidential power that would have astonished the Framers, who vested the power to initiate hostilities exclusively in Congress. The resolution, however, grants to the president unbridled discretion to go to war as he deems necessary against anyone, anytime, anywhere, for at least ninety days. As Arthur Schlesinger Jr. has observed, before "the passage of the resolution, unilateral presidential war was a matter of usurpation. Now, at least for the first ninety days, it was a matter of law."[1]

Implementation of the War Powers Resolution has revealed further deficiencies. After occupying Haiti, the Clinton administration actually cited the resolution favorably as another weapon to add to its ever-expanding arsenal of claims for presidential warmaking power. After nearly twenty-five years of experience, it would be better for both branches—and for constitutional government—to repeal the War Powers Resolution and rely on traditional political pressures and the regular system of checks and balances, including impeachment. There is some risk that repeal might indirectly signal a reduced role for Congress, but that role has reached a minimal level anyway, in part because of the War Powers Resolution. Over the long term, outright repeal would be less risky than continuing along the present path.

[1] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Imperial Presidency* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989), 434–35.

LOUIS FISHER is senior specialist in separation of powers at the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress. His most recent book is *Presidential War Power.* DAVID GRAY ADLER is professor of political science at Idaho State University. His most recent book, which he edited with Larry N. George, is *The Constitution and the Conduct of American Foreign Policy.*

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Passage of the Resolution

In drafting the War Powers Resolution, the House and the Senate began with incompatible principles. In the insightful words of Senator Tom Eagleton (D-MO), they "marched down separate and distinct roads, almost irreconcilable roads."[2] In 1970, members of the House were willing to recognize that the president, in certain extraordinary and emergency conditions, had the authority to defend the United States and its citizens without prior authorization from Congress. Instead of trying to define the precise conditions under which presidents may act, the House relied on procedural safeguards. The president would be required, "whenever feasible," to consult with Congress before sending American forces into armed conflict. He was also to report the circumstances necessitating the action; the constitutional, legislative, and treaty provisions authorizing the action, together with his reasons for not seeking prior congressional authorization; and the estimated scope of activities.[3]

The Senate did not act on this measure. In 1973, the House tightened the language somewhat by placing a time limit on presidential initiatives. Unless Congress declared war within 120 days or specifically authorized the use of force, the president had to terminate the commitment and remove the troops. The House bill also allowed Congress, by concurrent resolution, to direct disengagement at any time during the 120-day period.[4] Concurrent resolutions must pass both chambers but are not presented to the president for his signature or veto.

Senators refused to give the president such unilateral authority, and certainly not to make war wherever he liked, for whatever reason, for up to 120 days. Instead, the Senate tried to spell out the conditions under which presidents could act singlehandedly. Armed force could be used in three situations: first, to repel an armed attack upon the United States, its territories and possessions, retaliate in the event of such an attack, and forestall the direct and imminent threat of such an attack; second, to repel an armed attack against U.S. armed forces located outside the United States, its territories and possessions, and forestall the direct and imminent threat of such an attack; and third, to rescue endangered American citizens and nationals in foreign countries or at sea. The first situation (except for the final clause) conforms to the understanding developed by the Framers. The other situations reflect the changes that have occcurred in the concept of defensive war and life-and-property actions.

The Senate bill required the president to cease military action unless Congress within thirty days specifically authorized the president to continue. A separate provision allowed him to sustain military operations beyond the thirty-day limit if he determined that "unavoidable military necessity respecting the

[2] 119 *Congressional Record* [hereafter *Cong. Rec.*] 33555 (1973).

[3] 116 *Cong. Rec.* 37398–408 (1970). This measure passed again the next year under suspension of the rules, which requires two-thirds support; 117 *Cong. Rec.* 28870–78 (1971).

[4] 119 *Cong. Rec.* 24653–708 (1973).

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safety" of the armed forces required continued use for purposes of bringing about a prompt disengagement.[5] This effort to codify presidential war powers carried a number of risks. Because of imprecise language, legislation might widen presidential power instead of restricting it. Executive officials could interpret in broad fashion such terms as "necessary and appropriate retaliatory actions," "imminent threat," and "endangered citizens."

Pressured to produce a bill, House and Senate conferees fashioned a compromise product. Splitting the difference between the two chambers is natural and acceptable for most bills, but the WPR was more than a compromise between two conflicting bills. It compromised the institutional and constitutional integrity of Congress by giving the president a green light to use force anywhere in the world, for whatever reason, and without seeking congressional authority. Section 2(c), the heart of the resolution, attempts to tie presidential use of force to constitutional considerations: a congressional declaration of war, statutory authorization, or an attack on the United States, its territories, or its military forces. This effort, fully in accord with the Framers' constitutional blueprint, is then undermined and contradicted by other provisions in Sections 4 and 5, which allow the president to act unilaterally for sixty or ninety days. In deference to the Senate, the House shortened the time period from 120 days to sixty days. The president could take an additional thirty days to withdraw troops.

The conference version retained the House provisions regarding reporting and consultation. Under Section 3, the president is required "in every possible instance" to consult with Congress before he introduces troops into "hostilities" or into "situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances." This provision obviously vests the president with discretion to determine at a minimum whether consultation is "possible" and, even more generously, whether it is desirable. It permits the president to determine when, how, and even whom to consult. The ambiguity of this provision creates a constitutional problem, since Congress cannot delegate to a subunit the constitutional power to decide for war.

The meaning of "consultation" has been debated ever since 1973. Presidents have tended to treat it as a synonym for notification after the fact, while defenders of congressional power have viewed it as joint deliberation on a pending issue or problem. But Section 3 contains a deeper, more fundamental, constitutional flaw. Since the provision empowers the president to introduce troops into combat without prior congressional authorization, it not only repudiates the resolution's stated aim in Section 2(c) of ensuring the "collective judgment" of both branches, but vests in the president authority that far exceeds his constitutional powers. Bluntly stated, Section 3 unconstitutionally delegates the power to make war to the president.

The resolution's claim in Section 8(d)(1) that it does not intend "to alter the constitutional authority of the Congress or the President" cannot survive

[5] Ibid., 25051–120.

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scrutiny. Indeed, the principal vice of the resolution is that it radically tilts the balance of power between Congress and the president, and grants the president more power than he can derive from the Constitution.

President Richard Nixon vetoed the bill, primarily because he regarded it as impractical and dangerous to fix in a statute the procedure by which president and Congress should share the war power. He also believed that the legislation encroached upon the president's constitutional responsibilities as commander in chief. Both Houses mustered a two-thirds majority to override the veto: the House narrowly (284 to 135), the Senate by a more comfortable margin (75 to 18).

Although the War Powers Resolution overcame a veto, it did not survive doubts about its quality and motivation. Some of the congressional support relied on party politics: efforts to score some short-term political points at the cost of long-term institutional and constitutional interests. Many legislators took comfort in the resolution's symbolic value rather than its contents.

Consider the voting record of fifteen members of the House.[6] Initially they voted against the House bill and the conference version because they considered the legislation inadequate and unsound. To be consistent, they should have voted to sustain Nixon's veto to prevent the bill from becoming law. Instead, they switched sides and delivered the decisive votes for enactment.

These members reversed course for several reasons. Some feared that a vote to sustain would lend credence to the views of presidential power advanced in Nixon's veto message.[7] Others thought that an override might be a step toward impeaching Nixon. Congresswoman Bella Abzug (D-NY) voted against the House bill and the conference version because they expanded presidential war power. As she noted during debate on the conference report: "[It] gives the President 60 to 90 days to intervene in any crisis situation, or any pretext, while Congress merely asks that he tell us what he had done."[8] Yet she strongly supported a veto override: "This could be a turning point in the struggle to control an administration that has run amuck. It could accelerate the demand for the impeachment of the President."[9]

The thought of overriding a Nixon veto was tempting. Eight times during the 93rd Congress he had vetoed legislation; eight times the Democratic Congress came up short on the override. Some legislators regarded the override vote on the War Powers Resolution as an essential means of reasserting congressional power, particularly in the midst of the Watergate scandals.[10] The Saturday Night Massacre, which sent Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox, Attorney General Elliot Richardson, and Deputy Attorney General William Ruckels-

[6] Representatives Bella Abzug, Robert Drinan, John Duncan, John James Flynt, Jr., William Harsha, Ken Hechler, Elizabeth Holtzman, William Hungate, Phillip Landrum, Trent Lott, Joseph Maraziti, Dale Milford, William Natcher, Frank Stubblefield, and Jamie Whitten.

[7] For example, 119 *Cong. Rec.* 36220 (1973) (Cong. Elizabeth Holtzman).

[8] Ibid., 33870.

[9] Ibid., 36221.

[10] Thomas F. Eagleton, *War and Presidential Power* (New York: Liveright, 1974), 213–20.

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haus out of the government, occurred just four days before Nixon's veto of the War Powers Resolution. Ten days before the Saturday Night Massacre, Vice President Spiro Agnew's resignation in disgrace further heightened the cry for partisan and institutional blood.

Even with these intense politics, several Democrats in the House recognized that the conference product tilted power decisively toward the president. William Green, from Pennsylvania, remarked that the War Powers Resolution "has popularly been interpreted as limiting the president's power to engage our troops in a war." Because he had opposed such unilateral presidential action, he wanted to explain that a careful reading of the bill indicated that it "is actually an expansion of Presidential warmaking power, rather than a limitation."[11] Vernon Thomson of Wisconsin had no illusions about the bill: "The clear meaning of the words certainly points to a diminution rather than an enhancement of the role of Congress in the critical decisions whether the country will or will not go to war."[12] Bob Eckhardt of Texas condemned the abdication of congressional power. By allowing the president to engage U.S. troops for up to ninety days, "the Congress provides the color of authority to the President to exercise a warmaking power which I find the Constitution has exclusively assigned to the Congress."[13] Ronald Dellums of California, having opposed the House bill and the conference version, held firm and voted to sustain the veto: "Richard Nixon is not going to be President forever. Although many people will regard this as a victory against the incumbent President, because of his opposition, I am convinced that it will actually strengthen the position of future Presidents."[14]

There were fewer clear thinkers in the Senate during the override vote. Senator Eagleton, a principal sponsor of the War Powers Resolution, denounced the bill that emerged from conference as a "total, complete distortion of the war powers concept."[15] Instead of the three exceptions specified in the Senate bill and the thirty-day limit, the conference product gave the president carte blanche authority to use military force for up to ninety days. Although the media continued to describe the bill as a constraint on presidential war power, Eagleton punctured this misconception: "The bill gives the President of the United States unilateral authority to commit American troops anywhere in the world, under any conditions he decides, for 60 to 90 days. He gets a free 60 days and a self-executing option for an additional 30 days, making 90."

Even those who continued to support the bill and urged the override of Nixon's veto admitted the broad sweep of presidential power conferred by Congress. Senators Jacob Javits and Ed Muskie, in a "Dear Colleague" letter distributed to other legislators, conceded that nothing in the bill would have prevented President Nixon from sending U.S. troops to the Middle East to as-

[11] 119 *Cong. Rec.* 36204 (1973).
[12] Ibid., 36207.
[13] Ibid., 36208.
[14] Ibid., 36220.
[15] Ibid., 36177.

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sist Israel against Egyptian threats. The bill, they said, "would have required the President only to report to the Congress within 48 hours in writing with respect to the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces in foreign territory, airspace and waters."[16] The president could commit U.S. troops to the volatile Middle East with no nod to Congress other than having aides prepare a written report.

Eagleton confessed to being "dumbfounded." With memories so fresh about presidential extension of the war in Southeast Asia, "how can we give unbridled, unlimited total authority to the President to commit us to war?" He charged that the bill, after being nobly conceived, "has been horribly bastardized to the point of being a menace."[17]

The Framers' Intent

According to Section 2(a) of the War Powers Resolution, it was the purpose of Congress "to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations." Seldom has a statue misfired to such an extent on a basic purpose. The resolution does violence to the intent of the Framers and has not in any sense insured the collective judgment of Congress and the president in the use of military force.

The Constitution vests in Congress the sole and exclusive authority to initiate military hostilities, including full-blown, total war, as well as lesser acts of armed force. While the "original intent" of the Framers toward some constitutional provisions may be unclear or beyond recovery, there is, remarkably, no doubt about their decision to establish Congress as the repository of the power to commence war on behalf of the American people.[18] A more impressive and even stunning feature of the Framers' design, however, is the fact that it constituted a dramatic break from the existing models of government throughout Europe, which had placed the war power and foreign affairs firmly in the grasp of the monarch.

The Framers' departure from prevailing schemes reflected their intellectual orientation, their understanding of history, and their own practical experi-

[16] Ibid., 35953.

[17] Ibid., 36178.

[18] See, generally, Louis Fisher, *Presidential War Power* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995); John Hart Ely, *War and Responsibility* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); David Gray Adler, "The Constitution and Presidential Warmaking: The Enduring Debate," *Political Science Quarterly* 103 (Spring, 1988): 1–35; Francis D. Wormuth and Edwin B. Firmage, *To Chain the Dog of War: The War Powers of Congress in History and Law* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986); Edward Keynes, *Undeclared War: Twilight Zone of Constitutional Power* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1982).

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ences.[19] In their aspiration to effectuate a republican government, the Founders drafted a Constitution that "allowed only Congress to loose the military forces of the United States on other nations."[20] Deliberations at the Constitutional Convention demonstrate that the delegates embraced the principle of collective decision making, the concept of shared power in foreign affairs, and the cardinal tenet of republican ideology that the conjoined wisdom of many is superior to that of one.

The fact that the power of war and peace was historically associated with the monarchy was addressed repeatedly at the convention. On 1 June 1787, Charles Pinckney said he was for a vigorous president but was afraid that some of the proposals "would render the Executive a Monarchy, of the worst kind, towit an elective one."[21] John Rutledge wanted the executive power placed in a single person, "tho' he was not for giving him the power of war and peace." James Wilson sought to reassure the delegates. The prerogatives of the British monarchy were not "a proper guide in defining the executive powers. Some of these prerogatives were of a Legislative nature. Among others that of war & peace &c." Edmund Randolph worried about executive power, calling it "the foetus of monarchy." The delegates at the convention, he said, had "no motive to be governed by the British Governmt. as our prototype." If the United States had no other choice he might adopt the British model, but the "fixt genius of the people of America required a different form of Government." Wilson agreed that the British model "was inapplicable to the situation in this Country; the extent of which was so great, and the manners so republican, that nothing but a great confederated Republic would do for it."[22]

Alexander Hamilton, a favorite among extollers of a strong presidency, also rejected the British model of executive prerogatives in the conduct of foreign affairs and the exercise of the war power. While he explained in a lengthy speech to the Convention on 18 June that in "his private opinion he had no scruple in declaring . . . that the British Govt. was the best in the world,"[23] he nevertheless agreed that the English scheme would have no application in the United States. He proposed that the Senate would have the "sole power of declaring war" and, in language that would anticipate the role of the president as commander in chief, the president would be authorized to have "the direction of war when authorized or begun."[24]

The Framers' determination to preclude unilateral presidential authority to initiate military actions was demonstrated in the debates that surrounded the

[19] Fisher, *Presidential War Power*, 1–6; David Gray Adler and Larry N. George, eds., *The Constitution and the Conduct of American Foreign Policy* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996), 3–6.

[20] Edwin B. Firmage, "War, Declaration of" in Leonard W. Levy and Louis Fisher, eds., *Encyclopedia of the American Presidency* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), vol. 4, 1573.

[21] *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787*, Max Farrand, ed., (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937), vol. i, 65.

[22] Ibid., 65–66.

[23] Ibid., 288.

[24] Ibid., 292.

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crafting of the war clause. On 6 August, the Committee of Detail circulated a draft that provided that the legislature shall have the power "to make war."[25] This bore sharp resemblance to the Articles of Confederation, which vested the "sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war" to the Continental Congress.

When the war clause was considered in debate on 17 August, Charles Pinckney opposed placing the power in the full Congress. "Its proceedings, he said, were too slow. . . . The Senate would be the best depositary, being more acquainted with foreign affairs, and most capable of proper resolutions."[26] Pierce Butler "was for vesting the power in the President, who will have all the requisite qualities, and will not make war but when the Nation will support it." Butler's opinion shocked Elbridge Gerry, who said that he "never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war." Butler stood alone in the Convention; there was no support for his opinion and no second to his motion.[27]

The draft proposal to vest the legislature with the power to make war proved unsatisfactory to Madison and Gerry. As a consequence, they moved to substitute "declare" for "make," leaving the president "the power to repel sudden attacks." The meaning of the motion is unmistakable. Congress was granted the power to make, that is, initiate war; the president, for obvious reasons, could act immediately to repel sudden attacks without authorization from Congress. In genuine emergency situations, allowing no time for congressional deliberation, the president could order *defensive* actions. Roger Sherman spoke in support of the motion and thought it "stood very well. The Executive shd. be able to repel and not to commence war." George Mason "was agst giving the power of war to the Executive, because not <safely> to be trusted with it. . . . He was for clogging rather than facilitating war."[28]

The debates and vote on the war clause make it clear that Congress alone possesses the authority to initiate war. The warmaking power was specifically withheld from the president; he was given only the authority to repel sudden attacks. Confirmation of that understanding was provided by remarks of ratifiers in various state conventions, as well as by the early practice and contemporaneous statements of political actors.

In Pennsylvania, James Wilson expressed the prevailing sentiment that the system of checks and balances "will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against it. It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such distress; for the important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large."[29] In North Carolina, James Iredell compared

[25] Ibid., vol. ii, 182.

[26] Ibid., 318.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid., 318–319.

[29] *The Debates in the Several State Conventions*, Jonathan Elliot, ed. (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1836), vol ii, 528.

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the limited powers of the president with those of the British monarch. The king of England was not only the commander in chief "but has power, in time of war, to raise fleets and armies. He has also the authority to declare war." By contrast, the president "has not the power of declaring war by his own authority, nor that of raising fleets and armies. These powers are vested in other hands."[30]

The meaning of the war clause was thus settled at the dawn of the republic. The word "declare" enjoyed a settled understanding and an established usage. As early as 1552, the verb "declare" had become synonymous with the verb "commence." They both meant the initiation of hostilities.[31] This was the established usage in international law as well as in England, where the terms declare war and make war were used interchangeably.

This practice was familiar to the Framers. As Chancellor James Kent of New York, one of the leading jurists of the founding period, stated: "As war cannot lawfully be commenced on the part of the United States, without an act of Congress, such an act is, of course, a formal official notice to all the world, and equivalent to the most solemn declaration." While Kent interpreted "declare" to mean "commence," he did not assert that the Constitution requires a congressional declaration of war before hostilities could be lawfully commenced, but merely that it be initiated by Congress. What is "essential," according to Kent, is "that some formal public act, proceeding directly from the competent source, should announce to the people at home their new relations and duties growing out of a state of war, and which should equally apprize neutral nations of the fact."[32] Thus, Congress need not declare war. All that is required under American law is a joint resolution or an explicit congressional authorization of the use of military force against a named adversary.

The Constitution grants to Congress the sum total of the nation's power to commence hostilities. There was in the Convention no doubt about the limited scope of the president's war power. The duty to repel sudden attacks represents an emergency measure that permits the president to take actions necessary to protect the United States. The president was never vested with a general power to deploy troops whenever and wherever he thought best, and the Framers did not authorize him to take the country into full-scale war or to mount an offensive attack against another nation. John Bassett Moore, an eminent international law scholar, justly stated:

> There can hardly be room for doubt that the framers of the contitution, when they vested in Congress the power to declare war, never imagined that they were leaving it to the executive to use the military and naval forces of the United States all over the world for the purpose of actually coercing other nations, occupying their territory, and killing their soldiers and citizens, all according to his own notions of the

[30] Ibid., vol. iv, 107.

[31] Huloet's dictionary provided this definition: "Declare warres. *Arma canere, Bellum indicere.*" We have here two meanings: to summon to arms; to announce war. Quoted in Wormuth and Firmage, *To Chain the Dog of War*, 20.

[32] James Kent, *Commentaries on American Law* (New York: Da Capo reprint, 1971), vol. i, 53.

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fitness of things, as long as he refrained from calling his action war or persisted in calling it peace.[33]

The Framers did not create the title of commander-in-chief, but adopted it in light of the 150-year-old English tradition of entitling the office at the apex of the military hierarchy as commander in chief and of subordinating the office to a political superior, such as a king or parliament. The office carried with it no warmaking power whatever. This practice was thoroughly familiar to the Framers, and perhaps this settled understanding and the consequent absence of concerns about the nature of the office accounts for the fact that there was no debate on the commander-in-chief clause at the Convention. Hamilton laid bare the dimensions of the office in *The Federalist*, No. 69: "The President is to be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and admiral of the Confederacy; while that of the British King extends to the *declaring* of war and to the *raising* and *regulating* of fleets and armies,—all which, by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature."[34]

This model of republican government, so carefully crafted by the Framers to avoid the monarchical excesses of England, was abandoned by those who drafted and enacted the War Powers Resolution.

Experience under the WPR

Both Presidents Gerry Ford and Jimmy Carter understood the need to heal the wounds from the Vietnam War. During their administrations the executive branch did little to flex its muscles in warmaking. Ford used military force for the evacuations from Southeast Asia and during the *S.S. Mayaguez* capture, while Carter used military force in the attempted rescue of hostages in Iran. But those actions were limited in scope and did not greatly threaten the balance between the executive and legislative branches.

The record from Ronald Reagan to Bill Clinton has been one of increasing use of presidential war power, with Congress progressively marginalized. Reagan introduced U.S. troops to Lebanon, invaded Grenada, carried out air strikes against Libya, and maintained naval operations in the Persian Gulf. In none of these actions did he ask Congress for authority. Congress eventually passed legislation in the fall of 1983 to authorize military action in Lebanon for a period of eighteen months. President George Bush relied on independent

[33] *The Collected Papers of John Bassett Moore* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944), vol. v, 195–196.

[34] Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, *The Federalist*, Benjamin Fletcher Wright, ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), 446.

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executive power to invade Panama and only at the last minute did he come to Congress for support in acting offensively against Iraq. Clinton has used military force repeatedly without congressional authority: launching missiles against Baghdad in 1993, carrying out combat operations in Somalia, threatening to invade Haiti, conducting air strikes in Bosnia followed by the dispatch of 20,000 ground troops, and authorizing further air strikes of Iraq in 1996.

Military initiatives from Reagan to Clinton have revealed a glaring deficiency in the War Powers Resolution. Because of the Senate's capitulation to House conferees, the statute granted to the president for a period of sixty to ninety days the authority to conduct military operations on his own initiative, but after that point he needed explicit authority from Congress. The problem of presidential accountability is compounded by the fact that the resolution is written in such a way that the sixty-to-ninety day clock begins ticking only if the president reports under a very specific section: not Section 4, not Section 4(a), but only under Section 4(a)(1).[35]

Not surprisingly, presidents do not report under 4(a)(1). They report, for the most part, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution." The only president to report under 4(a)(1) was Ford in the *Mayaguez* capture, and his report had no substantive importance because it was released after the operation was over. The true meaning of the War Powers Resolution, then, was that presidents could unilaterally use military force against other countries for as long as they liked, until Congress got around to adopting some kind of statutory constraint.

The threatened invasion of Haiti disclosed another peculiar quality of the War Powers Resolution. In the past, executive officials had objected that it was too restrictive on the president. The Clinton theory of the Resolution, spun from the legal workshop of Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger, claimed that the statute "recognizes and presupposes the existence of unilateral Presidential authority to deploy armed forces [quoting from the statute] 'into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.'" (Dellinger carefully refers to the resolution as an "acknowledgment", not a "source," of executive power, because what Congress grants it may take away.)

To Dellinger, the structure of the resolution "makes sense only if the President may introduce troops into hostilities or potential hostilities without prior authorization by the Congress.[36] By declining to prohibit the president from deploying troops into situations like Haiti, Dellinger says that Congress "has left the President both the authority and the means to take such initiatives." Later, at a law school conference, he elaborated on that point: "By establishing

[35] Section 4(a)(1) applies to any case in which United States armed forces are introduced "into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances."

[36] U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, letter to Senators Dole, Simpson, Thurmond, and Cohen, September 27, 1994, from Walter Dellinger, 3; reprinted at 140 *Cong. Rec.* S14314 (daily ed. October 6, 1994).

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and funding a military force capable of being sent around the globe, and declining in the War Powers Resolution or elsewhere to forbid the President's use of his statutory and constitutional powers to deploy troops into situations of risk such as Haiti, Congress left the President both the authority and the means to take such initiatives."[37]

Read in that light, the War Powers Resolution grants to the president an unlimited, discretionary authority to choose war or peace. In so doing, it does great violence to the law of delegation. The statute does not attempt, for example, to delegate the war power for specified contingencies, nor does it provide a governing policy or standard. The president is vested with the authority to choose an enemy and to decide when to make war. The law of delegation stands for the proposition that Congress is the principal and the president is the agent. The War Powers Resolution makes the president the principal.

Members Rush to Court

One of the byproducts of the War Powers Resolution is the frequency with which legislators turn not to their colleagues to challenge the president but rather to the courts. Private parties have also litigated military issues. None of these efforts has been successful.

Former crewmen of the *S.S. Mayaguez* sued the United States for personal injuries resulting from President Ford's rescue attempt. A federal district judge held that Ford's action was immune from judicial review under the political question doctrine. The judge said that it "has long been settled that the underlying factual or legal determinations on the basis of which the President conducts the foreign relations of the United States are not subject to judicial scrutiny.[38]

On four occasions during the 1980s, members of Congress went to court to charge President Reagan with violations of the War Powers Resolution. President Reagan did not report under any provision of the resolution when he sent military advisers to El Salvador in 1981. The State Department claimed that no report was necessary, because the Americans were not being introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities. Several legislators filed a suit claiming that Reagan had violated the resolution by sending the advisers. Eventually, twenty-nine members of the House joined the action against Reagan. Arrayed on the opposite side were sixteen senators and twelve representatives who supported Reagan and urged that the case be dismissed. The federal judge, confronted by two congressional factions, refused to do the fact-finding that would have been necessary to determine whether hostilities or imminent hostilities actually existed. The court stated that it lacked "the resources and expertise" necessary to "resolve the disputed questions of fact concerning the military sit-

[37] Walter Dellinger, "After the Cold War: Presidential Power and the Use of Military Force," *University of Miami Law Review* 50 (1995): 107, 111–112.

[38] *Rappenecker v. United States*, 509 F.Supp. 1024, 1028 (N.D. Cal. 1980).

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uation in El Salvador" and dismissed the case on political question grounds, noting that Congress had failed to act legislatively to restrain Reagan.[39]

In a similar case, eleven members of Congress brought action against President Reagan for his invasion of Grenada in 1983, contending that he had violated the power of Congress to declare war. The judiciary declined to exercise its jurisdiction because of the relief available to members through the regular legislative process. The message was clear: If Congress wants to confront the president, it must do so by exerting legislative powers, not by turning to the courts.[40]

Another suit involving the Reagan administration's activities in Nicaragua was avoided by the courts on similar grounds. Twelve members of the House of Representatives, relying on a number of statutes including the War Powers Resolution, challenged the legality of Reagan's actions. The district court referred to the "impossibility of our undertaking independent resolution without expressing a lack of respect due coordinate branches of government."[41] When this opinion was affirmed by the appellate court, Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted that Congress "has formidable weapons at its disposal—the power of the purse and investigative resources far beyond those available in the Third Branch. But no gauntlet has been thrown down here by a majority of the Members of Congress."[42]

Also unsuccessful was a case brought by members of Congress who claimed that President Reagan's use of military force in the Persian Gulf in 1987 had not followed the procedures of the War Powers Resolution. The advice from the court was familiar. If Congress failed to defend its prerogatives, it could not expect to be bailed out by the courts.[43]

A more interesting dispute and a much more successful approach occurred in a 1990 case brought by members of Congress against President Bush's contemplated use of military force against Iraq. Attorneys for members abandoned reliance on the War Powers Resolution and stood firmly on constitutional provisions governing the war powers. Federal District Judge Harold H. Greene ruled that the issue was not ready for judicial determination, but decisively rejected many of the sweeping claims for presidential warmaking prerogatives promoted by the Justice Department. The court concluded that if Congress confronted the president, and the president refused to accept a statutory restriction, the issue might be ripe for the courts.[44] If future courts decide to reach the merits of war powers controversies, they would do well to follow Judge Greene's forceful rejection of a unilateral presidential power to wage war.

[39] *Crockett v. Reagan*, 558 F.Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, *Crockett v. Reagan*, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

[40] *Conyers v. Reagan*, 578 F.Supp. 324 (D.D.C. 1984), dismissed as moot, *Conyers v. Reagan*, 765 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

[41] *Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan*, 568 F.Supp. 596, 600 (D.D.C. 1983).

[42] *Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan*, 770 F.2d 202, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

[43] *Lowry v. Reagan*, 676 F.Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd, No. 87-5426 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

[44] *Dellums v. Bush*, 752 F.Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).

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Judge Greene stated that if the president "had the sole power to determine that any particular offensive military operation, no matter how vast, does not constitute war-making but only an offensive military attack, the congressional power to declare war will be at the mercy of a semantic decision by the Executive. Such an 'interpretation' would evade the plain language of the Constitution, and it cannot stand."[45]

Members might be forgiven their march to court. After all, they have been fully armed with war powers precedents as old or older than *Marbury v. Madison* (1803), the greybeard of all judicial precedents. At the dawn of the republic, the Supreme Court held in several cases that Congress enjoys exclusive authority to initiate military hostilities. No court in the intervening years has departed from that view.

In 1800, the Court held that it is for Congress alone to authorize either an "imperfect" (limited) war or a "perfect" (declared) war.[46] A year later, the Court stated with great clarity: "The whole powers of war, being by the constitution of the United States, vested in congress, the acts of that body can alone be resorted to as our guides in this enquiry."[47] The words are those of Chief Justice John Marshall, a member of the Virginia ratifying convention. In 1804, the Court held that President John Adams's instructions to seize ships were in conflict with an act of Congress and were therefore illegal.[48] Once again the opinion-writer was Chief Justice Marshall. In 1806, the question of whether the president may initiate hostilities was decided by Justice William Paterson, riding circuit, for himself and District Judge Matthias Burnet Tallmadge: "Does he [the president] possess the power of making war? That power is exclusively vested in congress. . . . [I]t is the exclusive province of congress to change a state of peace into a state of war."[49] These decisions established the constitutional fact that it is for Congress alone to initiate hostilities, whether in the form of a general or a limited war. They remain the supreme law of the land.

Amend the Resolution?

During House debate on the conference version of the War Powers Resolution, Congressman Robert Drinan (D-MA) acknowledged that "it is an imperfect bill—I voted twice against it already on that basis—but it is a bill that can be improved in the days and months to come."[50] In the years following 1973, there has not been a single amendment to the War Powers Resolution. To the extent that amendments are put forth, they typically widen the scope of independent presidential power.

[45] Ibid., 1145.
[46] *Bas v. Tingy*, 4 U.S. 37 (1800).
[47] *Talbot v. Seeman*, 5 U.S. 1, 28 (1801).
[48] *Little v. Barreme*, 6 U.S. (2 Cr.) 169 (1804).
[49] *United States v. Smith*, 27 Fed. Cas. 1192, 1230 (C.C. N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342).
[50] 119 *Cong. Rec.* 36207 (1973).

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One proposal would replace the War Powers Resolution with a Use of Force Act, which would delegate to the president a number of authorities, including the right "to protect and extricate citizens and nationals of the United States located abroad in situations involving a direct and imminent threat to their lives, provided they are being evacuated as rapidly as possible."[51] Such language could have been used to justify U.S. invasions of the Dominican Republic in 1965, Grenada in 1983, Panama in 1989, and Haiti in 1994. Americans abroad are abused and threatened every year.

The Use of Force Act would also authorize the president to use force abroad "to participate in multilateral actions undertaken under urgent circumstances and pursuant to the approval of the United Nations Security Council." This kind of language would have sanctioned Truman's use of military force against North Korea in 1950, Bush's operation against Iraq in 1990-1991, and Clinton's invasion of Haiti in 1994. In each of those situations the administration was able to get resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council authorizing the use of military force. Should the president seek authority from Congress? The Use of Force Act claims that a UN resolution would suffice.

The Use of Force Act would permit the president to use force abroad "to participate in multilateral actions undertaken in cooperation with democratic allies under urgent circumstances wherein the use of force could have decisive effect in protecting existing democratic institutions in a particular nation against a severe and immediate threat." All the president need do is get approval from NATO countries to order air strikes in Bosnia or send ground forces there. No need to involve Congress.

A number of bills, including the Use of Force Act, would create a congressional consultative group (a core group of about eighteen legislators) to meet regularly with the president to discuss potential situations in which military action might be necessary. This body might be useful, but consultation can never be a legal substitute for full congressional action. Congress cannot delegate to a subunit the constitutional decision to go to war.

On 7 June 1995, The House of Representatives narrowly failed to repeal the War Powers Resolution. Full repeal might have attracted more votes, because opposition to the resolution comes from both flanks: those who say it usurps presidential authority and those who believe it abdicates congressional prerogatives. Instead of full repeal, the proposal chose to retain two elements of the resolution: consultation and presidential reporting. That left the impression that presidents could do pretty much as they pleased in initiating military action, so long as they consulted a few people in Congress and sent regular reports. Congressman David Skaggs (D-CO) feared that a partial repeal would carry "an unfortunate implication" by suggesting that presidential authority in war "is restrained only by a consultative and reporting requirement."[52]

[51] Joseph R. Biden, Jr. and John B. Ritch III, "The War Power at a Constitutional Impasse: A 'Joint Decision' Solution," *Georgetown Law Journal* 77 (1988): 367, 398.

[52] 141 *Cong. Rec.* H5667 (daily ed. June 7, 1995).

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Toward the end of the debate, it appeared that a significant motivation behind partial repeal was augmentation of presidential power. Speaker Newt Gingrich appealed to the House "to, at least on paper, increase the power of President Clinton." He said he wanted to "strengthen the current Democratic President because he is the President of the United States. And the President of the United States on a bipartisan basis deserves to be strengthened in foreign affairs and strengthened in national security."[53] Forty-four Republicans, repelled by that philosophy, abandoned Gingrich. With their exodus the repeal effort fell short of votes, 201 to 217.

Conclusions

The War Powers Resolution has failed to achieve the basic purpose announced in Section 2(a): "to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances." The resolution undermines the intent of the Framers and has not insured collective judgment. Instead, unilateral presidential action is now routine.

Experience under the resolution has proved to be disappointing and frustrating. It is riddled with contradictions, ambiguities, and constitutional flaws. The American public and press have been thoroughly baffled about the application, implementation, and enforcement of the statute. The citizenry is understandably confused about the relationship of the resolution to the Constitution.[54] When, exactly, does the statute apply? Upon what occasions, conditions, and circumstances? The role of Congress has been confounded as well. Many members have been distracted from constitutional considerations and issues of policy by narrowly focused debates on definitional matters and procedural requirements that lie at the core of the resolution, but which have been routinely ignored and dismissed by the executive branch.

During earlier administrations, such as President Reagan's action in Grenada and President Bush's invasion of Panama, executive officials occasionally behaved as though the sixty-day clock was running, even if it had not been legally triggered by a report under Section 4(a)(1). Under those conditions it could be argued that the War Powers Resolution did have a constraining effect on presidential initiatives.[55] But we have had one-year commitments of military action in Haiti and Bosnia, with the latter now extended to a multiyear timeta-

[53] Ibid., H5672–73.

[54] Michael J. Glennon, "Too Far Apart: Repeal the War Powers Resolution," 50 *University of Miami Law Review* 17 (1995).

[55] Military operations in Panama and Grenada were conducted as though the sixty-day limit was enforceable, if not legally then politically. Fisher, *Presidential War Power*, 133, 142.

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ble, with no involvement at all by Congress. The executive branch no longer seems restricted to any time limit in using military force.

Repeal of the War Powers Resolution would eliminate the concession of 1973 that presidents may use military force anywhere in the world, for whatever reason, for up to ninety days, if not longer. There is no constitutional warrant for that proposition. Repeal would remove that source of presidential power and put an end to fruitless legislative debate over whether presidential "consultation" had been sufficient, whether presidential reports were timely and complete, and whether the president should have reported under Section 4(a)(1), 4(a)(2), or some other provision. Repeal would eliminate the current futile dashes to federal court, hoping for some kind of judicial answer. Members of Congress would understand that only legislative action can stop the president: withholding funds, prohibiting specific actions, and taking other concrete measures.

Impeachment remains a legitimate response to presidential usurpations. The congressional power of impeachment was for the Framers a cornerstone in the foundation of the state, an ancient weapon reserved for "acts of great injury to the community."[56] The Framers' fear of unilateral presidential warmaking, the deep-seated concern that one person might plunge the nation into a rash of chaos, misery, and disaster, drove them to vest the warmaking authority in Congress, and they did so in unmistakable terms. Presidential aggrandizement of that power—an act subverting the Constitution—is precisely the sort of abuse of power, trust, and office that epitomized what George Mason characterized as the "great and dangerous offenses" that would invite impeachment.[57]

The powerful engine of impeachment, of course, is not to be started whimsically. But the Framers expected it to be unleashed in response to actions that rocked the foundation of the state. If for reasons of character, political motives, arrogance, or contempt of Congress, the Constitution, or the rule of law, a president refuses to adhere to the constitutional constraints surrounding the war power, impeachment is warranted. Events from Vietnam to Iran-contra have made members of the executive branch more sensitive to the threat of impeachment.[58]

[56] Elliot, *Debates*, vol. iv, 113.

[57] Farrand, *Records of Federal Convention*, vol. ii, 550. Madison said that if the president were to commit "any thing so atrocious as to summon only a few states [to consider a treaty]," he would be impeached for a misdemeanor. Elliot, *Debates*, vol. iii, 500. James Iredell, member of the first Supreme Court, asserted at the North Carolina convention that the president would face impeachment for concealing "important intelligence" from the Senate in matters of foreign affairs. Ibid., vol. iv, 127. These concerns apply even more forcefully to executive usurpation of the war power.

[58] Theodore Draper, *A Very Thin Line* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1991), 521–22, 524, discussed the fear within the Reagan administration that President Reagan might have been impeached for his actions in Iran-contra. Draper explains that Attorney General Edwin Meese III testified at Oliver North's trial that Meese was concerned that Reagan might be impeached if he did not expose the diversion of funds of the contras. The same theme appears in Lawrence E. Walsh, *Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-up* (New York: Norton, 1997), 3, 24, 189, 355, 358–59, 360, 379, 397, 407, 494, 499. In 1974, the House Judiciary Committee seriously considered adding to the articles of impeachment against Nixon his bombing of Cambodia. *1974 CQ Almanac* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1975), 888–89, 896.

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Whether the War Powers Resolution exists or not, there are bound to arise situations in which a president may wish to use military force without obtaining prior authorization from Congress. He might commence war in violation of the supreme law of the land and then attempt to justify it on grounds of necessity. But he cannot be the judge of his own actions. He must seek immunity and exoneration from Congress in the way of retroactive authorization, a practice which is deeply embedded in American tradition.[59] The legal cloud over the president's action can be removed only by congressional approval. Our constitutional system is better protected by requiring presidents to act in the absence of law and later obtain legal sanction from Congress, rather than by having Congress authorize in advance, as with the War Powers Resolution, unilateral presidential action.

If Congress intends to recapture its dignity and control over warmaking on behalf of the American people, and if it intends to preserve the integrity of the Constitution, its prerogatives, and public control, it must learn to act with confidence and conviction in the exercise of its political and legal powers. On matters of war, the Constitution sides with Congress.*

Postscript: Clinton, the War Power, and Iraq

In February 1998, President Clinton was prepared to order heavy air strikes against Iraq to force Saddam Hussein to permit UN inspectors to search sites for weapons of mass destruction. The bombing was postponed when UN Secretary General Kofi Annan visited Baghdad and negotiated a settlement with Iraq. The Clinton administration accepted the settlement, with reservations, but made clear that military force remained an option if Iraq failed to comply with the new agreement.

Among the more remarkable features of the latest Gulf crisis was the fact that no one in the administration or in Congress ever mentioned the War Powers Resolution and how it might limit or empower the president. It was not a frame of reference. Surprisingly, the administration did not even advance a legal analysis to justify its use of force against Iraq.

The closest anyone ever came to a legal justification involved the vague intimation that Congress in passing the authorization bill in January 1991, somehow gave advance blessing to whatever the UN Security Council might do in the future in issuing resolutions on Iraq. On its face, such a claim—the delegation of the war power in perpetuity—would seem preposterous. Congress could no more surrender to an international body its prerogatives over foreign policy than it could its power of the purse. Let us consider this viewpoint.

[59] David Gray Adler, "The Constitution and Presidential Warmaking" in Adler and George, *The Constitution and the Conduct of American Foreign Policy*, 206–07, 215–16; Fisher, *Presidential War Power*, 38–39.

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On 14 January 1991, in Public Law 102-1, Congress authorized the use of U.S. armed force against Iraq. President Bush was authorized to use armed force pursuant to UN Security Council resolution 678 (1990) "in order to achieve implementation of Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677."

This statute is usually interpreted as congressional authority for Bush to drive Iraq out of Kuwait, which was the purpose of resolution 678, adopted on 29 November 1990. That resolution authorized member states to use "all necessary means" (that is, military force) unless Iraq withdrew from Kuwait on or before 15 January 1991. All the earlier resolutions set the stage for 678. Resolution 660, passed on 2 August 1990, condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and demanded immediate withdrawal. Resolution 661 imposed economic sanctions. Resolutions 662 to 677 reinforced resolutions 660 and 661 and added other restrictions.

How could it be argued that Congress on 14 January 1991, had transferred its constitutional power to the Security Council? Here is the reasoning. Resolution 678 authorized member states to use all necessary means "to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area." The phrase "all subsequent relevant resolutions" is taken to mean that whatever the Security Council promulgated after 14 January 1991 in the form of a resolution would be automatically sanctioned by Public Law 102-1.

First, the language in resolution 678 is ambiguous. What does "subsequent" refer to? Any resolution issued after 678? Or any resolution issued after 660 but before 678? It can be read either way. The natural reading in terms of the purpose of Public Law 102-1 is to refer to the resolutions from 660 to 678. After all, the objective was to oust Iraq from Kuwait. President Bush never had authority to send ground troops north to Baghdad in an effort to remove Saddam Hussein. He would have exceeded his statutory authority and violated the understanding of other nations that had joined the alliance.

The most unnatural reading would be to conclude that Congress, on 14 January 1991, had abdicated its constitutional powers to the Security Council, that henceforth the magnitude of the American military commitment would be decided by UN resolutions, not congressional statutes, and that whatever the Security Council decided would compel Congress to vote the necessary appropriations. This theory is too far-fetched to be taken seriously.

Grasping at these straws, shadowy as they are, underscores our central concern. We should not be trying to divine authority from various interpretations of the War Powers Resolution or Security Council resolutions. The touchstone for authority is the U.S. Constitution. There should be no doubt that whenever the president contemplates the use of offensive force he must go to Congress for authority.

That brings us to a final point. On 19 February 1998, during a visit to Tennessee State University, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was asked how Clinton could order military action against Iraq after opposing American policy

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in Vietnam. Her response: "We are talking about using military force, but we are not talking about a war. That is an important distinction."

As a matter of constitutional law, this is a distinction without a difference. The Constitution, as we have seen, vests in Congress the sole and exclusive authority to initiate military hostilities, regardless of their scope or magnitude. Efforts like Albright's would eviscerate the congressional war power.

For the past half century, presidents have resorted to the use of word games to justify their military adventures, but semantics are a poor substitute for legal analysis. On 29 June 1950, at a news conference, President Truman denied that the United States was "at war" in Korea. Rather, it was a "police action under the United Nations." In fact, it was an American war—measured by troops, money, casualties, and deaths—from start to finish. A federal district court noted in 1953: "We doubt very much if there is any question in the minds of the majority of the people of this country that the conflict now raging in Korea can be anything but war" (Weissman v. Metropolitan Life Ins., Co., 112 F.Supp. 420, 425 (S.D. Cal. 1953)).

When Bush invaded Panama in December 1989, the State Department called it a "humanitarian intervention." The Organization of American States, pointing to language in the OAS Charter that regards the territory of a nation as inviolable, condemned the invasion by a vote of 20 to 1.

A year later, the Justice Department argued in court that Bush could order offensive actions against Iraq without seeking advance authority from Congress. According to this theory, the use of 500,000 ground troops and air strikes fell short of war. As we noted, Judge Greene found no merit in this argument, dismissing it as a mere semantic ploy to avoid the plain language of the Constitution.

The Framers recognized that the president might have to respond promptly on his own initiative to "repel sudden attacks" against the United States. But the Framers reserved to Congress the authority and responsibility for taking offensive actions against other nations. The president could repel, but not commence war. As James Wilson explained at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, it "will not be in the power of a single man" to take us to war.

The Framers' fear that one man might—for reasons of political motive, imprudence, or recklessness—thrust the nation into war, drew from their knowledge that kings, tyrants, and despots had gone to war for less than meritorious reasons. Those policy concerns are as compelling today as they were two centuries ago. The intense political pressures, legal controversies, and personal travails that may surround and convulse this or any president may well cloud his personal judgment. Such concerns reaffirm the wisdom of the Framers' penchant for collective decision making in foreign affairs.

The Framers adopted a set of principles that are fundamental to self-government. The constitutional requirement of congressional authorization for offensive actions represented a radical break from monarchical rule in England, and it reflected the Framers' commitment to republican principles in the conduct of foreign policy. Word games by presidents to get around this requirement do much to harm and undermine the values of our constitutional democracy.

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Congressional Leadership of Public Opinion

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Research on Congress and public opinion poses a puzzle: public opinion appears to shape the collective behavior of Congress, while its influence on the substantive policy decisions of individual members is quite modest. We use the debate over health-care reform in 1993 and 1994 to suggest that the discrepancy can be explained in major part by the distinctive goals and strategies of congressional leaders. Responding to and shaping public opinion is more central to leaders' decision-making calculus than to rank-and-file members; the pursuit by leaders of collective goals—such as a strong party reputation and majority party status—requires attention to public opinion.

The failure to enact health-care reform offers a telling illustration of the disjuncture in collective responsiveness to public opinion and individual legislator responsiveness. The high salience of health-care reform and the widespread media discussion of public opinion created conditions seemingly conducive to responsiveness. Indeed, by the fall of 1994, the defeat of Bill Clinton's proposed reform corresponded with polling data that indicated a clear plurality of Americans opposed the president's proposal. Bob Dole greeted the collapse of health reform as evidence that Congress responded to the public and "that's how democracy works."[1] Yet, in interviews that we conducted with congressional participants in the 1993–1994 debate, we found very little evidence that public

[1] Haynes Johnson and David Broder, *The System: The American Way of Politics at the Breaking Point* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1996), 528.

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opinion exerted a direct influence on the positions taken by individual legislators. To the contrary, members were suspicious of opinion polls, and most claimed not to be greatly influenced by public opinion. Squaring these two patterns in the health reform debate generates insights into the disjuncture in current research between collective responsiveness and individual members' tendency to discount public opinion.

We begin by reviewing existing theories concerning public opinion and congressional policy making in order to account for this disjuncture. We then review the evidence regarding the two seemingly contradictory views of the role of public opinion in the battle over health-care reform during 1993 and 1994. We discuss our survey of congressional participants and track the behavior of congressional leaders. Finally, we use the case of health-care reform to develop a theoretical framework for incorporating leadership into the study of Congress's relationship with public opinion.

Public Opinion and Congressional Policy Making

There is a gap between theory and empirical findings about the influence of public opinion on Congress. The most viable theories of congressional decision making posit one of two goals—reelection or achieving policy objectives. When reelection is the dominant goal, then constituency opinion warrants explicit and substantial weight in explaining the voting decisions of individual members and the collective policy choices of Congress. When policy is posited as the proximate goal of congressional voting, policy preferences are usually said to be induced by a variety of factors, including legislators' personal views and public opinion.

Theories grounded in the electoral connection are of special interest because of their implications for the influence of public opinion on members' decisions and collective outcomes.[2] R. Douglas Arnold argues that "legislators choose among policy proposals by estimating the likelihood that citizens might incorporate these policy preferences into their choices among candidates in subsequent congressional elections."[3] In turn, congressional leaders seeking the votes of their colleagues "adopt strategies for enacting their policy proposals by anticipating legislators" electoral calculations, which requires that they estimate both citizens' potential policy preferences and the likelihood that citizens might incorporate these policy preferences into their choices among congressional candidates.[4] Thus, legislators and their leaders concern themselves with the substance of policy, because it may influence the public's evaluations at election time.

[2] David Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).

[3] R. Douglas Arnold, *The Logic of Congressional Action* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 14-5.

[4] Ibid., 15.

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Yet, at the level of individual members and their constituencies, empirical research supports the following propositions: first, constituency opinion about public policy has a measurable but small effect on congressional election outcomes; and second, constituency opinion about public policy is a highly conditioned influence on members' voting decisions.

The effect of constituency opinion on election outcomes is small, because voters give substantial weight to other considerations such as personal characteristics and party in their voting decisions and because voters know little about, and often do not act upon, members' policy positions or records.[5] Nevertheless, the effect is measurable and gives members reason to worry about constituency opinion especially under the following conditions: electoral marginality, high issue salience, clarity in the causal connection between policy choices and policy outcomes, large and immediate costs and benefits, and a traceable link between the member and the policy choice or outcome.[6]

Qualifying all empirical studies of the member-constituency connection is Richard Fenno's emphasis on the complexity and richness of the relationship between a member and his or her home constituents.[7] This relationship includes, but goes well beyond, the representative's explanatory style and established credibility and trust. The bottom line is that the policy-based connection between members and their constituents is likely to be quite loose.

By contrast, aggregate or macrolevel studies have found a strong relationship among public opinion, congressional elections, and congressional policy making. James Stimson et al. demonstrated that the public opinion, measured over many national polls on a liberal-conservative dimension, is strongly related to changes in congressional behavior, aggregated over a very large number of votes and issues.[8] David Mayhew found that Congress conducts major investigations and passes major legislation under both divided and united party

[5] Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina, *The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence* (Cambridge, MA: Havard University Press, 1987); Robert Bernstein, *Elections, Representation, and Congressional Voting Behavior* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1989).

[6] See Arnold, *Logic of Congressional Action*; William Bianco, *Trust: Representatives and Constituents* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); John Kingdon, *Congressmen's Voting Decisions* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973); Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," *American Political Science Review* 57 (March 1963): 45–56; Aage Clausen, *How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973); Robert S. Erikson, "Constituency Opinion and Congressional Behavior: A Reexamination of the Miller-Stokes Data," *American Journal of Political Science* 22 (August 1978): 511-35; Barbara Sinclair, *Congressional Realignment, 1925-1978* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982); Benjamin Page, Robert Shapiro, Paul W. Gronke, and Robert M. Rosenberg, "Constituency, Party, and Representation in Congress," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 48 (Winter 1984): 741-56.

[7] Richard Fenno, "U.S. House Members in Their Constituencies," *American Political Science Review* 71 (September 1977): 883–917; Richard Fenno, *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978).

[8] James Stimson, Michael MacKuen, and Robert Erikson, "Dynamic Representation," *American Political Science Review* 89 (September 1995): 543–65.

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control of Congress and the White House.[9] He explains this somewhat surprising pattern by, among other things, politicians' need to appeal to the public in their competition for electoral credit.[10] Both Stimson et al. and Mayhew attribute public opinion's influence to the efforts of individual politicians to maintain and enhance their electoral support.[11]

We are faced, then, with two competing accounts. The strong influence argument treats reelection as the dominant goal and posits a causal chain that is traced backward from collective congressional policy choices to coalition leaders down to individual members and their need to behave in a manner generally consistent with majority preferences of their home constituencies. Both the individual behavior of legislators and the collective policy choices of Congress are explained by this electoral-policy connection. On the other hand, the weak influence argument emphasizes the obstacles in establishing agreement between legislators and their constituencies on policy issues: alternative bases for evaluating incumbents and candidates for office; and multiple goals of legislators. Both accounts have reasonably strong theoretical and empirical underpinnings.

Reconciling these competing perspectives requires greater attention than has been devoted thus far to leadership of public opinion at both the micro and macrolevels in Congress. Mayhew[12] and Arnold[13] have not ignored altogether the role of leaders, but their accounts remain incomplete. Greater emphasis, we would argue, needs to be given to the distinctive collective goals of presidents and party leaders and the incentives of these special elites to respond to and direct public opinion. The health-care debates of 1993 and 1994 provide an opportunity to examine the way top leaders and public opinion interact to influence policy choices.

Individual Members and Public Opinion

We explored the role of public opinion in individual legislators' decision-making processes by focusing on the nature and use of legislators' information about public opinion in thirty-nine interviews with top staff from House and Senate offices during the summer of 1994.[14]

[9] David Mayhew, *Divided We Govern: Party Control, Law Making, and Investigations, 1946–1990* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991).

[10] Ibid., 100–35.

[11] Stimson et al., "Dynamic Representation"; Mayhew, *Divided We Govern*.

[12] Mayhew, *Divided We Govern*, 105–7.

[13] Arnold, *Logic of Congressional Action*, 88–118.

[14] The interviews were mostly conducted with administrative assistants or chiefs of staff; we also interviewed several legislative assistants, legislative directors, and committee staff members, depending upon who appeared to be best informed about a members' thoughts about health-care reform. Most of the interviews were conducted by telephone; a few were done in person. The interviews ranged from fifteen minutes to ninety minutes, depending on the time constraints of the respondent, and were based on a common set of structured questions. The number of interviews reported is at times less than thirty-nine, because time constraints prevented some staff from finishing the interview.

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The interviews focused on public opinion's general role in policy making, with special attention to its role in the health-care debate. We expected that health-care reform, more than most legislative issues in 1994, would stimulate legislators' attentiveness to public opinion. It was a highly salient issue—regularly ranked by the public as one of the country's three most important problems—and it had large and immediate costs and benefits.[15]

At first glance, the influence of public opinion on members' policy positions seemed unmistakable. Our congressional respondents fully expected the 1994 congressional elections to be influenced by voters' preferences toward health-care reform. In fact, 75 percent of the staffers with members running for reelection believed that health reform would be a central issue in the next campaign and agreed that a member's position would need to coincide with constituent opinion in order to gain reelection. And 88 percent believed that their bosses' positions on health-care reform would coincide with public opinion.

Our interviews also suggested, however, that it would be a serious mistake to assume that members' perceptions of constituent preferences significantly influenced their policy positions. Even though conditions were conducive to public opinion strongly affecting legislators, members actually resisted following polls and public opinion. The muted impact of public opinion on legislators appeared to be due to two factors: members' perception of public opinion surveys as unreliable, and their insistence on following their own convictions and values rather than public opinion. Both factors warrant further discussion.

For the most part, participants viewed the nearly endless stream of public opinion polls from the media, party organizations, and lobbyists as unreliable. They believed that polls are compromised by technical limitations. Changing question wordings and biasing sampling can, as one staff member put it, "move a survey from an 80-20 split to a 20-80 split." Moreover, they believed that polls are too crude to tap public sentiment about complex policy issues. For instance, several respondents complained that majority support for universal coverage was misleading because of the public's apprehension regarding the means for achieving universal coverage—through higher taxes, for example.

Members discounted the reliability of polls not only for technical reasons but also for political ones. Congressional staff believed that the supplier or source of the poll can dictate the results and that many polls are conducted by sources whose agendas differ from the legislator's. During the health-care debate, many respondents discounted or ignored polls from other congressional offices, party leaders, the White House, and other lobbyists because they did not share the source's ideology. For instance, several staffers observed that they did not trust the surveys conducted by Robert Blendon—a Harvard professor of Public Health and a commentator on public opinion toward health

[15] For an historical treatment, see Lawrence Jacobs, *The Health of Nations: Public Opinion and the Making of American and British Health Policy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Lawrence Jacobs, "Institutions and Culture: Health Policy and Public Opinion in the U.S. and Britain," *World Politics* 44 (January 1992): 179-209.

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care—because he worked with Ways and Means Health subcommittee members Pete Stark and Bill Thomas. (Stark and Thomas distributed Blendon's results through "Dear Member" letters.) When confronted with polls that conflict with their personal ideology or policy preferences, many legislators discard the polls rather than reconsider or modify their beliefs and preferences.

Instead of relying on polls, nearly three out of four staffers indicated that they used face-to-face meetings, letters, or phone calls to track constituents' opinions. Although they of course belittled "manufactured" or "artificial grass roots" campaigns run by interest groups, they valued a "heartfelt" or "thoughtful" letter, phone call, or personal contact, because it indicted strongly held and well thought out beliefs. Many respondents noted that their offices compiled daily or weekly reports on the number and subject of phone calls and letters. About one out of seven staffers said that "all sources are equally important," because it created a "total mosaic."

If legislators treated public opinion polls as objective, they might share a broad consensus regarding Americans' preferences. But our interviews suggest an opposite situation: members' skepticism regarding polls and their reliance on direct contacts with constituents encourage congressional offices to adopt divergent interpretations of public opinion. We asked staff members to characterize public opinion toward six aspects of the health reform debate — universalism, competition among health plans, cost control mechanisms, financing arrangements, desirable health care services, and the role of the states. Aside from universalism, which 86 percent of our respondents believed that their constituents' supported, there were large differences among congressional offices in their appraisal of their constituents' beliefs. The greatest divisions occurred on the issues of cost control and financing, with nearly equal groups expressing opposite estimates of their constituents. Staffers acknowledged genuine uncertainty about the public's preferences: many emphasized the complexity and fuzziness of public attitudes, and as many as a third of the respondents generally indicated that their constituents had no opinion on several of the policy issues. The subjective interpretation of the public's preferences invites confusion and conflict among individual congressional offices.

Legislative staff offered a second reason for refusing to "utilize polls as a finger in the wind": they questioned the wisdom and appropriateness of governing by polls. Table 1 indicates that only five of thirty-nine indicated that public opinion information should drive policy.[16] Letting polls drive decisions was considered "goofy," inappropriate, and dangerous because of the volatile nature of surveys. Indeed, a few argued that Clinton's excessive reliance on polls had produced politically damaging vacillation.

[16] The following question was asked: "Some people suggest that polls and other public opinion information are important for responding to public opinion; others suggest that this information is a tool to test and enhance the [MEMBER's] ability to lead or educate public opinion. What do you think is the primary purpose of gathering information on public opinion?"

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TABLE 1

Responses by Congressional Staff on Whether the Primary Purpose of Public Opinion Information Is to Respond or to Lead Citizens

	Answers By Congressional Staff	
	Frequency	*Percent*[1]
Responding to Americans is the primary purpose of public opinion information.	5	13
Leading Americans is the primary purpose of public opinion information.	14	36
Both responding and leading Americans is the primary purpose of public opinion information.	12	31
Other	5	13
Don't know/No answer	3	8
Total	39	

[1] Percentages do not add up to 100 percent due to rounding.

Instead of following public opinion, a plurality of respondents (36 percent) reported using public opinion information for the primary purpose of changing (and not responding to) public opinion. Staff members stoutly defended the use of public opinion information for leadership purposes. Some stressed pragmatism for opinion leadership; rallying public opinion was necessary today to "prove your own point" and win political support. Others argued that legislators had a responsibility or duty to "educate people regarding the negative unintended consequences" of policy choices.

Congressional leaders were singled out as especially effective in leading public opinion. About three of five staff looked to congressional leaders to direct public opinion. They expected party and committee leaders to take primary responsibility for influencing public opinion.

Legislative staff explained that polls provided strategically valuable information for three types of leadership activities. First, polls "enable members to find out what the public is thinking" in order to "build on areas of support" or challenge pockets of opposition. An aide to a legislator specializing in health care explained that polls showing a majority approved of the Clinton plan told his office that "we needed to educate the public regarding what we didn't like about the plan." Second, "polls help to focus and define messages." For instance, two-thirds of our respondents used polls to identify the most effective language or words for framing their policy decisions. Third, polls provided symbolic or rhetorical ammunition for bolstering the legislator's position. About two-thirds of the respondents indicated that polls were helpful in justifying a legislator's public position.

In short, legislative staff tended to minimize the impact of polls and other information about public opinion on their decisions; they primarily used public

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opinion information to craft their arguments, to justify their positions, and otherwise to shape public thinking. Public opinion on national health-care reform was not viewed by most staffers as an outside influence or an immutable constraint on their principals' behavior. Nevertheless, a third of the respondents reported that the purpose of polls varied according to the issue and the circumstances. For instance, an aide to a legislator specializing in health-care suggested, "If the issue is not in your committee and you don't know much about it, then respond. If you have a good grasp on the facts, you may try to educate." But on health-care reform in the 103rd Congress, such views represented a minority perspective.

To be sure, health-care reform was a complex issue; the public (as well as members of Congress) harbored multiple and competing considerations. Even with the issue's salience and high costs and benefits, members may have perceived substantial leeway to mold a position on the issue and craft an explanation that was acceptable to their constituents. It is possible, therefore, that our glimpse of members' reaction to information about public opinion is atypical of major issues. A major tax bill, for example, may generate closer adherence to perceived constituency views.

We do view health-care reform, however, to be reasonably typical of the class of major legislation that Mayhew identified.[17] The public may have had an identifiable preference in favor of new legislation, but because of the policy's salience, its large but debatable costs and benefits, and the complex characteristics of such legislation, public opinion remained uncrystallized or ambiguous with respect to important features of the legislation. Legislators responded to the general interest in reform by moving toward legislation, but they perceived plenty of room for following their ideological beliefs and personal policy preferences. Legislators used information about public opinion as a basis for adjusting their explanations and political tactics more than as a means for establishing a policy position over the range of choices they confronted in Congress.

Congressional Leaders and Public Opinion

Although individual members discounted the importance of responding to public opinion, congressional leaders were quite concerned about the public's views. For two reasons we focus here on the behavior of the minority leaders in the House and Senate—Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole (R-KS), House Minority Leader Robert Michel (R-IL), and Minority Whip Newt Gingrich (R-GA). First, the Republican minority won the legislative battle over health care. Successful efforts to respond or manipulate public opinion should be most obvious for the Republican leaders. Second, the position of the Democratic majority was—compared to the Republican position—constrained (though not firmly) by the president. In other words, it lacked variation and reflected Clin-

[17] Mayhew, *Divided We Govern*.

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FIGURE 1
*Public Support for Clinton Plan to Reform Health Care**



* The question wording is the following: "From everything you have heard or read about the plan so far, do you favor or oppose President Clinton's plan to reform health care?" (*Gallup Organization*)

ton's positioning as much as that of the majority leadership. Our primary sources of evidence on the behavior of Republican leaders during 1993 and 1994 were the *Washington Post, National Journal*, and *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*.[18]

Our working hypothesis was that the behavior of the Republican leaders during the health-care debate was motivated by their party's collective goals.[19] The collective policy objective appears to have been to allow no more than very modest health-care reform to be enacted. Further, the party sought to gain advantage over the Democrats in their national party reputation to win the White House in the 1996 presidential election and to gain enough Republican seats to control a majority in both the House and Senate. These policy and electoral goals motivated central party leaders to design strategies for shaping public opinion that anticipated both the Democratic party's strategy and both parties' joint impact on public opinion. The leaders' ultimate purpose of molding public opinion, we expected, was to be positioned to claim public support for policies that had always been favored.

The most decisive changes in the behavior of Republicans preceded the period of critical change in public support for Clinton's health reform plan, which is displayed in Figure 1. Republicans at first were publicly most receptive to

[18] We systematically searched these media sources for articles on the topic of health care that mentioned one or more of the minority leaders. Using the media to track Republican strategy runs the risk of some distortion; the stories may reflect not only the behavior of leaders but also journalistic norms and patterns of reporting.

[19] On the goals of party leaders, see Gary Cox and Matthew McCubbins, *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House of Representatives* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993);

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health reform at the height of public support in September 1993; as their public opposition became more direct and intense in the fall and winter, public support began to fall in January 1994.

The battle in the Senate over health-care reform was especially important. Some substantial reform could pass the House, it appeared, so the question was whether a majority, or a supramajority required to overcome a filibuster, could be mustered in the Senate. Consequently, Dole and Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell (D-ME) were the center of attention. The Democratic leadership in the House preferred that the Senate move first on health care in order to avoid the precarious position of unnecessarily voting for controversial legislation, though the House Republican leaders remained vocal in their opposition to the Clinton plan.

The public debate over health care began in earnest with President Clinton's speech to Congress on 22 September 1993 that outlined his health plan. Prior to Clinton's speech, Dole and his chief aide, Sheila Burke, spoke in general and optimistic terms: health reform enjoyed the support of a "solid core of Republicans" and would win passage by the spring of 1994.[20] While outwardly projecting a supportive message, Dole deferred the job of designing a Republican health plan to Senator John Chafee (R-RI), who proposed to achieve universal health insurance coverage by requiring individuals to pay for insurance—the so called individual mandate. By September 1993, more than half of the Senate's forty-four Republicans backed the so-called Chafee-Dole plan and signed a statement of principles that promised universal coverage. In this upbeat period before Clinton's speech, Dole supported Chaffee's negotiations with conservative House Democrats and signaled that he was ready to line up Republican support for key elements of the emerging Clinton proposal.[21]

Prior to Clinton's speech, the House Republicans also held out the possibility of incremental health-care reform. Newt Gingrich, who was the House minority whip, tried to avoid looking single-mindedly devoted to party politics by introducing an incremental bill in March of 1993, the "Action Now Health Care Reform Act."[22] By introducing alternatives to the Democratic plans, the Republicans could credibly claim to be for some form of health reform, not just negative naysayers. As the debate began, prominent *Washington Post* columnist David Broder warned that "[Republicans] have to be perceived as supporting dramatic change in today's health care system."[23]

Barbara Sinclair, *Legislators, Leaders, and Lawmaking: The U.S. House of Representatives in the Post-reform Era* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1995); Steven S. Smith, *Leading the Senate* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, forthcoming).

[20] "Dole Considering Run for Presidency," *Washingtion Post*, 23 August 1993; Dana Priest, "Health Care," *Washington Post*, 16 September 1993; Ruth Marcus, "Clinton Stamps 'Urgent Priority' on Health Plan," *Washington Post*, 23 September 1993.

[21] David Broder and Spencer Rich, "Route Through Congress Is Strewn with Hazards," *Washington Post*, 19 September 1993.

[22] Newt Gingrich, "Health Care: Time to Get Practical," *Washington Post*, 9 March 1993.

[23] David Broder, "GOP Health Care Strategy Emerging," *Washington Post*, 11 October 1993.

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While publicly holding out the possibility of passing a bipartisan health reform bill, the Republican leaders worked to undermine the Clinton plan. Several Washington pollsters advised the Republicans on the weak spots of the Democratic proposals and provided general tactical advice. One such Republican adviser, William McInturff, outlined both short- and long-run strategies, asserting in October that "as an interim tactic, it probably is enough for us to say that when you hear about something that is too good to be true, you better read the fine print." Frank Luntz also provided polls and advice to the House Republicans, but he recommended strong opposition by Republicans; "Bipartisanship allows the President and congressional Democrats to take sole credit for legislation WE support, leaving Republicans out in the cold."[24] In fact, Gingrich later told *Washington Post* reporters that he had decided soon after the Clinton speech that the Clinton plan could be killed and that he would seek to kill it rather than work for a compromise bill.[25]

Despite his ideological predisposition to oppose reform, Gingrich appreciated that public opinion could turn against the Republicans if they appeared too partisan or obstructionist. Gingrich and Michel bounced back and forth between issuing negative statements about the Clinton plan and pleading for bipartisanship. Gingrich's actions and statements seemed to indicate that he was opposed to anything but incremental reform, but when evidence of his obstructionism came to light, he gave lip service to bipartisanship and accused the Democrats of being excessively partisan. Gingrich was quite willing to be very partisan, but when his most partisan actions came to light, such as the assertion by Republican Fred Grandy that Gingrich gave "marching orders" to Ways and Means Republicans to oppose reform, Gingrich felt compelled to put a more positive political spin on the process.[26] For Gingrich, public opinion could be molded over the next year but had to be survived in the short run. Minority Leader Michel seemed to share Gingrich's perspective.[27]

Senate Minority Leader Dole initially pursued a somewhat different strategy. In the months leading up to Clinton's speech, he told Clinton that he expected that they would eventually be able to "work something out" and appeared to believe that a compromise plan would eventually be adopted.[28] Dole's initial approach seemed to reflect both his view that health-care reform was popular and his concern for protecting his party from Democratic attacks. For example, after initially supporting a Republican plan that would require individuals to pay for insurance, Dole backed away from this stance, asserting "I can already see the 30-second television spots" which would say, "Well, the

[24] Michael Weisskopf, "Turning Pique into Power, Consultant Molds Voter Anger to Help GOP," *Washington Post*, 27 October 1994.

[25] Johnson and Broder, *The System*, 187, 304.

[26] David Broder, "Democrats Close Ranks On Health: At Ways and Means, Party Unity Prevails," *Washington Post*, 17 June 1994.

[27] Johnson and Broder, *The System*, 191–2.

[28] Ibid., 35.

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Republicans didn't want your boss to pay for it, they want you to pay for it."[29] Dole's presidential aspirations no doubt heightened his sensitivity to public opinion. But, many of Dole's Senate Republican colleagues did not share his view about the prospects nor the need to compromise; instead, they sided with Gingrich's view that eventually Clinton could be defeated outright.[30] Dole too would eventually appreciate the political opportunity to sink health reform.

In general, Republicans pursued a strategy of anticipating public opinion by appearing responsive to it while simultaneously shaping opinion. The underlying motivation of both the Senate and House Republican leaders was to balance their electoral and policy goals. In order to avoid appearing too negative or partisan, the minority leaders started out by endorsing more incremental reforms than the Clinton plan. This strategy was aimed at bolstering their reputation among the public; it also gave them policy options they preferred to the Clinton plan, if not to the status quo. By taking this line of attack, the Republican leaders acknowledged that health-care reform was both a policy issue and an issue that would influence the public's assessment of the political parties.

Senator Dole's goals were reflected in his many self-conscious comments made over the course of the 1993-1994 health-care debate. He repeatedly reminded his colleagues that to be "part of the action . . . . we need somehow to bring 43 Republicans together and agree on a common plan."[31] Dole's fear was that the Democrats would capitalize on natural divergences within the GOP to "pick off enough Republicans to get the [Clinton] bill to pass."[32] Dole's efforts to reconcile the divergent pressures from conservative and moderate Senate Republicans produced a zigzagging quality in his behavior.

Dole and other Republicans appreciated the political dangers of outright opposition to health reform. As it was, polls regularly showed that Americans trusted the Democrats far more on this issue than Republicans. (By contrast, the public trusted the Republicans more than Democrats to cut taxes and fight crime.) Republican leaders agreed that explicitly setting out to "blow up the bridges and watch the trains wreck" would paint the party as obstructionist and cost it dearly in the 1994 and 1996 elections. "If you stand on the sideline and systemically shoot at everything that moves into your crosshairs," Representative Fred Grandy (R-IA) observed, "it's dangerous," because the party will become perceived as heartless and uncaring about an issue that touches voters very personally.[33] Dole concluded that the Republicans' public position must

[29] Dana Priest and Dan Balz, "Still Seeking an Alternative, GOP Launches Ads Against Clinton Health Plan," *Washington Post*, 21 May 1994.

[30] Johnson and Broder, *The System*, 304–5, 364–5.

[31] Dan Balz and David Broder, "Budget Rift Aside, Future Clinton Successes Will Demand Coalition," *Washington Post*, 8 August 1993; Dan Balz, "Dole Urges GOP Unity on Health Plan," *Washington Post*, 23 January 1994.

[32] Editorial, "A Risk for Republicans Too," *Washington Post*, 18 August 1993; Balz, "Dole Urges GOP Unity."

[33] Helen Dewar and Dana Priest, "Old Republican Fissures Feel Strain as Health Care Debate Grows," *Washington Post*, 20 February 1994.

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emphasize their commitment to "responsible" health reform and their willingness to work with Democrats to control costs and expand access.

In short, the goals of Republican leaders and especially Dole were interrelated: unifying Republicans within Congress would provide the basis for appealing to the public and thereby build the party's reputation and increase the likelihood of seizing majority status. But the two goals—the policy and political objectives—coexisted in an uneasy state of tension: projecting an appealing image of Dole's party as committed even to moderate reform conflicted with the preferences of conservative Republicans who objected to any expansion of the government's role in health care. But when Dole or other leaders played to the conservative wing of their party, they risked alienating moderate Republicans and appearing obstructionist to the public.

Dole and other Republican leaders relied on an arsenal of substantive strategies and tactical maneuvering to reconcile the twin goals of channeling Senate Republicans toward points of convergence and shaping the general public's preferences and evaluations of the Republican party. The purpose of the leaders' substantive strategies was to structure the choices over which both members and the general public formed opinions. Rather than simply taking members' preferences as exogenous and mechanically summing them up, they specified alternatives in order to construct or give shape to preferences. In particular, the Republican leaders pursued two substantive strategies: they formulated or endorsed policies to provide a focal point for Republican preferences; and they attacked unsatisfactory proposals in order to discourage Republican members from considering them as viable options.

In the five weeks between Clinton's speech and the first significant increase in public opposition, interest groups launched a well-funded public attack on the Clinton plan, epitomized by the infamous and mocking "Harry and Louise ad." The minority leaders also began to intersperse their supportive statements regarding health reform with criticism of the administration proposal and its procedures. Dole's soothing message for the public was that Republicans wanted to find "common ground" with Democrats in delivering universal coverage; he pressed his Senate colleagues that "we will have to come together on a plan or we won't be players."[34] By October, though, Dole criticized the Clinton plan as a sop to "big government, big business, and big labor," even as he qualified his remarks by asserting that he did not want to be "Dr. Gridlock" on health care reform. Much of his criticism of the Clinton plan was less direct and focused on the process for handling health reform; he persistently charged that congressional Democrats had taken the "unprecedented" step of rushing to begin hearings before the administration had prepared a bill for submission to Congress.[35] During this same period, Gingrich and Michel also gave harsh as-

[34] Editorial, "Questions about the Clinton Health Plan," *Washington Post*, 1 October 1993; David Broder, "On Divided Hill, Expectations of Action are High," *Washington Post*, 28 October 1993.

[35] Broder, "GOP Health Care Strategy."

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sessments of the Clinton bill. On *Meet the Press,* Gingrich called the Clinton plan a "monstrosity," a "disaster," and "the most destructively big government approach ever proposed." Michel offered equally apocalyptic forecasts, charging that the plan requires "upwards of 50,000 additional bureaucrats to meddle with our health care."[36]

After Clinton formally presented his plan to Congress in late October, the Republican criticism ran the gamut from mild to fierce. In responding to Clinton's plan, Dole and Michel emphasized the possibility of Republican health-reform plans, but stressed the policy differences between the two parties. Michel articulated this position concisely: "There are substantive and profound policy differences between those who support the concepts at the heart of your bill and those of us, like myself, who see another possibly different road to health care reform."[37] Gingrich was again more pessimistic, equating the Clinton bill to "socialism."[38] In late November, the *Wall Street Journal* published an editorial article by Dick Armey, which portrayed the Clinton bill as a complex maze.[39] Armey further worked to shape public opinion on health by creating a "rapid response" system for delivering or faxing Republican leaders' immediate responses to Democratic health-care announcements.[40] Armey's complex depiction of the Clinton health plan was so popular among the rank and file that the Republican leadership printed duplicates of the charts for rank-and-file members to take to their districts.

After his actions in October, Dole refrained in November from making major new statements on health reform. Only in December, after the president's and the public's attention shifted to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), events in Somalia, and public support for the Clinton plan began to slip, did Dole begin to stake out a "no health care crisis" stance advocated by former Minority Whip Richard Cheney and former Dan Quayle chief of staff, William Kristol.[41] Kristol had argued in a memo circulated to congressional Republicans that a Clinton victory on health-care reform would be disastrous for Republicans in the 1994 elections. On the other hand, a Clinton defeat would increase public frustration with the incumbent president and redound to the Republicans' favor at election time.

By early January, Whitewater stories came to dominate media coverage of the White House, distracted the public from the health care debate, and in-

[36] Ibid.

[37] "Clinton Delivers Health Bill, All 1,342 Pages of It," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report,* 30 October 1993.

[38] David Broder, "Gingrich Takes 'No-Compromise' Stand on Health Care Plan," *Washington Post,* 15 December 1993.

[39] Richard Cohen, "On the Edge," *National Journal,* 4 December 1993, 2888.

[40] Kevin Merida, "GOP's Fierce Armey Takes No Prisoners," *Washington Post,* 21 February 1994.

[41] Julie Kosterlitz, "Health Focus—No Room at the Inn for Reform?" *National Journal,* 15 January 1994, 144; James A. Barnes, "Selling Ideas," *National Journal,* 13 August 1994, 1944; James A. Barnes, "What Health Care Crisis?" *National Journal,* 29 January 1994, 265.

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creased public suspicion of the president and Hillary Rodham Clinton, who had led the reform effort. Gingrich and many other Republicans felt free to give up any pretense of willingness to compromise with the administration.[42] By the spring, Dole escalated his criticism of Clinton's plan and took charge from Chafee in designing a Republican alternative.

While he sought to design a Republican plan, Dole worked vigorously to signal his displeasure with the Democratic alternatives. During his response to Clinton's State of the Union address in late January, he graphically portrayed the president's proposal by using Armey's chart, a Rube Goldberg scheme of staggering complexity and suffocating bureaucracy. Reflecting (and encouraging) the growing public opposition to the Clinton plan, Dole acknowledged that "there are more things [about Clinton's plan] that bother us now than bothered us six or eight months ago."[43] Moreover, Dole reversed his earlier receptiveness to compromising with conservative Democrats and attacked Representative Jim Cooper's (D-TN) alternative, which had begun to attract support from major business groups and some Republicans.[44] Finally, Dole attempted to seize control over how health care was defined as a problem; he adopted Kristol's slogan, "There is no health care crisis," as his own.

While feeding public doubts about Clinton's proposal and marshaling Senate Republicans against Democratic entreaties, Dole shielded his party's reputation from charges of obstructionism. He acknowledged that Republicans "don't want the public to think all we're doing back here is playing politics."[45] To project an image of cooperativeness, he abandoned his "no crisis" comment, listed areas of agreement with Democrats, called for bipartisanship, and gingerly offered that compromising with Clinton was still "worth exploring."[46] Even in early March, Dole appeared to believe that public support for reform was sufficiently strong that Republican senators should find a plan they all could support.[47] He convened a retreat of mostly Senate Republicans to weave together competing GOP proposals into an incremental package—just the kind of legislation that Clinton was committed to vetoing. Similarly, Gingrich claimed—misleadingly, it appears—that "We think there is a real opportunity to write a bipartisan bill."[48] Dennis Hastert, the head of the GOP task force on

[42] Johnson and Broder, *The System*, 264–5, 275–6.

[43] Balz, "Dole Urges GOP Unity."

[44] Ann Devroy, "Clinton Asks Critics to Compare his Health Care Plan with Alternatives," *Washington Post*, 2 February 1994.

[45] Helen Dewar, "House Democrat Suggests Hearings to Clear Clintons," *Washington Post*, 16 March 1994.

[46] David Broder and William Claiborne, "Governors Call for Health Reform Bill," *Washington Post*, 1 February 1994; Ann Devroy, "Clinton Asks Critics to Compare his Health Care Plan with Alternatives," 2 February 1994; Dewar and Priest, "Old Republican Fissures"; Robert Novak, "GOP Losing the Health War," *Washington Post*, 24 March 1994.

[47] Johnson and Broder, *The System*, 363.

[48] Helen Dewar and Dana Priest, "GOP Leaders Remain at Odds Over Reform," *Washington Post*, 5 March 1994.

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health, summarized Republican concerns about shielding their party's reputation: although there were "some people on our side who want to kill health reform, that is not the image we want to portray."[49]

In the end game, reversing his earlier support for individual mandates and Chafee's moderate approach, Dole sharply criticized both a compromise plan being fashioned by a bipartisan group and the bill passed by the Senate Finance Committee in early July. He also explicitly raised the specter of a filibuster by threatening to block legislation that achieved universal coverage by using an employer mandate. Dole supplemented his substantive criticisms with attacks on the process: he charged that Democrats were "rushing" Congress into voting on legislation that "deserves a lot of deliberation." What was important, Dole asserted, was "getting it done right" instead of simply "getting it done fast."[50] In addition to fanning public doubts, Dole's insistence on "slowing down" as the session approached its adjournment served an important tactical function—it empowered the filibuster.

Dole formulated his own bare-bones package, which both crystallized the preferences of Senate Republicans and signaled the public that Republicans were not obstructing all reform. Dole's proposal, which won nearly united support from Senate Republicans, relied primarily on changes in insurance rules and rejected most of the key elements of the plans proposed by Clinton and Chaffee. (By early September, he backed away from even this conservative proposal.)

Dole continued to temper his strident criticism of Clinton and moderate alternatives by contending that he supported both universal coverage as a "goal" (rather than a principle to be enshrined in legislation) and bipartisan compromise, albeit in far more minimalist terms than he had originally endorsed. Dole's presidential aspirations motivated him to express interest in some kind of reform well after most Republicans had swung behind defeating all reform. Between mid-July, at the peak of public opposition to the Clinton plan, and Majority Leader Mitchell's abdication on health reform in late September, Dole continued his dual-track approach of criticizing nearly all proposals while insisting that he remained open to bipartisan compromise on a minimal package. Health reform was put to a final and quiet rest when Gingrich and Dole announced that Democratic insistence on a definitive vote on health care would ensure that the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) would be "killed." In the end, the Republicans had—according to Senator Bob Packwood—"killed health care reform. Now we've got to make sure our fingerprints are not on it."[51]

Having actively worked to influence public opinion, Republican leaders used the public opinion they helped to shape as a rationale for what they

[49] Spencer Rich, "Doctors Who Own Equipment Order More Tests, Study Finds," *Washington Post*, 15 April 1994.

[50] Ann Devroy, "President Signals Health Flexibility," *Washington Post*, 20 July 1994.

[51] Richard E. Cohen, "Now It's Time to Play the Blame Game," *National Journal*, 8 October 1994, 2357.

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wanted to do in the first place. In June 1994, Gingrich discussed public opinion as if it were an exogenous force, saying, "We should not get between the president and the voters when support for his health bill is collapsing."[52] Of course, the Republican leadership were not neutral bystanders during the "collapse" of support for the Clinton plan. Gingrich also argued that the unpopularity of the Clinton plan was attributable to the way in which the Democrats drafted their plan, claiming that the White House's "secret meetings" undermined confidence in the process.[53] Again, however, the Republicans did much to build the resentment against the process by speaking out often against the administration's task force led by Hillary Rodham Clinton and Ira Magaziner.

Integrating Leadership into a Theory of Public Opinion and Policy Making

As we've seen, congressional debate over health reform was characterized by two seemingly irreconcilable developments: individual rank-and-file legislators heavily discounted public opinion, and yet public attitudes closely corresponded with collective action by Congress. The discrepancy between the behavior of individual legislators and the collective action of Congress is explained by the strategic adjustments of congressional leaders. Republican leaders pursued a strategy of shaping future public opinion. In particular, Dole's efforts to provoke public opposition were carefully calibrated to coincide broadly with public preferences: he endorsed Chafee during the zenith of the Clinton plan's popularity and dropped both Chafee and his own bare-bones package during its nadir.

The commitment of congressional leaders to directing public opinion is consistent with research on both public opinion and Congress, which has clearly shown that public opinion is not an exogenous force in policy making but rather is a product of elite behavior, communicated through the media.[54] On most policy questions, individuals wrestle with multiple, competing considerations when they articulate preferences.[55] Political elites such as presidential candidates have strong incentives to alter the public's judgments and preferences by priming or highlighting the standards or considerations that individuals use in reach-

[52] Broder, "Democrats Close Ranks."

[53] Helen Dewar, "Tables Turning on Health Care as an Election Issue," *Washington Post*, 5 July 1994.

[54] Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, *The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); John Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro, "Studying Substantive Democracy." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 27 (March 1994): 9–17; James Kuklinski and Gary Segura, "Endogeneity, Exogeneity, Time, and Space in Political Representation," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 20 (February 1995): 3–21.

[55] John Zaller and Stanley Feldman, "A Simple Theory of the Survey Response: Answering Questions Versus Revealing Preferences," *American Journal of Political Science* 36 (August 1992): 579–616.

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ing their evaluations.[56] The implication is that congressional leaders can influence public sentiment by using information about public opinion to select popular policies and then to emphasize the public's deep-seated fears and ambivalence to affect its evaluations of proposed policies. As one congressional staffer put it, "[it is possible to] play one component of public opinion against another; for example, price controls versus dread of government."

While research indicates that public opinion can be influenced by elites, the behavior of key elites—congressional leaders, in this case — also needs to be explained. Barbara Sinclair[57] and Steven S. Smith[58] provide somewhat different lists of leaders' goals, but both lists include goals that constitute public goods or common-pool resources that require collective action to acquire and maintain. Collectivities, such as congressional parties, tend to face collective action problems because they underprovide public goods and common-pool resources. Collectivities employ a variety of strategies, including the creation of leadership and organization, to overcome collective action problems. If public opinion has a marked impact on the achievement of collective goals, even if it has only a marginal influence on most rank-and-file members, then leaders would be motivated to develop strategies to influence and account for it.

Smith argues that three collective goals capture the party responsibilities of congressional leaders: enhancing party reputation, gaining or maintaining majority party status, and passing or blocking legislation.[59] Because goals are interrelated, party leaders have an incentive to pursue them jointly. The party's national reputation affects the prospects of gaining or losing majority party status, majority party status affects the achievement of legislative goals, and action on legislative goals affects party reputation. A leader, then, who is expected to pursue any one of the goals would have cause to pursue them all.

The connection between public opinion and collective goals has been drawn by Gary Cox and Matthew McCubbins to establish the existence of a collective party interest in developing and preserving a favorable party record and, therefore, maintaining party control over committees whose jurisdiction was likely to influence the party record.[60] Like others who have found the influence of public opinion to be contingent on the nature of the issues, Cox and McCubbins argue that party leaders' interest in standing committees varies with the jurisdiction of the committees. For our purposes, the important point is that leaders have strong incentives to bolster the party record: party trends

[56] Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro, "Issues, Candidate Image, and Priming: The Use of Private Polls in Kennedy's 1960 Presidential Campaign," *American Political Science Review* 88 (September 1994): 527-40.

[57] Barbara Sinclair, *Majority Leadership in the U.S. House* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983); Sinclair, *Legislators, Leaders and Lawmaking.*

[58] Steven S. Smith, "Forces of Change in Senate Party Leadership and Organization" in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenhiemer, eds., *Congress Reconsidered*, 5th ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1993); Smith, *Leading the Senate.*

[59] Smith, *Leading the Senate.*

[60] Cox and McCubbins, *Legislative Leviathan.*

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clearly influence the outcomes in congressional elections and thereby the aggregate balance between the parties in Congress. While we do not accept the entirely electoral underpinning of the Cox-McCubbins argument, their empirical analysis provides a strong basis for expecting leaders to concern themselves with party reputation, majority party status, and legislative record.

Whether motivated by short-term legislative concerns or collective goals, leaders' efforts to influence public opinion is facilitated and encouraged by both the resources at their disposal and the expectations of their membership. Party leaders have accumulated, been granted, or simply benefit from resources that make it possible to influence public opinion.[61] Leaders have ready access to the leading pollsters associated with their party. Moreover, they use media specialists and party resources to dominate media coverage of Congress and thereby influence the public's perceptions of issues and politics.[62]

Leaders' use of these resources to manage public opinion is encouraged by the expectations of their congressional party membership: legislators expect their top officials to orchestrate media coverage, because it is the principal means by which the public receives political information. Previous research indicates that rank-and-file members consider the development of media strategies as a critical element in party leaders' job descriptions and have increasingly taken this into account in selecting leaders.[63] Indeed, in our survey, most congressional staff indicated that legislators looked to leaders to direct public opinion and considered the media's coverage of health reform as nearly determinative of public attitudes toward competing proposals.

Leaders' motivations and resources to influence public opinion have produced three sets of enduring activities. First, leaders interpret and evaluate public opinion polls. Like modern presidents,[64] congressional leaders have come to use information about public opinion as a tool to influence the policy choices of marginal legislators. Much like presidents, recent leaders now commission private polls and focus groups through their parties and use them to devise and defend strategies.

Second, leaders work to define the congressional agenda and structure the choices over which both legislators and the general public form opinions. Agenda setting goes beyond the careful referral of complex legislation to committees, shaping House special rules, and formulating Senate unanimous consent requests. It involves setting a pace for annual sessions, ordering the consid-

[61] Sinclair, *Legislators, Leaders, and Lawmaking*; Smith, "Forces of Change."

[62] Stephen Hess, *The Ultimate Insiders: U.S. Senators in the National Media* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1986).

[63] Sinclair, *Legislators, Leaders, and Lawmaking.*

[64] Lawrence Jacobs, "The Recoil Effect: Public Opinion and Policy Making in the United States and Britain, "*Comparative Politics* 24 (January 1992): 199–217; Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro, "The Public Presidency, Private Polls, and Policymaking: Lyndon Johnson" (paper presented at the 1993 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 2–5 September 1993).

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eration of major measures, and advising the president and others on legislative priorities. Such activities often involve leaders' judgments about public opinion and efforts to shape public opinion. During the health-reform debate, for instance, Dole and other congressional leaders simultaneously voiced support for the popular idea of reform and introduced complicating, crosscutting issues such as abortion and competing "causal chains" regarding the effects of comprehensive reform (for example, Clinton's plan would produce a Rube Goldberg scheme of lower quality and choice).

Third, leaders develop and articulate explanations of congressional politics that condition the ability of individual legislators to explain their positions at home. The public hears national leaders' explanations of developments in Washington sooner and more frequently in the national media than they hear the explanations offered by their own individual senators and representatives.[65] Explanations by leaders influence the public's evaluations of the two parties and their members, which in turn shape the context in which each rank-and-file member must explain his or her own positions and behavior. Leaders are expected to take into account this general explanatory context, which includes but clearly extends beyond individual issues.

Motivated by collective party goals and taking advantage of the resources associated with their positions, party leaders have become instrumental to the process by which Congress responds to and directs public opinion on major issues. Even when public opinion is but a marginal concern of most rank-and-file members, leaders' pursuit of party goals can under particular circumstances sway the public to adopt their preferred policies. Leaders' attention to shaping opinion may explain public opinion's correspondence with congressional decisions, even if its effect on most members is hardly detectable.

Conclusion

Congressional leaders' leadership of public opinion explains the apparent disjunction between Americans' marginal impact on individual members of Congress and their more significant effect on Congress as a whole. We believe that our argument has implications both for the role of leaders' goals in shaping the collective behavior of Congress and for reintegrating Washington politics into the study of congressional responsiveness to public opinion.

First, our argument that leaders' sensitivity to public opinion is driven by collective goals contributes in variety of ways to the study of Congress and public opinion. Party leaders' special responsibilities to overcome collective-action problems highlight the importance of making distinctive references to the needs and strategies of the Democrats versus the Republicans.

[65] On signaling by congressional leaders, see Edward Carmines and James Kuklinski, "Incentives, Opportunities, and the Logic of Public Opinion in American Political Representation" in John Ferejohn and James Kuklinski, eds., *Information and Democratic Processes* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990).

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Moreover, our study suggests that public opinion's impact on policy making is not limited to individual members' specific votes. Arnold's analysis of public opinion's impact is limited to single legislative battles: leaders design strategies for specific bills based on their estimates of the potential effects of public opinion on the electoral prospects of members.[66] Leaders' concerns with collective goals and strategies suggest, however, that public opinion has a pervasive and widespread impact on the congressional policy-making process—one that extends beyond its influence on rank-and-file members and fights over any single issue.

Finally, our approach avoids the false dichotomy of choosing between an explanation of policy decisions based on public opinion and an explanation of policies based on members' policy preferences. David Brady and Kara Buckley, for example, argue that members' basic policy preferences—rather than shifting public opinion, strategic errors by President Clinton, or other factors—doomed health care reform in the 103rd Congress.[67] The problem with this formulation, however, is that public opinion can have a more direct influence on the strategies of leaders than might be predicted on the basis of what we know about its influence on individual members. Leaders define the broad decision-making context by calibrating the timing of their actions and by specifying the alternatives over which both the public and rank-and-file members develop preferences.

The second broad implication of this article is that it reintegrates Washington leadership into the study of congressional responsiveness to public opinion. Stimson et al. found strong congressional responsiveness based on a significant study of highly aggregated patterns of public opinion and congressional behavior.[68] Neglected is the possibility that responsiveness at the aggregate level may be an artifact of leaders' success in influencing public opinion to adopt their desired policies: successive short-term leadership efforts may create the illusion of responsiveness at the aggregate level. In our study of the health-reform debate, leaders' public pronouncements, trial balloons, and other tactics were political strategies used to shape the debate, define the issues, alter the size and composition of the audience, and otherwise mold the preferences of the general public and rank-and-file legislators. The shaping of public opinion by leaders may offer the key to solving the puzzle of public opinion's muted impact on individual legislators, but its significant influence on the collective behavior of Congress is that leaders have the capacity under particular circumstances to bring the public around to adopting their preferred policies.*

[66] Arnold, *Logic of Congressional Action.*

[67] David Brady and Kara Buckley, "Health Care Reform in the 103rd Congress: A Predictable Failure," *Journal of Health Politics, Policy, and Law* 20 (Summer 1995): 447–445.

[68] Stimson et al., "Dynamic Representation."

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Is Anyone Listening? International Relations Theory and the Problem of Policy Relevance

JOSEPH LEPGOLD

On its face, intellectually powerful theory should be useful to policy makers. Indeed, it is more counterintuitive that better theory would *not* be useful to policy makers than the reverse. Reflecting this premise, many international relations (IR) theorists and at least some practitioners prefer a productive dialogue.[1] Far more, however, downplay the prospects for policy-relevant IR theory. This article explores how this debate might be reframed in ways that will generate more productive conversations on the problem of policy relevance. It concludes that while there are some obstacles, the theory-practice dialogue in IR can be improved in ways that advance the agendas of both theorists and policy makers.

I make four arguments that bear on these issues. First, while there is a communications gap between many IR theorists and practitioners, there is a far wider range of IR activities and groups than the simple theorist-practitioner dichotomy implies. Second, the institutions and professional networks that support the varied activities of these groups have already created the framework for a transmission belt that could be used to link theory to practice more easily and visibly. Third, these groups share a basic goal: to develop an ability to ana-

[1] See Alexander L. George, *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1993); Alexander L. George, "Bridging the Gap," General John C. Galvin (ret.), "Breaking Through and Being Heard," Edward Kolodziej, "What is the Challenge and Will We Accept It?," and Joseph Kruzel, "More a Chasm than a Gap, But Do Scholars Want to Bridge It," all found in *Mershon International Studies Review* 38 (April 1994); David D. Newsom, "Foreign Policy and Academia," *Foreign Policy* 101 (Winter 1995–96).

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lyze the strategic context facing political leaders precisely enough to evaluate competing causal claims. Fourth, theory can be useful to policy makers in various ways, and different theories will contribute more to some than others.

Of course, people who are profoundly skeptical of social-science theory are unlikely to be enthusiastic about efforts to make theory relevant to policy choices. But the issue for theorists who feel otherwise is what they can do to further this purpose. A generation ago, Abraham Kaplan suggested a solution:

> The criticism that a plan of action is "all right in theory but it won't work in practice" . . . must be properly understood. The theory may specify conditions which are not fulfilled in the particular case before us; the criticism then amounts to saying that the proposal is a good solution, but to another problem. A theory may even involve conditions which can never be fulfilled, because of the idealizations involved—perfect elasticity, frictionless motions, and the like. Then the criticism in question can only be to the effect that for the case at hand the assumed condition is an oversimplification, and that in this case the theory will not help to provide even an approximate solution. But unless in some cases the plan of action is of some use in solving our problem it is hard to know what is meant by the concession that it is "all right in theory." Theory is *of* practice, provided only that the mode and contexts of its application are suitably specified.[2]

The route to policy-relevant theory, then, is to specify more completely and precisely the defining characteristics of different theoretical arguments and the varied situations that confront policy makers.

This article explores how Kaplan's strategy might be pursued, given the contemporary organization of the IR field in the United States. The first section of this article reviews and reframes the notion of a theory-practice gap. The second section discusses different ways in which theory can be useful to policy makers and suggests how better specified theories could help fulfill these purposes. Examples from various IR literatures are used to illustrate the argument.

Rethinking the Theorist-Practitioner Gap

Many people believe that "much of today's [IR] scholarship is either irrelevant or inaccessible to policymakers," and that as a result one finds a "chasm" separating the "two cultures" of IR theorists and officials.[3] Four reasons have usually been adduced to account for this situation.

First, theorists and officials have different professional incentives. They often frame questions differently, face different kinds of deadlines, and usually seek different kinds of answers. Henry Kissinger put it this way: in public office, "it was no longer enough to be plausible in argument: one had to be convincing

[2] Abraham Kaplan, *The Conduct of Inquiry* (New York: Chandler, 1964), 295–296. (Emphasis in original.)

[3] The quoted phrase is found in Newsom, "Foreign Policy and Academia," 64. For the reference to a "chasm," see Kruzel, "More a Chasm than a Gap," 179; for the "two cultures" notion, see George, *Bridging the Gap*, chap. 1.

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in action. Problems were no longer theoretical; the interlocutors were not debaters but sovereign countries, some of which had the power to make their views prevail."[4]

The contemporary environment of both government and academia sharpens these distinctions. Officials feel pressured to make complex decisions ever more quickly, while academics are increasingly pushed to be on the leading edge of theoretical generalization. This was not always the case. Earlier in this century, much IR writing was done by practitioners for other practitioners. "In the Anglo-Saxon world of the 1920s and 1930s. . . . enlightened men, of learning and leisure, moved in and out of the worlds of academia, government and politics without observing too closely the boundaries between them."[5] Realism, for instance, was a set of maxims about statecraft before it became an academic theory of international politics. Most officials could articulate its principles even if they were unaware of its intellectual and historical roots.

Boundaries between IR theorists and officials appeared when academicians became more methodologically and espistemologically self-conscious.[6] More like natural scientists than engineers, "[these scholars'] product is published knowledge, and their audience and judges are their colleagues. They are not necessarily concerned with the application of their knowledge."[7] Officials, by contrast, typically want time-sensitive advice engineered for the problem at hand. Little in the modern elite academic incentive system rewards this; such work is unlikely to get scholars professional recognition and tenure.

This difference in incentives is accentuated by policy makers' desire for precise predictions about the results of possible policy choices.[8] They want to know that if condition Z exists or that if they do X, Y is likely. Few existing theories provide this kind of knowledge.[9] Without it, officials are often reluctant to make risky choices based on academic advice. Theorists, meanwhile, often worry that practitioners' preoccupation with predictability might lead them to conflate correlation with causation. For instance, U.S. officials find the argument that democracies do not fight among themselves appealing, because they think it helps them produce a result they like, even if neither they nor anyone else understands precisely why it works. Theorists, by contrast, have devoted much effort to analyzing whether or why this relationship holds.

[4] Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 54.

[5] William Wallace, "Between Two Worlds: Think Tanks and Foreign Policy" in Christopher Hill and Pamela Beshoff, eds., *Two Worlds of International Relations* (London: Routledge, 1994), 140.

[6] A. J. R. Groom, "Practitioners and Academics: Towards a Happier Relationship?" in Michael Banks, ed., *Conflict in World Society: A New Perspective on International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's, 1984), 193.

[7] James L. Adams, *Flying Buttresses, Entropy, and O-Rings: The World of an Engineer* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 40–41.

[8] Mark H. Moore, "Social Science and Policy Analysis" in Daniel Callahan and Bruce Jennings, eds., *Ethics, the Social Sciences, and Policy Analysis* (New York: Plenum Press, 1983), 274.

[9] Jon Elster, *Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 8–10; Kaplan, *The Conduct of Inquiry*, 347–351.

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The second reason is related to the first. Officials care about variables they can control or influence in the short to medium term.[10] Theorists, on the other hand, often have not framed their questions so as to focus on manipulable variables. Admittedly, this can be hard to do. Many scholars are interested in phenomena that are inherently abstract or otherwise not easily manipulable, and the explanatory variables they use may not provide the manipulable tools that policy makers want. For example, while theorists may identify competing ethnic identities as a key factor in the outbreak of communal violence, this variable provides officials little useful leverage. An answer that might satisfy a scholar may be of little use to officials seeking to forestall such violence.

A third problem is a perception that knowledge too often fails to accumulate, because academic debates rarely seem to get resolved. For instance, prior to the Gulf War and the U.S. intervention in Haiti there was much discussion as to whether economic sanctions can change behavior in target states. Despite a great deal of research and continuing practical interest in the issue, however, this debate remains unresolved.[11]

A fourth problem is that IR theory and research agendas often mirror contemporary events rather than reflect on them from a distance. For example, the Liberal reaction to Realism stemmed partly from the presumed decline of U.S. economic power and the oil crises of the 1970s, while the rise of Structural Realism in the 1980s reflected a renewed cold war.[12] IR study in the United States is especially prone to faddishness, because major foundations fund many key conferences and research projects, and in doing so often react to the latest major turn of world events.[13]

Theories that reflect events this closely carry two costs. One is that theorists lose their comparative advantage; they become little more than commentators on current events, but often without the detailed substantive expertise of journalists or historians.[14] A second is that they can help practitioners only when they have some distance from current developments. Much theoretical work in political science has been prompted by real-world issues that suggest intellectual puzzles. Especially in IR, one would expect a close comingling between discussions within a scholarly field (what Imre Lakatos calls a discipline's internal history) and discussions of substantive, nondisciplinary issues that affect

[10] Moore, "Social Science and Policy Analysis," 275–276.

[11] See, for example, the very different arguments in Klaus Knorr, *The Power of Nations* (New York: Basic Books, 1975); Lisa Martin, *Corecive Cooperation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, *Economic Sanctions in Support of Foreign Policy Goals* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, October 1993), 64–85; R. Harrison Wagner, "Economic Interdependence, Bargaining Power, and Political Influence," *International Organization* 42 (Summer 1988).

[12] Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Neorealism and Neoliberalism," *World Politics* 40 (January 1988): 235–237.

[13] Christopher Hill, "Academic International Relations: The Siren Song of Policy Relevance" in Hill and Beshoff, eds., *Two Worlds of International Relations* (London: Routledge, 1994), 7.

[14] Hill, "Academic International Relations," 10.

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scholars' interest in various theoretical problems (its external history).[15] A good IR theory, however, should identify and explain patterns that transcend particular issues, actors, and historical eras.[16] In doing so, it should explain and help anticipate major changes in world politics. Theory offers little explanatory power if it must be reinvented each time issues, actors, and eras change.

Each of these four problems is very real. But what needs to be done to make existing theory more visibly and easily useful to policy makers—identifying the defining conditions of different theoretical arguments more precisely and systematically—would accelerate rather than slow down theoretical growth. Moreover, a framework for connecting theories to specific policy problems already exists. There appear to be four major groups of literatures and professional activities in the field. These activities are supported by institutions and professional networks that create a potential transmission belt that runs from "pure" theory to "pure" policy making. The two intermediate types of activities involve people who have mixes of theoretical and applied interests. Since there is less professional distance between any two adjacent types of activities than across the whole spectrum, a series of bridges is already in place across much of it.

These IR activities can be arrayed as presented in Table 1.

TABLE 1

Professional IR Literatures and Activities

Theory-Building		Policy Applications	
Group I	Group II	Group III	Group IV
general theory	issue-oriented puzzles	case-oriented explanations	policy making
low			high
Proximity to Specific Policy Problems			

Group I: general theory. General theory aims to subsume under a coherent explanation a broad array of empirical phenomena; it is typically not attached to specific categories of issues, time periods, or geographic regions. Because these theories seek to transcend substantive contexts, they often take a deductive form. Rational choice approaches exemplify a Group I theory that focuses on the processes and outcomes of strategic interaction. Group I work asks such

[15] Imre Lakatos, "The Problem of Appraising Scientific Theories: Three Approaches" in Lakatos, *Mathematics, Science, and Epistemology*, Philosophical Papers, vol. 2, John Worrall and Gregory Currie, eds. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 115–116.

[16] Alan C. Lamborn, "Theory and the Politics in World Politics," *International Studies Quarterly* 41 (June 1997): 187–214.

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questions as: When do actors cooperate?[17] To what extent are actors' preferences endogenous to strategic interactions, and to what extent are they exogenous?[18] In the United States, such work is typically published in such IR journals as *International Organization*, *International Studies Quarterly*, *World Politics*, and in such general political science journals as *The American Political Science Review*.

Group II: issue-oriented puzzles. This type of literature analyzes particular classes of puzzles that are tied to specific categories of issues, temporal domains, and spatial domains. Puzzles are phenomena for which there is no adequate (or at least widely accepted) explanation.[19] In Group II work, unlike Group I theories, the range within which explanatory variables vary is typically restricted (though this is often implicit rather than explicit), and research questions are generally tied to specific empirical referents. Group II literature is designed to account for a pattern evident in a specific set of cases rather than to account for a wide variety of outcomes with a single explanation.

Group II comprises two kinds of IR literatures. One consists of area studies. Intellectually, this work is based on the assumption that certain mixes or ranges of variables distinguish regions from one another. This work sometimes borrows from that in Group I. One scholar, for instance, has explored why Arabic leaders who value their sovereign autonomy have also at times identified with a wider, pan-Arabic referent group that had incompatible preferences. He explained the puzzle by emphasizing politically powerful socialization processes within this wider group.[20] Some area specialists in the United States move in and out of government positions over the course of their careers and share ideas in various ways through professional networks.

A second kind of Group II literature explores what we might call theory-driven puzzles. While this work implicitly shares the area-specialists' assumption that certain mixes or ranges of variables distinguish one set of problems from others, the models in this type of literature tend to be grounded more explicitly in theories that apply across actors and regions. Alliance behavior, for example, has been explained by Group II models that claim leaders generically balance against external threats, that they align generically against internal as

[17] See, for example, Kenneth A. Oye, ed., *Cooperation Under Anarchy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Arthur A. Stein, *Why Nations Cooperate* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation," *World Politics* 40 (April 1988).

[18] For examples of the Constructivist position, see Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," *International Organization* 46 (Spring 1992); and Michael Barnett, "Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System," *International Studies Quarterly* 37 (September 1993). For a recent statement of the choice-theoretic position, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, *War and Reason* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).

[19] James N. Rosenau, "Before Cooperation: Hegemons, Regimes, and Habit-Driven Actors in World Politics," *International Organization* 40 (Autumn 1986): 852, 871.

[20] Barnett, "Institutions, Roles, and Disorder."

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well as external threats, and by broad models that see actors' learning rather than extant material conditions as the source of policy choices.[21]

Journals specializing in Group II work include *Latin American Research Review*, *International Security*, *Security Studies*, *Global Governance*, and *Political Science Quarterly*. Group II and I publication outlets overlap: *World Politics* and *International Organization* examine some region or issue-specific puzzles, while *International Security* at times focuses on issues of wider scope. But what distinguishes Group II work is a focus on puzzles that originate in and apply to substantive referents, rather than arguments that seek to transcend such referents.

Group III: case-oriented scholarship. The work in this group seeks to explain certain types of policy-relevant events or situations. Specialists in this role recognize that the logic underlying policy may need to be fleshed out in a generalizable way, so that lessons can be learned that apply beyond specific cases, thus obviating needless trial and error.[22] Yet their interest in generic knowledge is largely instrumental rather than purely intellectual. For instance, a former U.S. official wrote a book on how military power can be effectively used in the post-cold war world. He borrowed some classic work on force and diplomacy from Group I and II scholars, such as Thomas Schelling and Alexander George,[23] but focused on issues interesting to a policy audience. Group III publication outlets include journals such as *Survival* and *Orbis*, as well as many products of think tanks.

Group III work is produced largely in think tanks, at least in the United States, where Group I and II work dominates within most university faculties. It is also produced in universities with public-policy or international-affairs programs, which focus on professioinal training rather than generic knowledge for its own sake. Think tanks operate at the boundary between government and the part of the academic community with a sustained interest in policy.[24] They draw into dialogue people that "... cross the conventional boundaries between types of expertise and experiences. University professors sit [a]round the table with military officers and diplomats, with journalists from the quality press, businessmen and bankers, politicians and their research assistants. . . ."[25] As a result, think tanks and policy programs are the major places where people move back and forth from more theoretical to more applied activities and roles.

[21] Stephen Walt, *The Origin of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); Stephen R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," *World Politics* 43 (January 1991); Dan Reiter, "Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past," *World Politics* 46 (July 1994).

[22] Davis Bobrow, "The Relevance Potential of Different Products," *World Politics* 24 (Supplement, Spring 1972), 223.

[23] Richard N. Haass, *Intervention* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment).

[24] Donald M. Snow and Eugene Brown, *Beyond the Water's Edge: An Introduction to U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 239.

[25] William Wallace, "Between Two Worlds: Think Tanks and Foreign Policy" in Hill and Beshoff, *Two Worlds of International Relations*, 146.

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Think tanks come in many varieties. Some cover much of domestic and foreign policy, while others specialize in military strategy, international trade policy, or region-specific issues. Research associates at think tanks typically examine the concepts that underlie policy, using approaches drawn from such fields as law, economics, political science, and organization theory. They remain involved with policy makers through seminars or through publications that officials (or more often their staffs) read, yet try to remain detached from day-to-day concerns. Their distinctive product is a longer-term perspective on events and their implications than most day-to-day policy literature can afford.

Group IV: policy making. The IR literature in this group, found in such places as *Foreign Affairs*, *Foreign Policy*, and op-ed pieces in major newspapers, tends to focus directly on specific policy problems. It is designed for an audience that sees practical experience and the specific context in which a policy problem arises as the key factors that must be brought to bear in analyzing it.[26] Nevertheless, career policy professionals, while interested mainly in work that deals directly with issues on their desks, are more likely to use ideas from Group II and III work than are political-level officials. This reflects severe limits on top officials' time, but also different training and intellectual habits, with career officials likelier to be exposed to theoretical work.[27]

These four activities can be linked productively in several ways. Group I theories, for instance, can either be used to speak directly to policy issues, or they can be used to reframe Group II puzzles in ways that reflect connections among various IR puzzles. The Group II puzzles, in turn, might allow those in Group III to see more easily which Group II research questions and bodies of work apply to specific sets of policy problems. Group II puzzles can similarly speak directly to policy makers; or to make them more accessible to officials, they can be interpreted through those in Group III.

Consider, for example, how one particular Group I theory, rational choice, has addressed the problem of policy relevance. Rational choice has had a major impact in political science and economics. It is designed to explain value-maximizing choice (that is, preferences over policies), given actors' preferences over outcomes, and their perception of the strategic situation they face. It does not constitute a general theory of politics, since it does not explain why people value particular outcomes, norms, or other objectives as ends in themselves. For these reasons and others, it is highly controversial within parts of political sicence.[28] But it does account for policy choice and the outcomes that stem from strategic interaction in a theoretically powerful way.

Rational choice work can give policy makers two kinds of useful knowledge. First, it can tell them how best to achieve their objectives, if they know

[26] Bobrow, "The Relevance Potential of Different Products," 223.

[27] George, *Bridging the Gap*, 4 and chap. 1, fn. 2, 147–148.

[28] See, for example, Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).

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the preferences and power positions of the relevant actors on some issue. In game-theoretic terms, this amounts to specifying any equilibria that exist in a strategic situation.[29] By this criterion, the approach has successfully bridged part of the gap between theorists and practitioners, at least in the United States. In 1989, a CIA official said that spatial models, a type of rational-choice work, had generated correct predictions in 90 percent of the instances with which he was familiar.[30] Rational choice has been applied to issues as diverse as the future of Hong Kong, the prospects for stability in Northeast Asia, and the likelihood of peace in Northern Ireland.[31] Successful prediction of this kind amounts to a direct connection between Groups I and IV. Second, by providing a general theory of strategic interaction, rational choice can situate within a common, intuitively plausible intellectual framework the Group II debates that deal with particular types or conditions of strategic interaction. In this role, theory serves to organize existing knowledge of a particular type.[32]

It is one thing to give busy officials a deductively plausible set of policy recommendations. But why would they care about the organization of scholarly knowledge, given the communication problems discussed above? One reason is that by understanding key commonalities in strategic interaction across issues, actors, and times periods, those in Group III might better be able to locate and frame for policy makers the puzzle-oriented research they need. If, for instance, international regimes tend to be built in response to certain highly generic types of problems, as rational-choice work on institutions contends, it is useful to be able to apply that logic across the many issues on which governments interact. Formal analysis offers an intellectually consistent and replicable way to make these connections—and one that can be communicated credibly among officials who, after all, are themselves presumably utility-maximizing actors.

Of course, none of this implies that the only way to communicate IR theory to officials more productively is to focus on building highly general theories first. To the contrary, the process of more precisely specifying the empirical and theoretical assumptions that define Group II puzzles should proceed in any case. I take this issue up in the next section, where I argue that it has been common in IR to confuse distinctive prevailing conditions with different causal mechanisms. The two are quite different. As a result of this confusion, many

[29] Michael Nicholson, *Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 192), 60–61.

[30] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "The Benefits of a Social-Science Approach to Studying International Affairs" in Ngaire Woods, ed., *Explaining International Relations Since 1945* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1996), 67.

[31] See, among many other examples, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, David Newman, and Alvin Rabushka, *Forecasting Political Events: The Future of Hong Kong* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and C. H. Kim, "Prospects for a New Regional Order in Northeast Asia," *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 3 (1991); 65–82; Steven J. Brams and Jeffrey M. Togman, "The Dynamics of the Northern Ireland Conflict" in Miroslav Nincic and Joseph Lepgold, eds., *Being Useful: Policy Relevance and International Relations Theory* (manuscript, 1997).

[32] Bueno de Mesquita, Newman, and Rabushka, *Forecasting Political Events*, 7.

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IR debates have been intellectually unproductive. More precise specification of the assumptions underlying Group II puzzles may thus be necessary even in the absence of a widely accepted Group I theory, both to improve the connection to policy makers and as a step toward energizing conversations about what a general theory relevant to the kinds of puzzles at hand would look like.

With this in mind, it seems clear that IR policy practitioners who read or produce work in Groups III and IV can use insights or empirical findings from Group I or II work in five ways. First, officials may want to identify how different actors—themselves included—are framing questions, since foreign-policy controversies often turn on the analytical assumptions that define different intellectual traditions and world views.[33] People should expect to bargain quite differently with an actor who views utility in competitive terms than with one who sees large possiblities for win-win solutions. Clearer insight into one's own views and those of others could help many officials to identify not only which perspectives they find most persuasive in general, but also which sets of assumptions appear to fit best the specific policy issue at hand.

Second, some theory-driven puzzle work will help officials identify the strategic situations they confront, giving them a sense of the possibilities and constraints in that context. A theory of deterrence failure, for instance, might provide insight as to how the behavior of a greedy as opposed to a frightened adversary might differ.

Third, still other theories are designed in ways that can help officials assess the possible utility of different long-term policy goals. To take an example that is quite topical today, of what long-term use are international regimes? What kinds of problems can they help policy makers solve, and for which issues are they less useful or even dangerous?

Fourth, there are groups of theories that can help people identify and select strategies for achieving preferred outcomes, including the variables that are manipulable in certain situations and the risks of alternative strategies.[34] When it comes to questions of choosing a bargaining strategy, given some contextual knowledge about manipulable variables and the risks of various policies, expected utility theory, a variant of rational choice approaches, provides many examples of the direct Group I-IV connection.[35]

Fifth, there is a wide range of theories that speak to very focused questions about how one conceptualizes and measures different key variables. The litera-

[33] Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 143–165; Hill, "Academic International Relations," 21; George, *Bridging the Gap*, xviii.

[34] On the usefulness of identifying manipulable variables, see Stephen Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," *International Studies Quarterly* 35 (June 1991): 212; on policy risk, see Alan Lamborn, *The Price of Power* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1991), chap. 3.

[35] For example, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Fran Stokman, eds., *European Community Decision Making* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Multilateral Negotiations: A Spatial Analysis of the Arab-Israeli Dispute," *International Organization* 44 (Summer 1990): 317–340.

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ture on power falls in this category. Such theories can help officials and analysts interpret facts and decide which data are important to track.

Different theoretical literatures will thus be useful in distinct ways. Officials concerned about their short-term bargaining options, for instance, may not find much that is directly useful in work on the democratic peace or structural arguments at the level of the international system. But policy makers also can at times use analyses that help them plan for the future, diagnose strategic situations, and understand how other actors view the world. Depending on the specific question, different theories can be helpful in each of these ways.

This array of activities and uses of theory indicates that specialists in case-oriented scholarship (Group III work) can play a key role in helping to link insights from Group I work, area studies, or theory-driven puzzles to policy makers' concerns. Group III work can benefit from Group II's efforts to provide empirical referents and findings for larger theoretical questions, and from Group I's interest in processes common to various substantive problems. Correspondingly, Group II work may benefit from studies that are knowledgeably grounded in specific and practically-relevant referents. Yet the Group I and II literature can focus on explaining causation without necessarily exploring directly its policy implications. A distinct role for Group III specialists is to help transmit ideas from the left side of the continuum in Table 1 to the right side, and vice-versa. While many in Group III have social-science training, they use that knowledge primarily to structure and inform policy choices, not to extend disciplinary knowledge.[36]

The link between theory-building and policy applications, however, functions differently depending on whether the ideas come from area studies or more abstract work. This is not problematic where a direct Group I-IV link has succeeded, as it has among consumers of expected-utility work in the policy community. But the issue of abstraction does affect the Group II–IV link. Specialists in area studies often exchange views in various governmental, nongovernmental, and policy venues. By contrast, the communication problem between officials and scholars who focus on theory-driven puzzles is deeper. Theoretical work is based on an epistemology in which policy problems have no intrinsic interest unless their implications are generalizable.[37] Many officials find such an approach too abstract. Area studies, by contrast, emphasize how many causes combine in complex ways to shape actors' behavior. This is how many officials think; they want to understand cases in contextual detail.[38]

While little can be done directly to narrow this gap in professional cultures, the way theory-driven puzzle work is packaged can change. Many such arguments that are in fact highly conditional are presented as if they are generic;

[36] Moore, "Social Science and Policy Analysis," 290.

[37] Robert L. Rothstein, *Planning, Prediction, and Policymaking in Foreign Affairs* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), 134.

[38] Jack Snyder, "Science and Sovietology," *World Politics* 40 (January 1988): 170; Philip Zelikow, "Foreign Policy Engineering," *International Security* 18 (Summer 1994): 145.

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the defining empirical conditions that affect relationships among the variables are left unidentified. If these arguments were better specified, it would be easier to fit puzzle-specific research to real-world cases and therefore to use theory in a number of distinct ways. More precisely, specified arguments would also help policy makers better use area-studies work. Much like officials, area specialists have a causal perspective that drives the interpretation of context. But it often remains implicit.[39] Laying it out explicitly would help those interested in policy applications to approach area-studies work with a more critical eye. Finally, more explicitly specified arguments would help attenuate some unproductive debates within Group II, by getting people to see that the distinctive patterns reflected in various academic puzzles often reflect distinctive mixes of initial conditions, not different kinds of causes. I turn next to how these goals can be achieved.

Making Puzzle-Driven Theories More Policy-Relevant

I have argued that Group I IR theories can be used in two ways: to speak directly to policy issues, depending on the type of knowledge officials need; or to reframe Group II debates by highlighting generic patterns of choice and outcomes. But I have also contended that in the absence of a widely accepted Group I theory, more precise specification of the empirical and theoretical assumptions that define Group II puzzles should proceed. How can this be done?

By their very nature, Group II theories are built to examine distinctive theoretical and empirical puzzles. Not surprisingly, scholars disagree about the defining features of these puzzles—specifically, about the nature, frequency, and importance of different sets of issues; the salience of certain kinds of actors; the political arenas that matter in policy making; the compatibility of actors' preferences, and so on. The core intellectual debates in the field revolve around these controversies. While such disagreements are natural, they need to be discussed explicitly and precisely.

Two kinds of underspecification need to be avoided. First, empirical assumptions about the operative ranges of explanatory variables often remain implicit in scholarly work. As a result, scholars do not recognize that apparent disagreements about causation often reflect different empirical assumptions. For instance, Realists and Liberals implicitly agree that the compatibility of actors' preferences drives the strategic importance of power and whether people care more about relative or absolute payoffs; yet they tend to disagree about how compatible preferences typically tend to be. Implicit empirical assumptions may also obscure the effects of threshold changes in the values of the variables. To take one example, within a certain range of preference orderings, one may need threats to deal with another actor, but within other ranges one may need to reassure him instead. Clarity about the location and effects of thresh-

[39] Snyder, "Science and Sovietology," 175–176.

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olds between these ranges has theoretical and practical importance. When Soviet leaders in the mid-1980s came to have new expectations about the effects of continuing to operate under the existing system, for instance, international alignments were thrown into flux.[40]

A second problem arises when theorists do not specify the presumed effects of restrictive theoretical assumptions on outcomes. Of course, restrictive assumptions are necessary. The purpose of theory is to make the plethora of data in real-world situations interpretable. Moreover, as a practical matter, only a limited number of variables and relationships can be examined in any one argument. Such restrictions are based on *ceteris paribus* assumptions that the excluded factors remain constant during the period of observation or do not affect outcomes. Theory-driven puzzles would be clarified if they discussed more systematically the nature of the contingent generalizations that rely on such assumptions. In particular, cases where excluded variables can be assumed to interact with those in a model must be distinguished from those where there are no presumed interaction effects.[41]

These kinds of issues affect not just the internal validity of the resulting models (the degree to which relationships hold as stipulated within a sample of cases), but also their external validity (the degree to which they can be generalized beyond these cases).[42] Group III analysts use context-specific expertise to help them extrapolate Group II inferences to what officials want to know. Since no two cases are identical, a question arises: to what extent are the cases used to support a particular Group II model similar to those on officials' desks? To answer the question, those who specialize in Group III applications must assess the degree to which the model can be generalized beyond the cases that give it internal validity. To do this, they must be able to decide which excluded factors in fact interact with those in the model—and thus need to be included—and which can be ignored.[43] Their work becomes easier if the assumptions on which theory-driven puzzles are based are made explicit.

Unfortunately, this too seldom occurs. Many Group II models reflect puzzles that have emerged from prominent historical cases, without the contingent statements that would distinguish what is unique about the case from what is generic to the model. Arbitrarily restrictive assumptions about the values of the variables are thus often implicitly embedded in theoretical concepts. For instance, a spiral model (one reflecting the lessons of the 1914 crisis) claims that threats reinforce security dilemmas and are thus self-defeating. A Munich-syndrome model claims that threats establish credibility and induce adversaries

[40] See Joseph Lepgold, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, and James Morrow, "The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1985–1993," *International Interactions* 22 (1996): 41–66.

[41] Lamborn, "Theory and the Politics in World Politics," 16.

[42] See Donald T. Campbell and Julian C. Stanley, *Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1963), 5–22, for a discussion of the internal and external validity of various kinds of research designs.

[43] Campbell and Stanley, *Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs*, 17.

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to retreat. But neither indicates when and why other cases fit these patterns.[44] If the issue of which argument is correct is truly an empirical one,[45] underspecification creates a false theoretical problem. Similarly, underspecified arguments make the context-dependent nature of power unintelligible. Much work has shown that the relevant sources of power depend on the issues and actors involved.[46] Obscuring these distinctions yields a misleading view of the conditions under which power affects behavior.

One way to incorporate scope conditions explicitly into the contingent generalizations that dominate Group II theories is by analyzing typologies. A "type" is a group of cases in which the values of the variables are strongly associated. A typology asserts that the relevant variables occur together in fairly few combinations.[47] For example, it is often claimed that war stems from misjudgments about capability or resolve. Yet we may be able to match more precisely certain kinds of perceptual errors and causal effects. Misperception of another's resolve may be common in authoritarian systems, where the analysis or flow of information is politically hampered. Errors about capabilities may be common when actors' relative power positions are shifting rapidly. As these examples suggest, typologies present a systematic way to be precise about mixes of variables.

Too heavy a reliance on typologies could, however, impede the development of more powerful Group II theories. As Christopher Achen and Duncan Snidal note, "if generalizations are not required to apply to all cases, we can specify contingent conditions to protect any favored generalization, so long as it can be plausibly supported in some cases."[48] Theory-driven puzzle work must therefore ultimately move beyond unconnected typologies and seek to explain how different mixes of variables and the distinctive outcomes they produce are related to major underlying dimensions of variation in world politics. If IR research programs were to make this kind of connection in a systematic, explicit way, we would begin to see how patterns that are truly generic across cases get manifested under specific sets of policy-relevant conditions. Formal theory is one way to approach this intellectual task, since it examines the implications

[44] Robert Jervis, "Models and Cases in the Study of International Conflict" in Robert L. Rothstein, ed., *The Evolution of Theory in International Relations* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), 64, 67.

[45] Dean G. Pruitt, "Stability and Sudden Change in Interpersonal and International Affairs," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 13 (March 1969): 35.

[46] Lamborn, "Theory and the Politics in World Politics"; Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," *Behavioral Science* 2 (July 1957); David Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends Versus Old Tendencies," *World Politics* 31 (January 1979). For an expected-utility formulation, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Risk, Power Distribution, and the Likelihood of War," *International Studies Quarterly* 25 (December 1981).

[47] Arthur Stinchcombe, *Constructing Social Theories* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 44, 47.

[48] Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, "Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies," *World Politics* 16 (January 1989): 157, (Emphasis in original.)

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of different combinations of preference orderings, power positions, and time horizons, using a consistent set of analytic assumptions.

Nevertheless, as previously argued, the process of more precisely specifying the empirical and theoretical assumptions that define Group II puzzles should proceed apart from any particular consensus among theorists as to the merits of rational-choice approaches. Typological analysis is one way to do this. It can help clarify the defining features of theory-driven puzzles, both for those who focus on policy applications and for those mainly concerned with intellectual puzzles. Making these distinctions explicit would not only help policy makers identify the Group II work they can use; it might also stimulate conversations about the dimensions and causal processes of world politics that transcend particular puzzles.

One objection to this line of argument may come from scholars who deny that their understanding of specific puzzles—whether based on particular regions, periods, or types of issues—could be enhanced by looking for theoretical dimensions that reflect larger patterns. They seem to believe that efforts to explain these more general patterns deny the importance of their expertise.[49] This is not so. Debates between proponents of general social-science theories and regionally or substantively focused work often portray them as competitors, when they in fact are highly complementary. Without area-studies work, we could not understand what actions and decisions mean to the actors that take them, and thus could not know or explain their preferences. On the other hand, without a more generic understanding of strategic interaction that transcends such specific contexts, we would fail to understand whether and how much the lessons from specific cases can be extrapolated to others. Put somewhat differently, while some cases are highly atypical, practitioners and theorists need a way to systematically evaluate and compare them.[50] Precisely defined typological arguments that can be linked to more general theories would fulfill both needs.

It might also be argued that it is difficult to specify scope conditions precisely in theory-driven puzzles, since manipulating initial conditions through controlled experiments is impossible. But theorists can recognize and identify the distinguishing features of the cases they examine even if they cannot manipulate those conditions. And having done so, theorists can precisely articulate the corresponding assumptions about the range in which the variables actually vary.

Practitioners would benefit from more explicitly specified theories in each of the five ways discussed in the first section of this paper. First, a better awareness of the theoretical and empirical assumptions in different intellectual tradi-

[49] See, for instance, Chalmers Johnson, "Preconception vs. Observation, or the Contributions of Rational Choice Theory and Area Studies to Contemporary Political Science," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 30 (June 1997).

[50] Robert Bates, "Area Studies and the Discipline: A Useful Controversy?" *PS: Political Science and Politics* 30 (June 1997).

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tions and perspectives can help officials see how actors frame issues and define strategic situations. This would clarify the terms of some policy debates and, to the extent that one's own preferred strategy depends on another's definition of the situation, such clarity would help policy makers deal with other actors.

Second, arguments that clearly specify prevailing empirical conditions can help officials identify the strategic situations they face. Such work will illuminate groups of similar cases, minimizing people's tendencies to draw lessons from only the most readily available and visible examples.[51] For instance, if certain types of miscalculations were found to be closely linked with specific types of wars under certain external or domestic conditions, officials might find it easier to diagnose the nature of a nascent crisis more precisely than if all they had at hand was a universal "wars stem from misperception" generalization.[52]

Third, once policy makers understand the strategic context and the assumptions of other actors, more precisely specified theories can help them assess the possible utility of different policy goals. With respect to international regimes, for instance, officials might want to know the kinds of problems they are most (and least) helpful in addressing. They might also want to know how likely it is that an institution could help to transform the strategic context itself in some issue area. Or, to take another example, it is commonly asserted that democracies do not fight one another. Since democratization can be a slow and uneven process, what aspects of the process are most conducive to reducing armed rivalry, and which are relatively less so?

Fourth, given a particular set of preferences over outcomes and a clearer understanding of the strategic situation they face, more precisely specified theories can help officials make better strategic choices. This can occur in two steps. To begin, such arguments can help officials see more clearly what aspects of the environment are nonmanipulable, which aspects are more subject to their control in the short-to-medium term, and how the two are linked. An enhanced ability to control one's environment may be the clearest benefit of precisely defined scope conditions.[53] One may, for instance, be able to select a bargaining strategy with some confidence if one can assume that others' preferences over outcomes will remain the same. Expected-utility arguments, which make this assumption, are then useful in assessing options.[54] Constructivist arguments, by contrast, contend that actors' preferences can change as a result of

[51] Alexander L. George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Use of Information and Advice* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980), 240–242, 244–245.

[52] Diesing, *Patterns of Discovery in the Social Sciences*, 190; Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison" in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy* (New York: The Free Press, 1979), 59.

[53] Paul Davidson Reynolds, *A Primer in Theory Construction* (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1971), 91.

[54] For an example, see Bueno de Mesquita, "Multilateral Negotiations: A Spatial Analysis of the Arab-Israeli Dispute."

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social interaction.[55] If the situation instead fits these assumptions, policy makers' bargaining options beyond the short term are simultaneously broader and less certain than under conditions that fit the rational-choice assumption of stable preferences over outcomes.

Having made these judgments, policy makers can then take a second step. They can use more precise theoretical and empirical assumptions to identify the risks of alternative strategies. Since such risks will be minimized if options fit the situation, contingent propositions about the effectiveness of various strategies are most useful to officials.[56] For instance, what is the risk that trying to topple a government through economic coercion will instead strengthen it? Officials are aware of this risk, but it would be useful to know how it differs across types of cases. The sanctions literature, which often treats the feasibility of economic coercion as an either-or issue, is generally unhelpful in inferring degrees of risk.[57]

Fifth, well specified theories can help officials and policy analysts interpret facts and decide which data are important to track. Different theoretical arguments identify different meanings and imply different operational indicators for key concepts. The social power literature, for example, claims that capability indicators mean little outside a strategic context and set of policy goals; Realists typically make the opposite assumption.[58] The more precisely the various arguments are specified, the easier it is to test them against one another, assemble a cumulative body of evidence, and identify the practical policy implications.

One must remember, of course, that well specified arguments are no panacea in solving foreign-policy problems. People differ in what they believe constitutes problems to be solved and can disagree about how to solve a problem, even if they define it similarly. Social science can clarify issues and choices for officials, but rarely can identify specific answers.[59]

I have argued so far that if theory-driven puzzles were more precisely laid out, practitioners would find them more useful. But would the price be weaker theory? This is a common belief among theorists who see themselves and policy makers as inhabiting entirely separate worlds. But if we instead see the way in

[55] See, among others, Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It"; Martha Finnemore, "International Organizations as Teachers of Norms," *International Organization* 47 (Autumn 1993).

[56] George, *Bridging the Gap*, 120–125.

[57] One exception is David Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).

[58] Compare Dahl, "The Concept of Power"; Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics"; and Lamborn, *The Price of Power* with Robert Gilpin's noncontextual definition of power: "In this book, power refers simply to the military, economic, and technological capabilities of states." See his *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 13.

[59] Charles E. Lindblom, *Inquiry and Change: The Troubled Attempt to Understand and Shape Society* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 4, 149–150; Morris Janowitz, "Military Institutions, the Draft, and the Volunteer Army" in Bernard Barber, *Effective Social Science* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1987), 75–76.

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which the adjacent groups in Table 1 overlap, the trade-off between theory that is more policy-relevant and theory that is better on its own terms disappears. This is because policy makers as well as theorists need to analyze the strategic context in which action occurs precisely enough to evaluate competing causal assertions. Even if they are indifferent to policy relevance, theory-driven puzzle specialists could find that greater precision would allow them to work out the implications of their own assumptions more carefully. Once a basic set of models relevant to some puzzle is properly specified, for instance, the generalizations can be refined by assessing them according to various cases within each type.[60] Furthermore, precise identification of the contingent statements under which arguments hold would promote the internal disciplinary progress of puzzle-specific work by clarifying the nature of empirical and theoretical disagreements, thereby attenuating some unproductive debates. There is, in short, no inherent trade-off between good theory and policy-relevant theory.

Better specified arguments would also help those focusing on general theory and those interested in specific puzzles to discuss how various issue-oriented puzzles are linked. As I have argued, many IR models in effect reflect distinctive cases. Yet these models presuppose the existence of a set of logically interdependent principles that explains them.[61] A long-range theoretical task is to situate typologies as specific instances of more general arguments. While people might naturally begin to build theory by generalizing inductively about problems they care about, at some point Group II puzzles might be recast as parts of larger arguments. This would involve elaborating a set of theoretical assumptions about the relationships among variables that lets their values move beyond the restrictive ranges that defined earlier work. While some policy makers would be likely to eschew any such work on the grounds that it is too abstract, others might come to see that it can be intellectually efficient to explain specific cases through more generic lenses. Theoretically informed, case-oriented scholarship could make this connection for those who want to use it.

Conclusions and Next Steps

The broad skepticism about the possibilities for policy-relevant IR theory is unwarranted. There is a wider range of IR groups, at least in the United States, than the theorist-practitioner dichotomy implies, and the infrastructure that supports their activities has created a framework for useful exchanges. More such interactions take place already than is commonly acknowledged. But to realize fully this potential, officials must be able to link theory more effectively and easily to the issues they face. At present, this is difficult to do. Too often,

[60] Paul Diesing, *Patterns of Discovery in the Social Sciences* (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971), 189.

[61] John C. McKinney, *Constructive Typology and Social Theory* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966), 36; Diesing, *Patterns of Discovery in the Social Sciences*, 189.

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empirical and theoretical restrictions are built implicitly into theoretical models, and key elements of the strategic context are left undefined. This has two negative effects. First, practitioners who might want to use existing theories often find that they shed little light on the kinds of questions they face. Second, many theorists mistakenly think they disagree about basic causation, when in fact they disagree about empirical issues. This likewise confuses practitioners, who cannot be expected to look to theory for insights if theorists themselves rarely can come to closure on important matters. More precisely specified theories would address both problems.

Such arguments would allow those who specialize in case-oriented scholarship to realize their potential as intermediaries between theory-driven puzzle specialists and policy makers. Many of those who produce this literature have academic training, and others are former officials; they thus are well situated to translate well-specified arguments into the "engineering" terms working officials need. But to do this, they need arguments that carefully lay out empirical and theoretical assumptions. As the examples in this article suggest, work that carefully specifies the values of the variables is easier to apply to real-world cases. Better specified propositions might also facilitate a set of general theoretical assumptions about the relationships among variables that would allow their values to move beyond the restrictive ranges they assume in many existing theories. Such a general theory could speak directly to policy needs or it could be used to reframe Group II puzzles in ways that officials would find easier to use. Thus, what needs to be done to make theory more useful for policy makers will accelerate theoretical growth.

Clearly, this article can only begin to make a case for policy-relevant theory. To strengthen such a case, two types of further research would be useful. One would involve detailed case studies of past policy deliberations to determine what kind of knowledge or analysis was used (or might have been needed) at various points and whether theory might plausibly have helped to meet that need in some of the ways suggested above. For instance, in diagnosing Mikhail Gorbachev's objectives and plans in the mid-1980s, one could reconstruct how U.S. officials tried to determine the range of possibilities for dealing with a very unorthodox type of Soviet leader. What kinds of inferences or analogies did they use in making these judgments? How were the strategic situation and the risks of various strategies characterized? Could an existing theory or a more precisely specified version of such a theory have sharpened these inferences or pointed to other, less obvious options? To take one example, could an argument about the various types of reciprocity relationships in IR have helped to clarify the value of concessions the parties expected from one another and the timing on which they were expected?[62]

[62] See Joseph Lepgold and George Shambaugh, "Who Owes What to Whom, and How Much? Modeling Reciprocity Relationships in International Relations" (unpublished manuscript, September 1997).

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Another, more ambitious way to evaluate and extend the arguments in this article would involve bringing practitioners into a collaborative project with scholars to simulate various kinds of decisions, and perhaps reenact some actual decisions. Here, the proximate consumers of theory-driven policy recommendations would be asked what they need intellectually in order to make quality decisions, how they would use it if it were available, and then would give a candid appraisal of their satisfaction with the results. These findings could then be compared with the arguments made above.

The point in all of these enterprises, of course, is not to blur the line that sets apart those who focus on theory-building and those who focus on policy applications. This line is genuine and important. There is a real division of labor among the IR communities. But as in any interdependent relationship, different comparative advantages are precisely what give each group incentives to interact with others. It is odd, after all, to think that understanding the world better should not have important policy implications. If theorists clarify their assumptions about the world and communicate those clearly, they will improve their own work and have more to share with those who act.*

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The Internet and Political Control in Singapore

GARRY RODAN

The advent of information technology (IT) has generally been heralded as a force for the breakdown of authoritarian political control. One writer describes it as "the greatest democratizer the world has ever seen."[1] Both the volume and form of communication made possible by electronic technology are seen to greatly compromise, if not totally undermine, the capacities of authoritarian regimes to blunt the circulation of opposing views.[2] Seizing printing presses and jamming broadcasting frequencies, for example, is now a limited defense by authoritarian regimes against the flow of information. In the demise of such regimes in Eastern Europe and the coordination of students leading up to the Tiananmen Square massacre in China, attempts by authorities to insulate locals from editorials and reports by the international media proved futile while dissidents had access to facsimile machines and satellite television.[3] More generally, Samuel Huntington emphasizes the unprecedented importance of demonstration effects in the Third Wave of democratization made possible by changes in global communications.[4] Media proprietor Rupert Murdoch has

[1] Sam Pitroda, "Development, Democracy, and the Village Telephone," *Harvard Business Review* 71 (November/December 1993): 66. For general discussions of the democratic potential of IT, see Iain McLean, *Democracy and New Technology* (Oxford, UK: Polity, 1989); and Christopher F. Arterton, *Teledemocracy: Can Technology Protect Democracy?* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1987).

[2] See, for example, Lucian W. Pye, "Political Science and the Crisis of Authoritarianism," *American Political Science Review* 84 (March 1990): 9; Baruch Knei-Paz, "Was George Orwell Wrong? Technology and the Prospects for Democracy," *Dissent* 42 (Spring 1995): 267.

[3] See Nan Lin, *The Struggle for Tiananmen: Anatomy of the 1989 Mass Movement* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992), 147–9.

[4] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 102–3.

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even proclaimed: "Advances in the technology of telecommunications have proved an unambiguous threat to totalitarian regimes everywhere."[5]

However, since these events in Eastern Europe and China, another electronic medium has been emphasized in the association of IT with political pluralism and democracy: the Internet. This communication medium is nonhierarchical, interactive, and global. Its usage is also growing exponentially. The Internet affords unprecedented access to information and new avenues for individual political expression. The following extract from a letter published in the *South China Morning Post* captures the optimistic liberal mood pervading public discussion of this technology's political significance: "The Internet and associated technology is like a snowball which is rolling and getting bigger. It gives everyone a voice, which is why it will still be going while those who seek to regulate it will have departed the scene."[6] The Internet's bypassing of the strictures of formal political organizations and the scrutiny of government authorities is one factor behind a view that a direct, global democracy is now a prospect.[7] Also celebrated is the interactive, as opposed to passive, nature of this medium, which is expected to greatly enhance mediation between decision makers and citizen.[8] Some even see the Internet "allowing democracy of a more participatory nature than at any time since the ancient Greeks."[9]

In any evaluation of the impact of IT on authoritarian political structures, Singapore presents itself as a fascinating and essential case study. Here we have one of the most comprehensive strategies for the development of IT anywhere in the world, supported by huge state-led infrastructure investments. Indeed, Singapore's policy makers are committed to the transformation of the island economy into an information hub, trading in ideas rather than commodities. Yet Singapore's authoritarian leaders have no intention of surrendering political control in the process. Certainly they recognize the existence of some tension between their economic and political objectives. However, to date they have shown some capacity for reconciling the two. One technique has involved giving businesses privileged access to satellite television, while steering the general population toward the more content-controllable cable television. More

[5] Quoted in Jonathan Karp, "Prime Time Police: China Tries to Pull the Plug on Satellite TV," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 21 October 1993, 72. As it transpired, Murdoch was to revise this view and work cooperatively with authoritarian regimes in Asia to secure a share of the market for satellite television. See Louise do Rosario, "Self-Control: For Some in the Media, Beijing's Wish Is their Command," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 3 March 1994, 28.

[6] "Internet part of progress," *South China Morning Post*, 2 April 1996, 20.

[7] See Pamela Varley, "Electronic Democracy," *Technology Review* 94 (November/December 1991): 43–51; *Asiaweek*, 2 February 1996, 15.

[8] See James H. Snider, "Democracy on Line," *The Futurist* 28 (September 1994): 15. A similar case is made for some of the technological forerunners to the Internet in Bruce H. Kirschner, "Electronic Democracy in the 21st Century," *National Civic Review* 80 (Fall 1991): 406–12.

[9] Steve Westley and Dave Zinman, "The Internet Is Changing Politics," *The New Democrat* (May/June 1996). Both authors are executives of Internet service or advertising companies in the United States.

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generally, authoritarian rule in Singapore is comparatively sophisticated with legalistic and cooptive methods of political control being especially pronounced and effective.

Although the Internet represents a more difficult technical challenge for Singapore's control-minded officials, the government has embarked on an ambitious attempt to superimpose strict broadcasting censorship on the medium. Other authoritarian regimes in Asia have been inspired by this model of regulation, which raises a number of general questions. First, can access to the Internet be effectively controlled, or will it have the sort of snowballing political effects predicted by some? Second, to what extent is control of the Internet a technical question alone, and how important are social and political structures in shaping the Internet's impact? Do the particular characteristics of authoritarianism in Singapore render it more capable than most authoritarian regimes of restricting the Internet's liberalizing potential? Third, has the Internet's potential political significance been overestimated? Does a plurality of individual political and social views on the Internet necessarily translate into organized political and social action?

The PAP's Brand of Authoritarian Rule

Despite the superficial appearances of a competitive political system, notably regular elections involving a range of political parties, Singapore is a defacto one-party state. Through a variety of means, effective challenges to the ruling People's Action party (PAP) are obstructed. Historically, this included some crude forms of intimidation of political adversaries and critical elements of the media by invoking the Internal Security Act (ISA), under which people can be held indefinitely without trial. However, the more pervasive and definitive features of authoritarianism in Singapore involve a sophisticated and systematic combination of legal limits on independent social and political activities on the one hand, and extensive mechanisms of political cooption to channel contention through state-controlled institutions on the other. This suppression of a genuine civil society not only fundamentally hampers the PAP's formal political opponents, it generally blunts political pluralism, including interest group politics. The PAP's political monopoly is rationalized through an elitist ideology, which depicts government as a technical process that must be the preserve of a meritocracy.

After coming to power with self-government in 1959, the PAP was beset with internal divisions between Lee Kuan Yew's faction of English-educated middle class nationalists and more left-wing representatives of labor and student movements dominated by the Chinese-educated. This friction culminated in a formal party split in 1961 and the formation of the Barisan Sosialis as a rival to the PAP. Although the PAP was stripped of its grassroots organizational networks with the left's exodus, the PAP retained the executive power of government. This proved a decisive strategic advantage during the 1960s. The inde-

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pendent and militant trade-union movement was brought to its knees through a series of security sweeps on its leadership and legislative curbs on its activities. At the same time, the state-sponsored National Trades Union Congress (NTUC) was promoted.[10]

As a complement to this and following a spate of residual student activism and protest outside the parliamentary realm, changes to the Societies Act in 1967 were enacted barring political engagement by organizations not specifically registered for such purpose. Apart from severing opposition parties from social bases, this virtual outlawing of pressure groups shielded the government from organized public scrutiny. Meanwhile, the PAP not only used state instrumentalities for blatant party-political propaganda, it also developed a host of community-level state and parastatal organizations to mobilize support for the government.[11] Engagement in politics by organizations not strictly registered for such purposes was not in itself of concern to authorities. Rather, it was engagement in non-PAP or anti-PAP politics that was problematic.

In conjunction with the PAP hampering its opponents and critics, it also undertook economic and social reforms that generated a support base for the party. Without this, the PAP could not have survived regular elections, let alone consistently achieve resounding victories. The PAP presided over real and substantial benefits for Singaporeans in terms of public housing, employment, education, and poverty eradication. Importantly, though, this social and economic transformation has involved a consolidation and extension of state economic assets and social jurisdiction. By 1990, for example, through just three holding companies, the Singapore state was the sole shareholder of fifty companies with interests in a further 566 subsidiaries and total assets of US$6.51 billion.[12] The coordination and control of resources is greatly enhanced by tight interlocking directorships involving a small coterie of politically-trusted civil servants.[13] This gives the PAP a considerable, even if sometimes indirect, capacity to influence the delivery of services, the awarding of business contracts, and the shaping of career opportunities.

[10] Frederic C. Deyo, *Dependent Development and Industrial Order: An Asian Case Study* (New York: Praeger, 1981); Garry Rodan, *The Political Economy of Singapore's Industrialization* (London: Macmillan, 1989); Londa Rosa, "The Singapore State and Trade Union Incorporation," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 20 (1990): 487–508.

[11] Seah Chee Meow, *Community Centres in Singapore* (Singapore: Singapore University Press 1973).

[12] "Role of state owned enterprises," *The Straits Times Weekly Overseas Edition*, 29 August 1992, 20; Soon Teck Wong and Tan C. Suan, *The Lessons of East Asia: Singapore Public Policy and Economic Development* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1993), 23; Werner Vennewald, *Technocrats in the State Enterprise System in Singapore* (Working Paper Number 32, Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, 1994), 27–8.

[13] Vennewald, *Technocrats in the State Enterprise System*; Soon and Tan, *The Lessons of East Asia*, 28; Chia Siow Yue, *The Role of Institutions in Singapore's Economic Success*, Paper for the World Bank Project on the High Performing Asian Economies, November 1992, 11, 19.

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As a result, the increasing affluence of many Singaporeans has gone hand in hand with a growing dependence on the state, producing vulnerability to both cooption and political discipline. During the 1997 election campaign, the PAP nakedly exploited this. Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong warned that multimillion dollar commitments to upgrade public housing, in which around 90 percent of Singaporeans live, would be undertaken on a priority basis, with areas supporting the opposition last in line. To reinforce this threat, the government announced a new system of vote counting, which enabled it to ascertain voting preferences down to a precinct level of 5,000 votes.[14] Whether out of fear of retribution or the seduction of government rewards, the electorate responded by arresting a sustained decline in the government's share of votes at every general election since 1980.

However, the increasing social complexity accompanying the city-state's economic development has posed challenges for the authoritarian system. In particular, the PAP has found that more diverse social interests require some sort of political accommodation to preempt pressure for civil society. Accordingly, we have seen initiatives in cooption reaching out to sectional interests, including domestic business groups, women's groups, and professionals. Mechanisms to open up consultation with such groups are intended to divert disaffection from competitive political processes and reinforce the PAP's elitist and technocratic ideology. Thus, whether it be through the Nominated Member of Parliament (NMP) scheme or the incorporation of wider community involvement in Government Parliamentary Committees, individuals are officially brought into such fora to add particular expertise to the decision-making process on a nonconfrontational basis, rather than to represent any constituency. Instead of opening up space for civil society, the PAP state is in effect expanding its own space.[15]

An even more significant feature of contemporary authoritarian rule in Singapore has been the increasing recourse to legal techniques of political control. Certainly, extensive surveillance by the Internal Security Department continues within Singapore. However, with the communist threat long extinguished, stable domestic race relations, and no challenges to the sovereignty of the Singapore state, the use of the ISA to imprison PAP critics is more open to question. It also invites international attention and risks creating political martyrs of opponents. Since the early 1980s, but especially following the last arrests under the ISA in 1988, there has therefore been an accelerated shift toward the use of administrative law to further restrict the political activities of organizations, as well as the use of defamation, libel, and contempt of court actions by government figures against individual political adversaries and critics.

[14] Chau Mui Hoong, "PM: Precincts with Greater Support Get Upgraded First," *The Straits Times*, 1 January 1997, 1.

[15] Garry Rodan, "State-Society Relations and Political Opposition in Singapore" in Garry Rodan, ed., *Political Oppositions in Industrialising Asia* (London: Routledge, 1996), 95–127.

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Significant examples of the former include modifications in the late 1980s to the acts covering legal and other professions and the introduction of the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill in 1990, effectively outlawing uninvited public social or political comment from institutions that had hitherto escaped the stricture of the Societies Act. Meanwhile, the scale and propensity of legal actions has escalated, with the most capable and combative opposition figures primary targets. In this exercise, Lee Kaun Yew continues to consolidate his reputation as "the most successful individual litigant in history,"[16] but more of his colleagues in the PAP are following the example. In 1997, Lee was joined by ten other government leaders in a total of thirteen libel actions against Tang Liang Hong of the Workers' party. Tang had accused government leaders of lying during the January 1997 election campaign after they labelled him—some contend baited him—as a "dangerous Chinese chauvinist." A total of US$5.65 million was awarded in damages to the PAP members of parliament.[17] Tang also faces thirty-three counts of tax evasion, not the first time the Inland Revenue Department has shown a sudden interest in an individual after that person has locked horns with the government.

A similar technique is applied to the international press, where the trend has been away from the expulsion of journalists toward tightened legal limits on the media and punitive court actions. Amendments to the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act in 1986 gave the minister of Communications and Information the capacity to restrict the circulation of foreign publications in Singapore that were deemed to be engaging in domestic politics. A string of disputes ensued thereafter, many centering around the reluctance of publishers to concede to the government an unedited right of reply to critical articles. Further amendments in 1990 tied foreign publications even closer to the jurisdiction of local courts, requiring them to secure an annual permit and deposit a substantial fixed bond toward any legal liabilities that might be incurred. After costly losses of access to Singapore's circulation and advertising markets, foreign publishers have generally adopted a more cautious reporting approach. Nevertheless, the *International Herald Tribune* was hit with two expensive suits arising from different articles in 1994. They touched on government sensitivities over charges of PAP nepotism and the absence of judicial independence in Singapore.[18]

[16] Mark Baker, "Lee Poised for Legal Knockout," *Sydney Morning Hearld*, 10 May 1997. Before the 1997 actions, Lee had already successfully contested eight major defamation cases and been awarded more than US$1.56 million in damages by the Singapore courts. As many as eleven separate civil actions had been taken out by Lee against known opposition figures, some of which were settled out of court.

[17] Ahmad Osman, "PAP Leaders Awarded $8.075m in Damages," *The Straits Times*, 30 May 1997. In handing down his statement on damages, Justice Chao Hick Tin also raised the possibility of further charges against Tang for "scandalizing the courts." A court injuction by PAP leaders had earlier frozen assets of an estimated US$7.83 million belonging to Tang and his wife in Singapore and abroad.

[18] The articles involved were Philip Bowring, "The Claims about Asian Values Don't Usually Bear Scrutiny," *International Herald Tribune*, 2 August 1994; and Christopher Lingle, "The Smoke over Parts of Asia Obscures Some Profound Concerns," ibid., 7 October 1994. In the Bowring case, the High Court ordered the *International Herald Tribune* to pay US$638,000 in damages to Lee Kuan Yew,

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What seems clear in all of this is that forsaken profits and stiff legal penalties have been more effective in fostering self-censorship than earlier methods of intimidation. However, the information media in general and related enterprises have to contend with similar pressures. Academic books, for example, are not banned; but publishers, distributors, and retailers will often decide against any association with a critical or contentious manuscript or publication for fear of legal repercussions or the loss of annually-renewable licenses.

The centrality and distinctiveness of legalism to the reproduction of authoritarian rule in Singapore has not escaped theorists' attention. Essentially making the same point, Kanishka Jayasuriya describes this as "rule through law rather than rule of law,"[19] while Christopher Tremewan characterizes it as "thinly disguised rule by decree."[20] In contrast with legal institutions in liberal democratic systems, where challenges to state power are not only possible but common, in Singapore they serve more to consolidate and expand the power of the state and to enforce the government's objectives and policies.[21] The structural conditions under which the judiciary operates, including the granting of short-term appointments to the Supreme Court that may or may not be renewed at the government's discretion and the potential for untenured lower court judges to be transferred between judicial and government service, provide an avenue through which political influence and pressure can be exerted over the judiciary.[22] Considerable ideological store is placed by the PAP, however, in the depiction of Singapore's judicial system as independent and fair. Ironically, such is the government's insistence on this that it is virtually impossible to publicly debate the question without inviting an action for contempt of court. As Jayasuriya observes: "The distinguishing feature of this legalism is the use of liberal language, rhetoric and the ritual of law to pursue its distinctly illiberal political objectives."[23]

Singapore's IT Strategy

Singapore's economic planners began promoting the widespread application of IT in the early 1980s, seeing it as strategic in the restructuring of the economy

his son and Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, and Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong. In the Lingle case, the various parties were first charged by Singapore's High Court and ordered to pay damages and legal costs totalling US$72,212 after being found guilty of "contempt of court by way of scandalizing the Singapore judiciary." Then Lee Kuan Yew filed a civil suit for libel against the *Tribune* which resulted in a damages payment of US$213,000. In a separate libel action by Lee Kuan Yew against Lingle, a further US$70,972 damages was awarded to the senior minister.

[19] Kanishka Jayasuriya, "The Rule of Law and Capitalism in East Asia," *The Pacific Review* 9 (1996): 367.

[20] Christopher Tremewan, *The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore* (London: Macmillan, 1994), 194.

[21] Jayasuriya, "The Rule of Law and Capitalism in East Asia," 369.

[22] Tremewan, *The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore*, 193.

[23] Jayasuriya, "The Rule of Law and Capitalism in East Asia," 379.

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toward higher value-added production. They also wanted Singapore to be a production site for the IT industry. Accordingly, in 1980 a ministerial-level committee, the Committee on National Computerization (CNC), was established to ensure the computerization of the civil service, to boost training of software professionals, and to encourage the indigenous software and services industry. Economic recession in 1985–1986 only served to reinforce the emphasis on IT as a basis for deriving new competitive advantages. Thus the National IT Plan in 1986 saw the National Computer Board, Singapore Telecom, the Economic Development Board, and the National University of Singapore collaborate to achieve a more integrated strategy between hardware manufacturing, and telecommunication and software services. In support of this plan, the late 1980s saw a range of complementary institutional initiatives and substantial state investments in physical and social infrastructure.[24]

In 1992, the National Computer Board detailed a new strategic statement, *IT2000—A Vision of an Intelligent Island*. Under *IT2000*, it is now planned that all 750,000 households on the island will be connected to a comprehensive computer network by the year 2000 with the compulsory installment of broadband coaxial and optical fibre networks. Households, businesses, schools, libraries, government departments, and statutory authorities will be electronically interlinked to facilitate shopping and other commercial and official transactions, as well as provide cable and interactive television services and the Internet. A wireless communications network will also afford mobile computer access to information services throughout Singapore. So extensive is the plan that even public space is likely to be wired. It is proposed that television cameras be fitted at corridors, lifts, public parks, car parks, and neighborhood centers for monitoring purposes.[25] The plan was quickly acted on, with more than 100,000 households connected with wiring to support broadband applications before mid-1996.[26]

The economic rational behind *IT2000* is grounded in a recognition that Singapore's traditional role as broker facilitating commercial exchanges between regional economies and the rest of the world needs to undergo a transformation. According to Minister for Information and the Arts George Yeo: "Geography will matter less in the future. We must therefore think of new ways to retain our position as a hub. Over the next 20 to 30 years, we must make sure that we have the new infrastructure to remain a junction for goods, services, people, information and ideas. If we succeed, we will be one of a number of great cities in the Pacific Century. If we fail, other hubs will displace us and we will be relegated to a backwater."[27] Singapore is thus expected to maintain a

[24] Wong Seng Hon, "Exploiting Information Technology: A Case Study of Singapore," *World Development* 20 (December 1992): 1817–1828.

[25] Ravi Veloo, "Do We Really Need on All-seeing Camera?" *The Straits Times*, 13 July 1995.

[26] Michael Bociurkiw, "Motorola to Network Singapore," *Asia Times*, 6 June 1996.

[27] George Yeo, "Information Technology—Positioning Singapore in Asia" (speech at launch of Singapore Technologies (ST) Teleport, 23 April 1995 (http:///www.gov.sg/government/speeches/new/i.htm).

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position at the crossroads of East and West, but in the new role, telecommunications and other electronic media are deployed to broker design, research, engineering, manufacturing, distribution, sales, and marketing to global sites.[28]

Within this latest IT plan, the Internet has an important economic function. George Yeo maintains that: "By co-ordinating the entry of both the public and private sectors into Internet in a deliberate way, we can increase our overall effectiveness, influence and competitive advantage in the world."[29] Yet when policy makers originally conceived of interconnecting all Singaporean households, businesses, government departments, and institutions with an interactive medium, it was not the Internet they had in mind. Rather, it was Teleview—the world's first interactive video-text system, which receives and reacts to instructions from a user through a phone line and sends back text, graphics, or photographs through the phone or radio waves. This was commercially launched by Singapore Telecom in 1990, and at the time of the initial *IT2000* statement in 1992, it had about 10,000 subscribers.[30] Most importantly, this was a nationwide, not international, interactive information service.

The subsequent take-off around the world of the technically superior and international network, the Internet, forced authorities to rethink their plan. They decided to upgrade Teleview so that it provided access to the Internet. This made commercial sense, both by protecting the initial investment in Teleview of US$35.48 million and by providing business in Singapore with the most advanced electronic infrastructure. But this decision involved a challenge to customary levels of political control over information flows. Before long, Singapore had three separate commercial Internet service providers. By March 1996, the Internet business services were already worth around US$7.10 million in Singapore, and there were more than twenty companies whose sole or major business was Internet services.[31]

It is important to note, however, that while the Internet came to be embraced as a crucial element of the *IT2000* strategy, it was something that evolved rather than having been an integral element of the original conception. Also, in turning Singapore into an intelligent island providing a range of services that depend on creative intellectual capacities, innovation, and a free flow of information, Singapore's leaders have a good deal of prior experience in controlling the political spillover from various other industries not normally associated with restrictive political cultures.

An Early Model of Profits and Censorship

A decade ago, plans to make Singapore a publishing center were scoffed at in light of strict limits on critical journalism and well publicized clashes with the

[28] Richard Rapaport, "Singapore: Still Onward and Upward," *Forbes ASAP*, 29 March 1993, 78.

[29] George Yeo, Launch of Infomap, 8 March 1995 (http://www.gov.sg/government/speeches/new/j.htm)

[30] Ng Wei Joo, "Time Now for Teleview?" *The Straits Times*, 23 June 1992.

[31] "Singapore Sees Internet Business Doubling in '96'," *Reuter Asia-Pacific Business Report*, 22 March 1996.

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executives and journalists of publications such as *Far Eastern Economic Review* and *Asian Wall Street Journal*. Nonetheless, such major and reputable publishers as John Wiley, McGraw-Hill, Addison-Wesley, Simon & Schuster, Reed Elsevier, and the Thomson and Times Mirror group have adopted Singapore as their regional base. Evidently, combinations of infrastructure, production and distribution factors, advertising revenue, and other considerations outweighed apprehensions about the restrictive political climate in Singapore. Already we see a similar pattern shaping international investments in some of the electronic media.

Indeed, the attempt to make Singapore a regional broadcasting center for the Asia-Pacific area is proving remarkably successful. Prominent international television networks—including the U.S. entertainment and video loan giant Home Box Office, the music channel MTV, sports network ESPN, and multimedia Walt Disney—are now operating from Singapore. Ironically, while private satellite receivers are banned in Singapore, the island is used to beam services into the rest of Asia. Singapore's role as a regional broadcasting center will be further enhanced if the government realizes its plans to have a satellite in space by 1999 capable of redirecting television shows, telephone, telegraphic, and other communications to extensive areas across Asia.[32]

The exceptions the government makes for private-sector access to satellite television within Singapore is explained by George Yeo in terms of the commercial imperative of up-to-date information. However, he also insists that the preservation and transmission of what he refers to as "cultural values" is a separate question too important to be entrusted to the market.[33] With this in mind, the government has launched a comprehensive cable system to meet the domestic demand for foreign broadcasts while retaining its ability to screen out "objectionable" material. Cable TV in Singapore is run by a conglomerate called Singapore Cable Vision (SCV). This is comprised of the state companies Singapore International Media (31 percent), Singapore Technologies Ventures (24 percent), Singapore Press Holdings (20 percent), and Continental Cablevision (25 percent), which is the third largest cable operator in the United States. In June 1995, SCV initially offered twenty-five channels with a line up including MTV, ESPN, Discovery, Prime Sports, TVBI (HK), CNN, and Star TV's Channel V. When the infrastructure is completed, SCV will be able to offer up to sixty-four channels to all Singaporean households.

To date, the self-censorship among international companies eager to secure a position in the Singapore market has obviated the need of authorities to exercise much direct control over content. CNN has even gone so far as to alert SCV to potentially sensitive material, as it did before screening coverage of the case involving U.S. teenager Michael Fay, who was found guilty of vandalizing

[32] Bociurkiw, "Motorola to Network Singapore," 1.

[33] Cherian George, "Satellite TV Should Foster Understanding: BG Yeo," *The Straits Times Weekly Edition*, 7 May 1994, 4.

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cars in Singapore.[34] More generally, cable service providers have offered material that is either apolitical, such as music and sport, or that is family oriented and that reinforces the sort of conservative values championed in government rhetoric. These companies are demonstrating that there are profits to be made from accommodating rather than challenging authoritarian leaders in Asia. The government's goal of content control is also aided by the policy of wiring residences on a mandatory, rather than subscription basis.

The Internet's Technical Challenge

The question is whether the quite different electronic technology of the Internet will be less compatible with such structures. The Interent involves access to information through a variety of means, including newsgroups, world wide web (WWW), email, gopher, telenet, file transfer protocol, and Internet relay chat. The first three are by far the most common currently in use. Newsgroups provide a format for discussion that has enabled individuals to exchange views and information across the globe. There are thousands of specialized newsgroups, most of which are unmoderated. World Wide Web sites (or home pages), of which there are currently about 30 million,[35] provide individuals, organizations, and corporations the opportunity to transmit and receive information in text and graphic format. Email is an electronic mail system that is one of the oldest and still most popular uses of the Internet.

In the debates over whether or not the Internet can actually be subjected to effective censorship, the prevailing view seems to be that control-minded authorities have met their match. By its nature, the Internet provides the possibility of obtaining and disseminating information via multiple electronic routes, thereby making it extremely difficult, it not impossible, to impose restrictions on sufficiently determined and technologically literate individuals. For example, access to any newsgroup can be cut off to customers either as a result of pressure from authorities on an Internet Service Provider (ISP) or at the discretion of a given ISP.[36] However, a user could find a publicly accessible news server that carries the censored newsgroup. This might be done, for example, via a WWW page. Email could be used to the same effect.[37] A second option would be for the user to take out an account with an ISP in a different country. A third option would be for a user to take out an account with a professional

[34] Will Atkins, "Friendly and Useful: Rupert Murdoch and the Politics of Television in Southeast Asia, 1993–95," *Media International Australia* 77 (August 1995): 54–64.

[35] Alta Vista, "About AltaVista" (http://www.altavista.digital.com/cgi-bin/query?pg=about), 28 June 1996.

[36] Robin Whittle, "'Refused Access Lists?' Why Internet Communications Cannot be Reliably Blocked," from Web site of Robin Whittle—First Principles Consulting, 29 May 1996 (http://www.ozemail.com.au/~firstpr/contreg/refused.htm).

[37] Bob Rankin, *Accessing the Internet by E-Mail: Doctor Bob's Guide to Offline Internet Access* (ftp://rtfm.mit.edu/pub/usenet-by-hierarchy/news/answers/internet-services/access-via-email), 28 June 1996.

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search service for WWW and newsgroups, giving access to articles via their news server. This is done through access to such a company's web site. In yet another option, users could employ third parties to pass on contributions to newsgroups, as well as receive them from third parties.[38]

Similarly, the authorities could simply block access to the WWW by preventing access to a particular server. The problem with this technique is that it has the potential to inadvertently block a range of other services available on a banned server. It is also cumbersome, costly, and likely to increase significantly the time a server takes to process general requests. It also assumes that authorities are fully aware of the content of web pages available. Ways around this form of blocking include the use of a proxy server, which allows the user to retrieve information from a prohibited server indirectly. Another way would be to email a message to a server dedicated to allowing email access to the WWW. These servers are known as "email to WWW gateways."[39]

Software is also widely available to block general access to specified material. Surf Watch, Cyber Patrol, and Cyber Sentry are examples of such software. Some of these search for key words and filter out material generated by searches for them. However, this can inadvertently filter out material not targeted. The ISP America Online, for example, had this problem when its filter process was unable to differentiate between pornographic material using the word "breast" and a serious discussion of breast cancer.[40]

A number of points need to be stressed in connection with this ongoing struggle between regulators and advocates of an uncensored Internet. First, the technology is still in its infancy, making it impossible to declare a victor. Second, the difficulty of blocking information needs to be assessed in terms of the political will of authorities and the consequent resources made available for the exercise. Third, the question of political control and the Internet is broader than whether or not information can be blocked. It is also a question of whether the Internet can be monitored.

Monitoring is a less crude mechanism of political control, especially since it is not necessarily apparent that it is occurring. It is also comparatively easy to undertake when it is focused and involves the cooperation of domestic ISPs, other local telecommunications providers, and/or administrators of computing services within organizations, such as a university. Monitoring of particular individuals' use of the Internet is technically easier the closer information is intercepted from the point of departure or receipt, as opposed to being intercepted midstream. This could be as simple as tapping a phone line linking a user to an ISP, or inspecting the messages to or from particular individuals as they pass

[38] Whittle, "'Refused Access Lists?'"; Kees Brants, "Policing Democracy: Communication Freedom in the Age of Internet," *Javnost—the Public* 3 (1996): 57.

[39] Whittle "'Refused Access Lists?'"; Rankin, "Accessing the Internet by E-Mail."

[40] Brants, "Policy Democracy," 57–58; Peng Hwa Ang and Berlinda Nadarajan, "Censorship on the Internet: A Singapore Perspective," *Communications of the ACM* 39 (1996) 76; "Internet Censorship, The Top Shelf," *Economist*, 18 May 1996, 84.

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through an ISP.[41] On this point, the editor of *Australian PC World* responded to a letter in the July 1996 edition that expressed concern (based on a personal experience) about the private information that could be obtained about an individual user on the Internet:

> . . . if anyone wants to go to the trouble, it's possible to trace all your activities on the Internet, and discover everything you've looked at, how long you looked at it on-line, and what you've down-loaded to look at off-line. . . . Your boss can easily monitor all your activities if you're connected via your local network, and if not your ISP can monitor all your activities in great detail, if they can be bothered. Administrators and anyone with any technical skill can easily read your e-mail. Far from preserving our anonymity, the Web makes us far more exposed. There's no getting around it. The more we use machines like telephones and computers for communicating, the more we're susceptible to surveillance. If you want to remain anonymous, you have to go lo-tech.[42]

The monitoring potential on the Internet gives rise to ambiguous positions by governments on technologies designed to safeguard privacy, known as encryption. While governments understand the commercial importance of privacy on the Internet, they are also worried about the criminal and security implications of a foolproof system. Thus, although encryption technology exists to render intercepted messages unreadable, the U.S. government has been forcing software companies producing Netscape Navigator and Microsoft Internet Explorer and exporting from the United States to use weak enough encryption to enable interception by governments and their agencies. Similarly, while the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has called on countries to avoid creating unjustified obstacles to trade in the name of cryptography policy, a recent report by the 29-country group did not rule out the idea of governments having access to keys to unlock encrypted material.[43]

The potential to exploit what mechanisms there are for monitoring or blocking information on the Internet is mediated by social and political structures. When extensive networks of political surveillance are already in place and a culture of fear about such practices exists, the impact of monitoring is likely to be strong. Indeed, in certain social and political settings, the Internet has the potential to assist authorities in identifying government critics. Here the mere use of encryption can serve to arouse the suspicion of authorities, however costly or technically difficult this technology may be for authorities to read messages.[44]

[41] See "Hidden Eyes on the Internet," *South China Morning Post*, 6 October 1996.

[42] "No privacy on the Net," *Australian PC World*, July 1996, 179.

[43] Kirstin Ridley, "Get Connected, Get Encrypted," *The Reuter European Business Report*, 8 May 1997. The U.S. government push for the idea of key escrow has attracted significant support within the OECD. See "Will Spies Hold Your Keys? International encryption policy debate heats up as weak security becomes risky," *Network Computing*, CMP Publications Inc., 15 March 1996.

[44] Testimony of Philip R. Zimmermann to the Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space of the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 26 June 1996. Posted to Fight Censorship email discussion group, 26 June (URL: http://fight-censorship.dementia.org/top/).

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The political effects of the Internet thus appear to be uneven: facilitating some new avenues for individual political expression, but also availing authorities of new information about individuals that can be used in refining political control strategies. Moreover, the single-most important feature of political control in Singapore involves the obstruction of organizational bases for alternative social and political views to those of the ruling party. It is this criterion, rather than individual expressions alone, against which the democratic possibilities of the Internet must be judged.

The Government's Dual Strategy on the Internet

By mid-1996, there were around 200,000 users of the Internet in Singapore.[45] In addition to the 100,000 subscribers,[46] this includes access from the various cyber cafes that have recently sprung up. The government had also set up ten Internet clubs at state-run community centers.[47] With regular use of the Internet involving 5-10 percent, Singapore has a participation rate rivalling the United States and ahead of Australia.[48] But while this is in line with the *IT2000* strategy, it nevertheless causes the government some anxiety. The Internet is a web comprising more than 70,000 computer networks connecting an estimated 50 million users in around 130 countries.[49] More than 9,000 newsgroups containing discussions or picture data bases are accessible through the Internet, including sexually and politically explicit material. Yet, in a reference to the flow of ideas, images, and information on the Internet, Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew contends: "The top 3 to 5 percent of a society can handle this free-for-all, this clash of ideas."[50] For the bulk of the population, however, exposure to this is likely to have destabilizing social and political effects, according to the senior minister.

Out of concern about some of this access, Singapore's authorities have gone to extraordinary lengths to demonstrate their technical capacity to monitor usage of the Internet. In 1994, a scan of public Internet accounts held with local ISP Technet was conducted in search of files with the extension GIF (Graphical

[45] A survey by Survey Research Singapore concluded that in addition to the 100,000 subscribers, about 191,000 people use the Internet in Singapore. See Ng Wei Joo, "300,000 could subscribe to Internet next year," *The Straits Times*, 8 April 1996, 2. These figures have been questioned, but the Television Corporation of Singapore still suggested around 200,000 users (including subscribers) is possible. See *The Sunday Times* (Singapore), 14 April 1996.

[46] Singapore Telecom expects this figure to rise to 300,000 or 10 percent of the population by 1997. See John Stackhouse, "Singapore Wired about its Future," *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 7 July 1996.

[47] Helen Chang, "Singapore Wakes Up and Smells the Internet: In Cybercafes All over Town, Strong Computer Mania Is Brewing," *Business Week*, 25 March 1996, 30.

[48] "Singapore in Big Net Plan," *The West Australian*, 5 June 1996, 22.

[49] Sandhya Rao and N. Chinna Natesan, "Internet: Threat or Opportunity for India?" *Media Asia* 23(1996): 96.

[50] As quoted in Nathan Gardels, "City of the Future: What America Can Learn from Post-Liberal Singapore," *Washington Post*, 11 February 1996.

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Interchange Format). This produced a total of 80,000 files, of which five were considered by authorities to be pornographic.[51] While the government has indicated it does not intend any further unannounced searches, its demonstrated capability to search files on this vast a scale may in itself and by design have a suitably chilling effect. There is also a reported case of officials at the National University of Singapore discontinuing the employment of an academic scholar after confronting him with text copies of email messages critical of an administrator that the scholar had sent over the Internet.[52]

Such exercises in monitoring are aided by structural characteristics of the domestic telecommunications industry and corporatist political relationships that are typical of Singapore.[53] Initially, Singapore Telecom monopolized public access to the Internet through Singnet, which began operating in mid-1994. In September 1995, this monopoly was broken with the entry of Pacific Internet, a joint venture involving the government-linked conglomerate Sembawang Corp. unit, Sembawang Media, and ST Computer Systems & Services, a unit of the government-owned Singapore Technologies. A third ISP entered the public market in March 1996, when Cyberway was launched. Cyberway is a joint venture between the domestic press monopoly Singapore Press Holdings Ltd. (another government-linked company) and the government-owned Singapore Technologies Pte. Ltd. Providing Singapore's Internet service is thus wholly in the hands of government-owned and government-linked companies.

The potential of authorities to monitor the Internet traffic was assisted by the agreement in May 1996 among the three local ISPs to establish a Singapore Internet Backbone.[54] With this, traffic between local ISPs no longer needs to be routed via the United States, a process that incurred extra costs and time. The new link means faster connections within Singapore, but also a more self-contained system that enhances the capacity of authorities to follow the passage of information. Added to this is the fact that, owing to the monopoly enjoyed by Singapore Telecom over phone lines in Singapore, there is only one way in or out of the country when travelling on the information superhighway.[55] A further consideration in all of this is the fact that all Singaporeans have a num-

[51] Philip Shenon, "Two-Edged Sword: Asian Regimes on the Internet," *New York Times*, 29 May 1995; Ian Stewart, "Internet File Hunt Prompts Outrage," *The Weekend Australian*, 7–8 January 1995, 10; Jürgen Rudolph, "Cyberspace and its Influence in Southeast and East Asia—A Preliminary Appraisal" (unpublished paper, 1996), 12.

[52] Christopher Lingle, *Singapore's Authoritarian Capitalism: Asian Values, Free Market Illusions, and Political Dependency* (Barcelona: Edicions Sirocco, S.L. & Fairfax, VA: The Locke Institute, 1996), 27.

[53] Rodan, *The Political Economy of Singapore's Industrialization*; Chua Beng Huat, *Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore* (London: Routledge, 1995).

[54] Philip Lim, "Singapore ISPs Sign MOU to Promote Faster Local Internet Access," Press release issued by Singapore Telecom, Cyberway and Pacific Internet, posted to SEASIA-L <SEASIA-L@msu.edu>, 13 May 1996.

[55] Kevin Hamlin, "Singapore Sweeps Internet Clean," *Asia Times*, 6 March 1996, 1.

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bered identification card that has to be produced to take out a domestic account for the Internet.

The belief that the Singapore government regularly monitors individuals on the Internet is widespread. One contributor to *soc.culture.singapore* cited a personal experience and posted a message via a remail service in the United States in order to insure anonymity. This person claimed to be a civil servant who had posted articles "questioning the wisdom of some government policies" and had reason to believe his/her phone was subsequently bugged. A friend had also revealed someone had been "asking him questions about me—my character, who did I associate with etc." The intimidating aspect of this experience was evident, as the individual expressed fears of losing his/her job and warned: "I know for sure that all messages on scs [*soc.culture.singapore*] are closely monitored by MITA [Ministry of Information and the Arts]. There are information officers whose job is to read messages on scs and feed the important ones back to the high ups."[56]

Authenticating these and similar claims is of course difficult. What matters, however, is the impact these messages have on other users. It is even possible that some claims are fabricated by or on behalf of authorities with the aim of creating apprehension and promoting self-censorship.

Research written up in 1995 by Hwa Ang Peng and Berlinda Nadarajan revealed that broad censorship of the Internet was already present in Singapore, with access to newsgroups through local ISPs affected by the way local telecommunications provider, the state monopoly Singapore Telecom, operated its lines. According to them, for example: "The Unix shell used by Singapore Telecom has been deliberately crippled to remove some functions. Subscribers have to use a menu to get access to Internet services. Internet service providers in Singapore censor Usenet groups by filtering out those with suggestive names. The system administrators can also set conditions for usage, revoke certain services from users' accounts, or deny log-in access totally. These rules tend to be haphazard and crisis-oriented."[57]

Despite these practices, access to a wide range of political materials was still available through the Internet. For example, U.S. Department of State reports on human rights as well as similarly critical material on Singapore from Amnesty International were readily available on newsgroups and WWW. The discussion group *soc.culture.singapore* is of most concern to the Singapore government. Over 10,000 messages were posted on it from mid-1994 to mid-1995,[58] so it was proving a popular forum. It does not generally contain radical critiques of the PAP.[59] Nonetheless, *soc.culture.singapore* is an unmoderated discussion

[56] Anonymous posting to *soc.culture.singapore*, 29 October 1995.

[57] Hwa Ang Peng and Berlinda Nadarajan, "Censorship on the Internet: A Singapore Perspective," 76. This published article was previously circulated on the Internet in May 1995 at http://inet.nt tam.com.

[58] Kunda Dixit, "Clash of Cultures in Cyberspace," *Jakarta Post*, 17 July 1995, 4.

[59] Tan Chong Kee, ed., *Soc.Culture.Singapore: The Unauthorised Version, The Singapore Internet Community at its Best* (Singapore: Singapore Electronic Forum, 1996).

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group whose agendas, in stark contrast with most other media in Singapore, cannot be controlled by the PAP. It has given expression to perspectives and information sufficiently critical of the PAP for the party to adopt the strategy of direct political engagement with its detractors on the Internet. Significantly, this was the preferred option over instructing local ISPs to block access to this newsgroup.

In early 1995, amid criticism of Singapore on the Internet for falling short on democracy and human rights, MITA Minister George Yeo foreshadowed the party's entry into cyberspace. "We must have our battalions there all ready to engage in that debate," he told *The Straits Times*.[60] The party organ *Petir* subsequently elaborated: "Presently, there are quite a few individuals who spread falsehoods about Singapore and the PAP. Other destructive behavior includes impersonating our President and PAP leaders. We need to respond decisively, convincingly and stylishly. We have a duty to combat misinformation and make a stand for the PAP."[61] The task, it was emphasized, was urgent: "If we delay, the opposition parties and more irresponsible users will beat us to it."[62] Accordingly, the party youth organization, Young PAP, began regularly commenting on *soc.culture.singapore*.[63]

This PAP presence becomes especially evident during certain debates, such as that which transpired in 1995 over the appropriateness of Prime Minister Goh being awarded an honorary degree from Williams College in the United States. Protesters argued that the curbs on free speech and critical inquiry in Singapore under Goh rendered any award from an American university offensive. In the various exchanges on *soc.culture.singapore*, the stance by Young PAP was bolstered by the appearance of a spokesperson on behalf of the Ministry of Information and the Arts, who attacked government critics and played a custodial role for the PAP's position.

Such engagement with critical voices on the Internet is consistent with the approach taken with the international press, where authorities devote considerable energy to "correcting" published views and information. Threats of legal actions, removal of a correspondent, or cuts in circulation rights in Singapore have long been supplemented by extensive official statements through the media in response to criticism or unwelcome observations. This engagement is not so much an indication of tolerance as resignation. Even though Singapore's authorities have intimidated much of the international media, they have not been able to instill among them quite the same degree of uniform timidity as that characterizing the domestic media. This will be even less achievable through the Internet. Official political engagement on the Internet to "combat misinfor-

[60] Chung Tsung Mien, "S'pore Bulletin Board on the Internet Soon," *The Straits Times*, 20 February 1995, 1.

[61] "Why We Need to Go into Cyberspace," *Petir*, May/June 1995, 55.

[62] Ibid., 57.

[63] Harold Fock is head of YP Internet Committee. Nicholas Philip Lazarus (NUS Law Faculty) is another Young PAP member who regularly debates on *soc.culture.singapore*.

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mation" means that individuals critical of the Singapore government can quickly find themselves in direct conflict with the well-resourced PAP state machinery.

As an adjunct to this combative entry into cyberspace, the PAP government also embarked on a creative and polished information offensive. To promote positive images of business and government in Singapore, it has established its own Web site (http//www.sg/infomap/). InfoMap includes the republic's yearbook and other official publications. At the launch of InfoMap, George Yeo commented: "We should operate in cyberspace the way we operate in the international political, economic and cultural arenas. Where and when it is advantageous to move collectively under the Singapore banner, we should do so."[64] InfoMap requests for May 1996 numbered a high 511,268,[65] suggesting this service is proving attractive to users of the Internet.[66] An interagency group with representatives from both the public and private sectors has also been formed to encourage the representation of Singapore in cyberspace.

Tightening Regulatons

However, in this two-pronged strategy, the PAP government remains determined not to concede any more media control than is absolutely necessary. As George Yeo emphasized, "Censorship can no longer be 100 percent effective, but even if it is only 20 percent effective, we should not stop censoring."[67] Perseverance with this line led to the introduction in 1996 of a tough new regimen covering the Internet, suggesting authorities might be aiming higher than 20 percent. Described by Yeo as "an anti-pollution measure in cyberspace,"[68] regulation of the Internet was to transfer from the Telecommunication Authority of Singapore (TAS) to the Singapore Broadcasting Authority (SBA). The latter was to "concentrate on areas which may undermine public morals, political stability or religious harmony in Singapore."[69] Yeo distinguished between private electronic communication or "narrowcasting" and the "broadcasting" of information to millions of users at one time. He emphasized that "our interest is in the broadcasting end of the spectrum,"[70] with the focus of attention on Web sites. The SBA would monitor Web sites by sampling incoming material.

[64] George Yeo, Launch of Infomap, 8 March 1995 (http://www.gov.sg/government/speeches/new/j.htm).

[65] Web Server Statistics, "HTTP Server General Statistics," May 1996 (http://www.sg/infomap/stats/May/may.html).

[66] A user from the National Computer Board, whose Internet identity is "Teddy Bear Hugger," appears to have a specific role as facilitator of official web sites, often directing or answering enquiries about Singapore on *soc.culture.singapore*.

[67] Quoted in "Singapore to censor part of Internet," United Press International, 7 July 1995.

[68] Quoted in Bociurkiw, "Motorola to network Singapore," 1.

[69] Singapore Broadcasting Authority, "Singapore Broadcasting Authority Statement on the Internet," *The Straits Times Interactive*, 5 May 1996.

[70] Yeo quoted in Geoffrey Periera, "New Moves to Regulate the Internet Here," *The Straits Times Weekly Edition*, 9 March 1996, 24.

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The following are the main features of the 1996 regulations. First, local Internet service operators and content providers will have to be licensed and subject to SBA-imposed conditions. Second, all political parties, religious organizations, and other organizations and individuals with Web pages discussing religion or politics must register with the SBA. Third, service providers must take action to prevent the availability of "objectionable content," which threatens public security and national defense, racial and religious harmony, and public morals. This includes "contents which tend to bring the Government into hatred or contempt, or which excite disaffection against the Government" and "contents which undermine the public confidence in the administration of justice." The SBA will supply information on blacklisted sites, but service providers will need to also exercise judgment in the provision of subscription services. The use of proxy servers is required of commercial Internet access service providers, while public providers such as schools, cyber cafes, libraries, and community centers are required to connect with the proxy server and install software, such as Surfwatch and NetNanny, to restrict access to objectionable content. Fourth, licensees are required to provide details on readers targeted by their service; the names of editors, publishers, and organizations involved in the service; and keep detailed records on subscribers and their Internet use to assist with investigations. Licensees are also required to accept responsibility for content. Finally, electronic newspapers targeting subscriptions in Singapore must be registered and subject to local media laws under the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act.

The transfer of regulatory responsibility to SBA signifies that the government makes no legal distinction between the Internet and other media. As an SBA statement read: "By licensing content powers, SBA also reinforces the message that the laws of Singapore such as the Penal Code, Defamation Act, Sedition Act and Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act apply as much as to communications on the Internet as they do to the traditional print and broadcasting media." However, service operators and content providers have made the point that their positions are not analogous to that of a newspaper editor.[71] As one operator asked: "If someone uses a fax machine at a post office to send a libelous letter, should the post office be held responsible?"[72] Yet, under the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act, not only can author and editor be prosecuted for defamatory or libelous material, but the distributor and printer as well. The idea is to exert as much pressure as possible to foster self-censorship and caution in trying to avoid objectionable content.

[71] The new regulations have been condemned by Human Rights Watch, which argues that the Internet is significantly different from other broadcast media in the level of choice and control afforded to the individual. Imposing the same restrictions is seen as a response to the "Internet's potential for increasing the political participation of the disenfranchised." Quoted from letter by Sidney Jones, executive director, Human Rights Watch/Asia, to George Yeo, minister for Information and the Arts, faxed on 13 August 1996.

[72] Quoted in "Singapore Laws Apply in Cyberspace," *The Straits Times*, 24 February 1996, 23.

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The attempt to render the Internet subject to legal requirements and responsibilities comparable to other media is of course neither peculiar to Singapore nor of special political significance. Service providers such as Prodigy and Compuserve have already been sued in the United States for having allegedly libelous statements distributed across their networks.[73] In February 1996, an anonymous posting in Singapore from the CyberHeart cafe on *soc.culture.singapore* about three local lawyers immediately resulted in an apology from the cafe's owners and a disassociation from the content of the posting.[74] Several cyber cafes subsequently reconfigured their newsreaders so that patrons could only browse material and not post material on newsgroups.[75] This seeming over-reaction reflects a broader sense of vulnerability of service operators in Singapore born out of government sensitivity to criticism and an act that emphasizes the need to assure political stability and the avoidance of objectionable content.

The requirement for Web sites of political parties and religious organizations to be registered and licensed is also aimed at producing uniformity. The regulations will impose the spirit of the Societies Act, which limits public political comment. Even before these regulations were announced, one of Singapore's few organizations registered as a nonparty political discussion group ran into difficulties with its Web page when it tried to sponsor on-line political dialogue. The Socratic Circle, a small and politically moderate group of professionals, briefly held some lively political discussions in 1995 before it was informed by the Registrar of Societies that it would have to cease all activities other than recruitment and the dissemination of club information on its Web site. Public Internet discussions of politics were deemed illegal because they would involve nonmembers. It is a specific condition of the Socratic Society's registration under the Societies Act that its discussions only involve members.

While the regulations may at one level simply be a logical extension of existing curbs on other media and civil society in general, there is at least one respect in which they depart from previous legislation. Local journalist Koh Buck Song has made the important observation that SBA regulations have a much more explicit party-political component in calling for protecting the security and stability of the "government," as opposed to the "nation." Barring content that "tends to bring the *Government* into hatred or contempt, or excites disaffection against it," warns Koh, could "grant unchecked—possibly un-

[73] Stewart Baker, "The Net Escapes Censorship? Ha!" *Wired* 3(9) (http://www.hotwired.com/wired/3.09/departments/baker.if.html), 6 May 1995.

[74] Lim Li Hsien and Jimmy Yap," Libellous Message Posted on Net through Cybercafe," *The Straits Times*, 23 February 1996, 1. This posting has since been removed at the instruction of the SBA following a complaint by a law firm. See "Singapore Regulator Takes Internet Action," *Asian Wall Street Journal*, AP Dow-Jones News Service, 22 July 1996, 4.

[75] Cybertime, "Libellous Message Thru Local Cybercafe" (http://cybertime.com.sg/Features/event.htm), 23 February 1996.

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checkable—power to the ruling body to deny any criticism of it on the Internet."[76]

SBA guidelines barring "contents which undermine the public confidence in the administration of justice" are also significant. Should somebody document a case of maladministration of justice, for example, would this invite prosecution of the whistleblower?

Among regular Internet users, the new regulations came in for public criticism. Members at one Web site based at Stanford University and set up by Singaporeans studying overseas—the Singapore Internet Community (http://www-leland.stanford.edu/~chongkee/singapore.html/)—protested the new regulations: its site displayed a black ribbon, mimicking the blue badge of U.S. sites objecting to federal regulations to curb Net content.[77] One active newsgroup participant on *soc.culture.singapore*, Benedict Chong, submitted a detailed petition to the SBA from users on that discussion group. The petition opposed "any attempt to limit or control political, religious or other debate on the Internet" and expressed concern that licensing and registration requirements would lead to overcautiousness on the part of content providers and Web page designers. Moreover, the petition stated: "We do not believe that any SBA or IASP [Internet Access Service Provider] functionary has the moral authority to be the judge and jury on what constitutes 'objectionable content' especially with regards to political or social commentary."[78] Extending on this position, one contributor to Sintercom, Gerard Lim, argued: "The vagueness and carte-blanche nature of these criteria run counter to the clarity, fairness and transparency that the rule of law is supposed to provide."[79]

There was no doubt among opposition parties about the aims and implications of the licensing and registration scheme. Singapore Democratic party's secretary-general, Chee Soon Juan, welcomed the SBA's declared intentions to curb pornography, hate literature, and criminal activities. However, he asked, "What does the regulation and licensing of political parties, think-tanks, Islamic, Christian and Buddhist associations have to do with sex, hate and crime?"[80] The real agenda, he emphasized, was political control to "help buttress the PAP's total domination of Singapore's politics for a few more years."[81] He expressed concern that under the guise of "exciting disaffection against the government," authorities could stop all manner of political debate, including

[76] Quoted in Koh Buck Song, "Internet OB Markers Should Protect Nation," *The Straits Times*, 5 August, 1996, Life, 4. (Empahsis in original.)

[77] Chang, "Singapore wakes up and smells the Internet," 30.

[78] "Petition on the Proposed SBA Internet Regulations" (http.//cybertime.com.sg/Features/pet.htm), 3 July 1996.

[79] Quoted in Cherian George, "Cyberspace: Issues are Here on Earth," *The Straits Times*, 21 July 1996, 7.

[80] Quoted in Chung Tsung Lien, "How Political Groups See the Move," *The Straits Times*, 6 March 1996, 23.

[81] Ibid.

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criticisms his party had recently leveled at the government over cost of living increases. This point was echoed by National Solidarity Party (NSP) Assistant Secretary-General Steve Chia Kiah Hong, who contended: "We are a political party. If we are successful in voicing what the PAP has not done, and people begin to dislike the PAP, is that 'objectional content?'"[82] NSP Secretary-General Yip Yew Weng simply described the regulations as a "violation of democracy."[83] Nominated member of parliament (NMP) and NUS law professor, Walter Woon, made the point that, since the proposed laws can only be effective in Singapore, "the only people who will comment on Singapore politics will be foreigners and Singaporeans living in exile, and that's not healthy."[84]

Despite the SBA's announcements, the NSP subsequently proceeded with its plan to set up a Web page, making it the first opposition party to do so (http://www.nsp-singapore.com/). The NSP Web page provides detail about the party, copies of its press releases, and other information on the NSP. It also contains a political discussion board and guest book for comments to be posted—both of which appear to be well patronized. Interestingly, the introduction to the discussion board contains the following italicized caveat: "Please note that all comments are strictly the views of the authors. The National Solidarity Party shall be in no way responsible for the views, comments and actions of the users of this www political discussion board." Contrary to this disclaimer, the regulations do in fact render the NSP responsible for content on this site.

Commercial Internet content and service providers have expressed apprehension about their responsibility under the regulations for assisting the SBA in censorship. Pacific Internet's chief executive, Nicholas Lee, rather ominously explained his predicament thus: "The boundaries are still kind of grey. We have to test each case to find out where the boundaries are. The grey areas will lead to self-censorship."[85] Installation and operation of the necessary infrastructure to block content as required by the SBA has also been a significant increased cost for companies. Nevertheless, providers have fallen quickly in line with the new regulations. While subscribers of the recently established Cyberway are already on proxy-serviced lines, Pacific Internet and Signet promptly took steps to ensure all their subscribers were connected to a proxy server. Whatever executives and managers of such commercial organizations think of the tight political controls imposed through the regulations, as with other commercial media organizations operating in Singapore, these sentiments are tempered by business considerations in a rapidly expanding market.

[82] Quoted in "New Rules Easy to Follow Say Some Internet Providers," *The Straits Times*, 13 July, 1996, 29.

[83] Quoted in "How Political Parties See the Move," 23.

[84] Quoted in Matthew Lewis, "Singapore's Internet Curbs Worry Some Analysts," *The Reuter Asia-Pacific Business Report*, 6 March 1996. Students overseas commenting through the Singapore Internet Community on Singapore Electronic Forum and Speaker's corner, for example, would be outside the jurisdiction of the Singapore authorities.

[85] Quoted in Catherine Ong and Toh Han Shih, "SBA Promises Light-handed Approach to Regulating Internet," *Business Times* (Singapore), 12 July, 1996, 1.

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Amid widespread criticism and concern about the regulations, the government announced the establishment of a National Internet Advisory Committee (NIAC) comprising some nineteen members. Its job was to advise the SBA on Internet regulation and promotion.[86] Significantly, the NIAC's composition of academics, government officials, and industry representatives reflects a technical conception by the government of the issues involved and the expertise appropriate to their address. In its deliberations, the NIAC has access to the otherwise secret SBA list of blocked sites under the 1996 regulations.

Moderation and Discipline

Minister for Information and the Arts George Yeo claims authorities are concentrating on a few dozen Web sites of mass appeal, and these are predominantly about pornography. The aim, claims Yeo, is to ensure that the open areas in cyberspace are "relatively pristine and wholesome."[87] However, the government's refusal to publicly identify proscribed Web sites necessarily fosters continued caution. Where self-censorship fails, the government has been prepared to apply legal sanctions.

One of the first developments in the wake of the regulations being enacted was the establishment of a moderated version of the newsgroup *soc.culture.singapore.* The ostensible rationale for this was to "relieve the congestion in scs, raise the signal-to-noise ratio and serve as a distinct subset of scs for a more in-depth and focused discussion of highly relevant issues pertaining to Singapore and Singaporeans."[88] Certainly the popularity of *soc.culture.singapore,* which stood at about 400 postings per day by this time, did mean that comprehensively wading through postings was laborious. However, it was also the case that the newsgroup attracted messages that parodied Singapore politicians, included racial observations, as well as offering sexual services and even the occasional pornographic pictures.[89] Netters themselves voted overwhelmingly to form the separate newsgroup. This was not an attempt to impose political censorship, since items considered inconsistent with the new newsgroup's charter could still be posted on *soc.culture.singapore.* It was an implicit display of responsibility and sensitivity to the new regulations nonetheless.

[86] This committee also includes Harold Fock, who in addition to being an investment officer with the Monetary Authority of Singapore, is head of the Young PAP Internet Committee. The National Internet Advisory Committee will not just advise on bulletin board content, but foreign news wire services, and a range of other electronic information services. See "Panel Appointed to Help SBA Regulate the Internet," *The Straits Times*, 20 August 1996, 25.

[87] As quoted in Han Fook Kwang, "Why Policing the Internet is Everybody's Business," *The Straits Times,* 5 October 1996, 35.

[88] "2nd Call for Votes: soc.culture.singapore.moderated," 27 September 1996, (http://www.sintercom.org/cfv).

[89] Thomas Lee, "Surfers to Vote for Moderated Version of Singapore Forum," *The Straits Times Interactive*, 15 August 1996.

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The first incident arising in the wake of the regulations involved the closure by Singapore Telecom of a seventeen year-old student's Internet homepage which had been used to disseminate racist jokes about Malays.[90] There was little fanfare surrounding this decision, and the SBA did not need to direct the ISP involved. Instead, it acted on the basis of complaints from subscribers and, no doubt, in the knowledge of the 1996 regulations.

A more controversial and significant case involved the prosecution of Singaporean Lai Chee Chuen, who faced seventy-seven charges of possessing obscene films, including material downloaded through the Internet. Lai was fined US$43,929. In the face of public concern about random inspections of individuals' use of the Internet, authorities emphasized that the arrest of Lai followed a tip-off from Interpol, which had been probing child pornography rings using the Internet to exchange information and images. However, police would not reveal how Lai's activities were monitored once Interpol had passed on information. Local computer experts suggested that "the police could have enlisted the local Internet service providers to assist in the operation.[91]

The climate of concern was reinforced by articles appearing in *The Straits Times*, which outlined the various ways web users are vulnerable to surveillance. One such article, entitled "You Are Never Alone Out There on the Net," discussed how the technology permits: a record of which sites a user is consulting, and the frequency of such visits; how incoming e-mail messages usually remain on a hard disk cache for a long time, even after deletion, and are thus recoverable by others; and how access can be obtained to password-protected computer files through the use of password-recovery programs. It states at one point: "The features in network management programs also make reading e-mail a cinch. Your boss, should he so choose, can scrutinise your office e-mail. So try not to curse him, not on e-mail at least."[92] For many readers, "boss" would be a metaphor for government.

In an ironic further illustration of the technological susceptibility of users of the Internet to intrusion, in late 1996 the Singapore government's Web site was modified without authorization after a hacker managed to break into the network.[93] For some Singaporeans this was both amusing and discomforting at the same time. After all, if the authorities are unable to insulate themselves from such invasions, what chance does the average Net user have?

Although opposition political parties viewed the 1996 regulations as a deliberate attempt to stifle political debate, they nevertheless attempted to har-

[90] "Home Page Containing Racist Joke Closed," *The Straits Times*, 20 October 1996, 31.

[91] Ray Heath, "Net Surfers Experience Wave of Fear," *South China Morning Post*, 29 September 1996, 8.

[92] Yeong Ah Seng, "You Are Never Alone Out There on the Net," *The Straits Times*, 6 November 1996, 38. See also letter by Ng Chern Ann, "Net Paedophilia an Issue to Be Addressed," *The Straits Times*, 28 September 1996, 36.

[93] Adeline Goh, "Police Looking into Hacking of Govt Web Site," *The Straits Times*, 10 December 1996, 2.

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ness the Internet. Following the NSP's lead, the Singapore Democratic party (SDP) set up three Web sites. Two of these were attached to town councils under the jurisdiction of the party, and the other was a dedicated SDP site. However, following candidate nomination day for the general election of January 1997, the SDP and the NSP Web sites ran into difficulties. The SBA instructed both parties to remove biodata and posters of its candidates. It was deemed that the parties were in contravention of the Parliamentary Elections Act, because the rules pursuant to the act do not provide for campaigning on the Internet (although they do not proscribe them either). The SDP's Jufrie Mahmood told an election rally crowd: "We put our biodata on the Internet. This was to inform everyone. But we were told to remove biodata. They want you to have the impression that we are a bunch of clowns. Even simple information, they hide from people."[94] Hopes these parties had of circumventing stereotypes about opposition candidates in the government-controlled media through the Internet were thus short-lived.

The curbs on the use of the Internet by opposition parties were part of a broader obstruction of the exploitation of new media for political discussion or propaganda purposes. In mid-1996, the SDP had been rejected a license to sell a party political videotape on the grounds that such a medium could sensationalize political issues, would not allow for effective rebuttals, and threatened to turn political debate into a contest between advertising agencies "vying for maximum effect by evoking emotive reaction."[95]

Conclusion

The Singapore government's model of Internet control has been influential among authoritarian states in Asia. In September 1996, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) committee on culture and information met in Singapore and agreed to collaborate on finding ways to control activities on the Internet. Although the agreement did not include the adoption of a common regulatory framework, only the representative of the Philippines rejected the idea of political control.

Even before this, several Vietnamese delegations had visited Singapore to learn about Internet policing practices, and China sent senior information official Zeng Jianhui to the city-state for the same purpose.[96] In both Vietnam and China, the intention is to steer electronic information flows through officially

[94] "No Biodata on the Web. Parties Told," *The Straits Times*, 29 December 1996, 21.

[95] George Yeo quoted in Leong Ching Ching, "Using Videotapes Will Debase Politics: BG Yeo," *The Sunday Times* (Singapore), 28 July 1996, 3.

[96] Peter Meares, *Radio Australia*, 24 March 1996; Steven Schwankert, "The Giant Infant: China and the Internet," (http://www.iw.com/current/china.schmtl); Shela Teft, "China Attempts to Have its Net and Censor It Too," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 5 August 1996, 1.

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controlled channels to enhance monitoring and censorship.[97] After a brief period of blocking access to 137 sites in September 1996, Chinese officials followed the Singapore example of more selective restriction and a greater reliance on the threat posed by the possibility of monitoring. In China the technique for this is more blunt, with subscribers to the Internet having to register with local security bureaus, enabling officials to ascertain who is visiting which websites.[98] In Indonesia there had been a comparatively tolerant and unregulated climate for the Internet, but this changed following the Jakarta riots of July 1996. Authorities banned a mailing list and arrested and interrogated a local university lecturer for messages sent to Holland about the riots.[99] The Indonesian Armed Forces also subsequently established its own Web page to counter critical perspectives on the regime. In Malaysia, where there is an ambitious program to attract the world's leading multimedia companies, Minister of Information Mohamed Rahmat has proposed that Internet users be licensed for "better control on the materials that appear in the Net."[100]

Whatever inspiration the Singapore experience may provide for other authoritarian regimes, we should be clear about the distinguishing features of the model. A central feature of the Singapore strategy on Internet control is the attempt to bring this medium under the same tight regimen as other electronic and nonelectronic media. Penalties are applied at various levels of information provision and authorship—be it book sales, distribution, or publishing, for example, or Internet service provision or newsgroup hosting. These combine with legislation, open to wide interpretation, outlawing "interference in domestic politics" (as in the case of the international press) or content which "brings the Government into hatred or contempt" (as in the Internet). When the political will to obstruct certain information and views is coupled with such variables as an efficient and technically competent bureaucracy, an established regime of political intimidation and surveillance, and embedded corporatist structures facilitating cooperation between state officials and administrators across the public and private sectors, you have a formidable mix. While this mix cannot be reproduced easily, if at all, it may nevertheless be instructive for admirers of the Singapore model.

The Singapore model does not constitute a foolproof means of halting the advance of information. Moreover, the battle between control-minded authoritarians and those seeking to exploit the Internet for liberal and liberating purposes will continue as technologies and political contexts change. There cannot be a final solution in this dynamic—in Singapore or anywhere else. However,

[97] See "Vietnam Issues Internet Rules," *San Jose Mercury News*, 28 May 1997, posted on Southeast Asia Discussion List (SEASIA-L@msu.edu); Teft, "China Attempts to Have Its Net and Censor It Too," 1.

[98] Matthew Fletcher and David Hsieh, "Easing the Net Curbs: Beijing Gives in to Profit—and Reality," *Asiaweek*, 31 January 1997, 25.

[99] See Declan McCullah, "Trouble in Paradise," *Hotwired, The Netizen*, 19 August 1996.

[100] Michael Bociurkiw, "Malaysia in a Tangle over Net Rules," *Asia Times*, 5 June 1997, 16.

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against liberal expectations of the Internet as a force for the erosion of authoritarian states and the empowerment of individuals and civil society, this study suggests a very different proposition must be taken seriously: such technology can also be harnessed by some states to consolidate a climate of fear and intimidation and create new opportunities to disseminate propaganda and information in their favor. The possibility of the Internet becoming another medium dominated by the powerful is real and has implications beyond Asia.*

* Thanks to Robert Roche for valuable research assistance in the preparation of this article.

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The Joint Chiefs of Staff: From Service Parochialism to Jointness

PETER J. ROMAN
DAVID W. TARR

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) is responsible for managing the U.S. armed services. It represents the interests of the military and participates in the national security policy-making process. The JCS can facilitate or harm an administration's pursuit of its national security policy objectives. Above all, the relationship between the Joint Chiefs and the president is the central link in civil-military relations in the United States.

Since World War II, the JCS has been the institution to manage and coordinate the separate military services. Interservice rivalry has been endemic to the armed forces of the United States. C. Kenneth Allard persuasively argues that in coping with the challenges that military operations on land, sea, and air have posed for America's armed services over their entire histories, each branch of the military developed its own entrenched and distinctive "strategic paradigm."[1] In a similar vein, Carl H. Builder asserts that "the most powerful institutions in the American national security arena are the military services—the Army, Navy, and Air Force—not the Department of Defense. . . ." and that each of these institutions ". . . ha[s] distinct and enduring personalities." These service identities and personalities make them almost impervious to change from the outside, Builder argues. Hence their continuing autonomous and self-interested behavior.[2]

[1] The paradigms for each service are, briefly put, land power (Carl von Clausewitz), sea power (Alfred Thayer Mahan), and air power (Giulio Douhet). C. Kenneth Allard, *Command, Control, and the Common Defense* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).

[2] Carl H. Builder, *The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 3, 204.

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The command, control, and coordination problems associated with America's organizationally separated armed forces have been the object of institutional reforms throughout the twentieth century. Separate service interests and distinctive service personalities constitute the ideological, psychological, and doctrinal basis for parochial service orientations. That is, the army, navy, and air force each have unique strategic doctrines, service cultures, and interests that reinforce their preferences for autonomous organization and operations, and that undermine efforts and agencies for interservice coordination.

From the beginning, the Joint Chiefs of Staff functioned as a committee of autonomous service heads. They wore two hats—one as chief of staff, where each was commander of his own forces and promoted his service's interest in the policy process; and the other hat, where each served as a member of the corporate Joint Chiefs of Staff, which obligated him to rise above his service interests to address the nation's security interests by contributing a unified military perspective. But a significant legacy of service autonomy was the JCS decision-making principle of unanimity; that is, all the chiefs had to agree, or the JCS could not take a position on an item.

It is significant that "jointness" originated as a military concept within the JCS, a committee where service chiefs attempted to work together as separate entities, from separate traditions and orientations. "Joint" meant combining the services, such as the chiefs in the JCS committee, or military units from several services in the field—a joint operation. Jointness implied team work among members of separate teams, wearing different uniforms. Neither the chiefs nor their service organizations had any truly unified experience or doctrine for command, control, and operation of the American military services.

In the pages that follow we argue that a norm of jointness, imposed from the top down, is now clearly evident in how the military functions. This new kind of jointness requires centralization and integration of organizations, doctrines, resources, and command. The key to this change lies in the implementation of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986—commonly known as Goldwater-Nichols—which changed how the Joint Chiefs of Staff functioned. Prior to 1986 the joint or unified perspective was seriously compromised by the allegiance of the service chiefs to their own service interests, but the evidence now shows that service parochialism is being suppressed in favor of fully integrated military advice.

We will show that the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 and its subsequent implementation have combined to transform the JCS system.[3] The dominant norm for the JCS is no longer parochial protection of individual service interests, but a norm of jointness, in which service perspectives, forces, and doctrines are genuinely integrated. The chairman can now provide civilian

[3] This article is based on a larger project on military advice to civilian leaders. We are conducting interviews with senior civilian and military policy makers, both active and retired. To date, we have conducted over 120 interviews. All of our interviews are on a not-for-attribution basis. In this article, we use the term "flag officer" in reference to both admirals and generals.

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decision makers with a unified military perspective. He can recommend the use of trained, joint forces in operations in military theaters abroad, manage the JCS organization, and speak for the military as a whole in high-level interagency deliberations. The JCS organization is now a force for service integration imposed from the top down.[4]

The Old Corporate JCS System

President Franklin D. Roosevelt created the Joint Chiefs of Staff ad hoc during World War II to organize the services to fight. In 1947 Congress established the JCS by law as a permanent institution with passage of the National Security Act.[5] This act created the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, and the commanders in chief of the unified commands (CINCs),[6] which were designed to provide policy advice that crossed individual service perspectives and unified plans and operational coordination in the conduct of military operations.

Drawn from the experience and precedents of the Joint Chiefs organization during World War II, the new organizational structure kept power in the hands of the separate armed services, each of which could check the joint community despite the nominal unification of the defense establishment. By this legislation, military service autonomy was confederated but by no means eliminated. The National Security Act maintained the essence of service autonomy. Parochialism was colorfully expressed by World War II hero Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey in testimony before a Senate committee in 1945. He urged Congress to reject proposals that would allow the military chiefs of the other services to determine Navy policies: "I, for one," thundered Halsey, "am unwilling to have the Chief of the Army Air Force pass on the question of whether or not the navy should have funds for building and maintaining a balanced fleet. One might just as well ask a committee composed of a Protestant, a Catholic, and a Jew to save our national souls by recommending a national church or creed."[7]

At the top of the military hierarchy stood the Joint Chiefs of Staff, consisting of the four service chiefs (army, navy, air force and, after 1952, the marines), and, with 1949 amendments, a chairman. The Act stipulated that the JCS "shall act as the principal military advisers to the President and Secretary of Defense."[8] As amended in 1949, they were designated advisers to the National

[4] Jointness may not yet penetrate very far down the ladder into the separate military services, but it is clear in the operational mode in the unified and specified commands, as we explain below.

[5] For more on the National Security Act, see Demetrios Caraley, *The Politics of Military Unification: A Study of Conflict and the Policy Process* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966).

[6] The provisions of the act outlined the duties of the JCS, one of which was ". . . to establish unified commands in strategic areas when unified commands are in the interest of national security." Public Law 80-253.

[7] Quoted in Allard, *Command, Control, and the Common Defense*, 116.

[8] *The Department of Defense: Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944–1978*, edited by Alice C. Cole, Alfred Goldberg, Samuel A. Tucker, and Rudolf A. Winnacker (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Historical Office, 1978).

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Security Council (NSC) as well. These three entities were subsequently to be known as the National Command Authorities (NCA).

The JCS were required to arrive at decisions and policy advice as a corporate body, which meant that a single, unified view was expected. If the chiefs were deadlocked, the chairman did not have the authority to force a resolution, nor could he substitute his own advice to give to civilian authorities.[9] Either the issue remained unresolved or a "split" paper was sent to the secretary of Defense. In some cases, the split paper was forwarded to the NSC, where the deadlock was resolved. Thus, the services could defend their own parochial interests by not concurring, but if they failed to achieve consensus, they risked increased civilian intrusion into policy domains that were normally the prerogative of the uniformed military.[10]

Because of the strong incentive to reach consensus within the JCS, the chiefs developed several mechanisms to facilitate agreement. The first, the Joint Staff, evolved out of a series of committees into an expanded staff of functional directorates.[11] The Joint Staff worked for the director—as it still does—but for most of its history it served as the staff for the corporate JCS, not as the staff of the chairman. Officers regarded service on the Joint Staff, like other joint assignments, as an unattractive career option; it provided few opportunities for promotion. The Joint Staff became populated by the soon-to-be retired and, in the words of one flag officer on the Joint Staff, the "sick, lame, and lazy."[12] Consequently, the Joint Staff rarely posed formidable policy alternatives to those developed by the services.

The Joint Staff managed a complex coordination procedure to generate JCS policy advice. Sometimes called "flimsy-buff-green-red stripe" for the colors and sequence of the respective papers, drafts of policy papers were coordinated between the Joint Staff and the staffs of each of the services. If agreement could not be reached by the Joint Staff and service staffers, the paper together with the disagreements was kicked up to their superiors. The requirement for JCS consensus gave the service staffs great leverage in this policy coordination process and created an incentive for each service to hold out until its position was satisfied. After several iterations, a disputed paper would reach the Operations Deputies (OPSDEPS) committee, a group of three-star flag officers from the services and the Joint Staff, or perhaps even the chiefs. According to one study "a dissenting Service thus can force any issue to the agenda of the JCS—

[9] Informally, most chairmen would provide their own views to the president and secretary of Defense.

[10] For example, decision to create a Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) for nuclear war planning was made by President Eisenhower only after the JCS could not agree and a split paper was forwarded to Defense Secretary Thomas Gates. See Peter J. Roman, *Eisenhower and the Missile Gap* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), 99–105.

[11] *A Concise History of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-1978* (mimeograph, Historical Division, JCS, March 1979), 19, 44.

[12] Interview with flag officer.

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still another committee. Though the issue may be of interest only to one or two of the four chiefs, and in the opinion of the others not require their joint consideration, it still comes before the five-member tribunal, and they must deal with it."[13] Although only a handful of issues could be addressed personally by the chiefs,[14] these were usually the most controversial—the ones that the deputies and other staff officers had already fought over. A service chief facing a contentious issue was often reluctant to depart from his service position; to do so would likely undermine support within the service for his leadership. Chiefs found themselves in the grip of the service action officers, often referred to as the iron majors, who did the staff work.[15]

Service parochialism, combined with the need for consensus, rendered the JCS process largely ineffective. A flag officer who served on the Joint Staff in the early 1980s characterized JCS deliberations under the corporate system as follows: "It will take the JCS a week to decide how many angels can dance on the head of a pin or what to have for lunch next Tuesday. It doesn't matter what they are deciding; it still takes a week. The JCS are not used to making decisions quickly and get very upset when they are forced to do so. Further, the JCS are reluctant to offer advice on their own initiative, except on a few that might be service initiatives.[16]

Service parochialism that dominated the JCS also kept the unified and specified commanders—the CINCs—weakened. These four star officers were responsible for planning and conducting military operations, frequently with forces drawn from more than one service. Their capacity for joint operations was constrained by a number of factors: parochial service cultures, promotion regulations that dissuaded officers from serving in joint positions, directives that limited a CINC's authority over his forces, and the legacy of an executive-agent system for service management of the commands.[17] Much of the power in the unified commands in this system lay in the hands of the service representatives in the commands—the service component commanders. The services benefited from this system, because they could influence operational decisions thereby strengthening their primary functions of training and equipping forces.[18] Thus, in the pre-Goldwater-Nichols system, the services could control

[13] Report for the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff by the chairman's Special Study Group, *The Organization and Functions of the JCS* (the "Brehm report"), April 1982, 9.

[14] In 1976, Lawrence Korb estimated that the chiefs personally decided 2.8 percent of the approximate 15,000 issues examined in this process. Lawrence Korb, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First Twenty-Five Years* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), 22–23.

[15] Maxwell D. Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), 90.

[16] Interview with flag officer.

[17] John H. Cushman, *Command and Control of Theater Forces: Adequacy* (Washington, DC: AFCEA International Press, n.d.), 50–57.

[18] House Armed Services Committee, *Report on the Bill Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (H.R. 4370)*, 99th Congress, 2nd sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, [GPO], 1986), 33.

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both the JCS and the CINCs, and ensure that military advice and policy promoted their respective interests.

The deficiencies of the old corporate JCS system were apparent in many realms. In long-term planning, the JCS created a process for generating joint planning documents, but the process often broke down because of interservice rivalry and produced bland documents that merely compiled service views. Sometimes the services blocked the process altogether.[19] Similarly, JCS participation in defense budgeting developed slowly because the National Security Act did not assign a budgetary role to the JCS.[20] Consequently, the JCS remained ineffective in providing a joint overview of defense programs. Even when civilians sought JCS advice on budget matters, their responses were often useless, because they failed to set priorities. This was as true during the Eisenhower administration as it was in the Reagan administration.[21] During crises, the parochial propensities of the JCS tended to be less pronounced, but complaints still arose about the quality of JCS contributions.

The most important customers of the JCS—presidents—often expressed dissatisfaction with the advice they received. According to Lawrence Korb, "At one time or another, all of the post-World War II presidents have accused the JCS of failing to fulfill its responsibilities in the policy process."[22] For example, President Dwight D. Eisenhower frequently complained that the chiefs failed to take sufficiently broad perspectives on military affairs, and he exhorted them to think more jointly. In 1956, Eisenhower, frustrated with interservice rivalry over the budget, told Defense Secretary Charles Wilson that "the Chiefs of Staff system we now have has failed. . . . Apparently the system is wrong."[23] President John F. Kennedy expressed similar concerns and even issued a National Security Action Memorandum which delineated how the chiefs should advise him: "While I look to the Chiefs to present the military factor without reserve or hesitation, I regard them to be more than military men and expect their help in fitting military requirements into the overall context of any situa-

[19] See Lt. General Bernard E. Trainor USMC (Ret), "The JCS Deliberate Planning Process" in Trainor, *The Reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: A Critical Analysis* (New York: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986), 44. Also see, Robert J. Watson, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume 5: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953-1954* (Washington, DC: JCS Historical Division, 1986), chap. 4; Kenneth W. Condit, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume 6: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1955–1956* (Washington, DC: JCS Historical Division, 1992), chap. 2.

[20] "The National Security Act of 1947–26 July 1947" in *The Department of Defense: Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944–1978* edited by Cole, Goldberg, Tucker, and Winnacker (Washington, DC: OSD Historical Office, 1978), 45, 46.

[21] Compare, Roman, *Eisenhower and the Missile Gap*, 133–135 and William J. Lynn and Barry R. Posen, "The Case of JCS Reform," *International Security* 10 (1985–86): 70, 78.

[22] Lawrence J. Korb, *The Fall and Rise of the Pentagon* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979), 112.

[23] Memorandum of Conversation with the President (MCP) on 18 May 1956, Andrew Goodpaster, in U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume 19: National Security Policy* (Washington: GPO, 1990), 305. Also, MCP on 11 October 1960, Goodpaster, 12 October 1960, Staff Notes–October 1960 (1) folder, Ann Whitman files, Eisenhower Diaries series, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abiline, KS.

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tion, recognizing that the most difficult problem in Government is to combine all assets in a unified, effective pattern."[24]

Other presidents and their administrations encountered problems with the JCS as well, although some were unrelated to the corporate nature of the institution. But despite dissatisfaction with the corporate JCS system and the occasional calls for reform, in the four decades after the passage of the National Security Act, no significant alterations were initiated. To compensate, many policy makers circumvented the JCS system by garnering policy advice from other actors, such as the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) staff or military officers assigned outside the JCS and service staffs.

The JCS Reform Movement

In the early 1980s a defense reform movement arose. It focused on, among other things, the inadequacy of the JCS system for generating advice and on the endemic operational problems encountered by the CINCs. On 3 February 1982, the sitting JCS chairman, General David Jones, told a closed session of the House Armed Services Committee that restructuring the JCS would be his priority for the rest of his tenure as chairman and in his retirement. Although complaints about the JCS had circulated for years, never had a chairman spearheaded them. In a series of public statements, General Jones argued that the JCS could not deliver effective advice because the individual service chiefs represented narrow service interests.[25] Problems arising from dual hatting of the service chiefs were exacerbated by their desire for unanimity when advising civilian authorities. With a weak chairman unable to force a resolution, this JCS system, according to Jones, produced advice that was "not crisp, timely, very useful or very influential. And that advice is often watered down and issues are papered over in the interest of achieving unanimity."[26]

Jones initiated the most prolonged public discussion of defense organization in four decades. Both houses of Congress conducted hearings; analyses were provided by the academic community, think tanks, and even the Congress itself.[27] The principal charge of advocates of reform was that the JCS had consis-

[24] Quoted in Lt. General Victor H. Krulak, USMC, (Ret.), *Organization for National Security: A Study* (Washington, DC: United States Strategic Institute, 1987), 85–86.

[25] General David Jones, "Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 12 (Spring 1982): 138–149; Jones, "What's Wrong With Our Defense Establishment," *New York Times Sunday Magazine*, 11 May 1982, 38.

[26] Quoted in Senate Armed Services Committee Staff Report, *Defense Organization: The Need for Change* [Hereafter cited as "Locher Report"], 99th Congress, 1st sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1985), 158.

[27] Notable are Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Organization, Structure, and Decisionmaking Processes of the Department of Defense, Hearings*, 98th Congress, 1st sess., 1983, parts 1–12 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1983); Robert J. Art, Vincent Davis, and Samuel P. Huntington, *Reorganizing America's Defense: Leadership in War and Peace* (New York: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985); *Toward a More Effective Defense: The Final Report of the CSIS Defense Organization Project* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1985).

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tently failed to develop effective, unified advice for civilian leaders because of service parochialism and consensus decision-making procedures. Three former secretaries of Defense sided with the reformers. James Schlesinger observed that "the proffered advice is generally irrelevant, normally unread, and almost always disregarded."[28] Melvin Laird told the Senate that "as now organized, the JCS are too frequently unable to provide effective cross-service advice on issues that affect important service interests and prerogatives."[29] Harold Brown wrote that "the result [of interservice policy procedures] is often the lowest-common-denominator resolution of differences in service positions, adding together requests rather than making hard choices either between services or between operational theaters."[30] These former defense secretaries made a persuasive case that civilian leaders received advice compromised to protect all four services—joint in name but certainly not in spirit.

American military operations in Grenada and Lebanon in 1983 underscored defense reformers' assertions that service parochialism contributed to operational ineffectiveness and inefficiency. Strongly critical of the JCS roles in these and other operations, reformers focused on four points.[31] First, reformers argued that service parochialism created a tendency for each chief to "roll" the CINC to insure that his service got a piece of the operation. This was evident in the design of the Desert One force as well as the task force that invaded Grenada.[32] Second, reformers pointed to the fact that service chiefs detracted from joint operations through their connections to their service component commanders in the unified commands. Ambiguous command responsibilities, excessive layers of command, and an inflexible chain that resisted the integration of Washington's political objectives with the requirements of the field commander plagued the CINCs.[33]

[28] Quoted in *Locher Report*, 5. Schlesinger testified that "The Secretary of Defense is sometimes rebuked for not reading those documents [JCS policy documents]. In my brief inquiry of members of the JCS, the members of the JCS do not read those documents either." U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings on Reorganization of the Department of Defense*, 99th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1987), 210–211.

[29] U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings on Reorganization of the Department of Defense*, 651.

[30] Harold Brown, *Thinking About National Security* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), 209.

[31] Among the events were operations in Vietnam, the attempted rescue of the *Mayaguez*, the attempted rescue of the American hostages in Iran, the bombing of the Marines in Lebanon, and the invasion of Grenada. For a discussion of these events, see Richard Gabriel, *Military Incompetence: Why the American Military Doesn't Win* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1985).

[32] According to one flag officer on the Joint Staff at the time of the Grenada invasion: "On the Thursday before the Monday invasion date, the Marine in the JCS said that they needed to have a Marine contribution for the future of the Corps. As a result, the Grenada operation went from a night Special Operations mission to a day conventional attack." Confidential interview with Joint Staff flag officer. See also, Gabriel, *Military Incompetence*, chaps. 4, 6: Lynn and Posen, "The Case for JCS Reform," 83–85; Major Mark Adkin, *Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), chap. 7.

[33] Admiral Robert Long (Ret.), *Report of the DoD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act* (mimeograph, 20 December 1983).

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Third, critics noted that the JCS intervened in operational tactics far in excess of any statutory authority, even to the point of issuing specific orders to commanders in the field. According to one of the Marine ground commanders in Lebanon: "You see the strong hand of the JCS in Beirut. . . . The JCS executed orders with some level of detail. Combatant commanders would write orders and hope that the JCS sent it back to them."[34] Fourth, service parochialism in organizing forces undermined coordination between the services on the battlefield. Because of service-driven budget choices, the armed forces lacked the doctrine, training, familiarity, and technical capability to perform jointly. One officer who served on the Joint Staff after Grenada said that the lack of joint training made the Grenada operation like "trying to win the World Series with a sandlot team."[35] The failure of the different services to communicate during the Grenada invasion had at least one mundane root: The director of the Joint Staff, Lt. General Jack Merritt, failed to alert the Joint Staff's director of command and control, Lt. General Robert Herres, of the impending operation to preserve its secrecy. As a result, no special measures were taken in the Pentagon to insure that the invading forces from the different services could communicate with each other. But if forces had been organized in a more joint and integrated manner, such measures would not have been necessary in the first place.

Although slow to respond to the accusations of defense reformers, the Defense Department led by Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and the navy presented a united front against any radical reorganization. Weinberger and some former and sitting chiefs repudiated the reformers' characterization of JCS advice. Weinberger said that the charge of service parochialism "is simply not the case with the chiefs with whom I have worked."[36] General John Vessey, less than a year after retiring as chairman, argued that if the reformers' charges were true, "I would have been chairman for only enough time to submit my resignation."[37] The sitting chiefs uniformly claimed that dual-hatting did not prevent effective advice. A "disturbed" Marine Commandant, General P. X. Kelley, told the Senate that "to say that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have normally been unable to subordinate the interests of their parent Services to the large interests of national defense is an intemperate observation which I do not accept—nor should you!"[38] These chiefs and other opponents of reform believed that dual-hatting worked and that the responsibilities for advising civilian authorities and for managing the services should not be separated.[39]

[34] Confidential interview. General Norman Schwarzkopf discusses the same problem with respect to Grenada. H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, *It Doesn't Take A Hero* (New York: Linda Grey/Bantam Books, 1992), 255–256.

[35] Confidential interview with Joint Staff officer.

[36] U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings on Reorganization of the Department of Defense*, 81.

[37] Ibid., 401.

[38] Ibid., 518.

[39] See the testimony of Admiral James Watkins, chief of Naval Operations, ibid., 502–513.

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Defenders of the JCS system pointed out that General Vessey had initiated internal measures to improve the development of joint perspectives from the Joint Staff and to increase the authority of the CINCs.[40] They also argued that trying to fix these problems by consolidating power in the office of the JCS chairman was contrary to the American tradition of checks and balances in governing institutions. Some doubted whether military advice to civilians would improve through a stronger chairman. Centralizing military advice under the JCS chairman, they warned, might make civilian leaders less aware of dissenting viewpoints. They feared reorganization might narrow the diversity of military viewpoints conveyed to civilian leaders. Navy Secretary John Lehman argued "the inability of civilian leaders to compete with the view of a single, all-powerful senior officer would leave a President no choice but to disregard completely or accept without question the opinion of his sole military advisor."[41] Thus, for opponents of defense reform, changes in the system were unnecessary and risked undermining civilian control of the military.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act

After several years of study and debate, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986.[42] The act contained provisions designed to enlarge the authority of the JCS chairman in order to improve advice to the president, as well as to strengthen other joint institutions. These changes came at the expense of the services, who found their influence curtailed by the legislation. The shift in authority and responsibility within the highest levels of the military changed the distribution of power within the JCS and also altered both how the military generates advice and how the military leadership interacts with civilian authorities.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act deemphasized the corporate responsibilities of the JCS and strengthened the chairman. Under the act, the chairman, rather than the JCS as a whole, is designated as the "principal military adviser" to the senior civilian leadership (the president, secretary of Defense, and the NSC). The law allows the chairman to attend and participate in NSC meetings at the discretion of the president.[43] The act named the service chiefs as "military advis-

[40] *Organizing for National Security: The Role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff* (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1986), 7–10.

[41] U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings on Reorganization of the Department of Defense*, 602.

[42] The best overview of the events leading to the Goldwater-Nichols act is Thomas L. McNaugher with Roger L. Sperry, "Improving Military Coordination: The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization of the Department of Defense" in Robert S. Gilmour and Alexis A. Halley, eds., *Who Makes Public Policy?* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1994), 219–258. Also see Vincent Davis, "Organization and Management" in Joseph Kruzel ed., *American Defense Annual, 1987–1988* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987), 171–200.

[43] *The Goldwater-Nichols Act, U.S. Code*, vol. 50, sec. 402 (1986). The chiefs endorsed this on the grounds that it simply codified the existing relationship.

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ers" to the civilian leadership and specified that the chairman notify the president if any chief dissents from his position, but the chairman is now individually responsible for advising the civilian leadership and is freed from service parochialism when formulating advice.[44] The act directs the chairman—not the corporate JCS—to provide planning and advice to the civilian leadership on a variety of subjects, including strategic plans, net assessments, contingency plans, readiness, requirements, budgets, joint doctrine, and service roles and missions.[45] The degree of service influence over his policy advice would be determined by how the chairman chooses to exercise his new statutory authority.

Congressional reformers recognized that a chairman could not realize this expanded role without independent staff support. The act, therefore, placed the Joint Staff under the chairman rather than the corporate JCS and created a new position of vice chairman of the JCS (VCJCS).[46] The vice chairman functions as the chairman's deputy, represents the chairman at many interagency meetings, and chairs the JCS in his absence. Thus, the Goldwater-Nichols Act sought to improve the quality of military advice to civilian leaders, both by enlarging the authority of the chairman and by providing the staff support necessary to do this.

Another section of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was aimed at reducing the influence of service parochialism on operations. The act clarified the chain of command by stating that operational authority ran from the president to the secretary of Defense and then directly to the CINCs.[47] The service chiefs and service secretaries were excluded from operational command responsibilities. While the act keeps the chairman technically out of the chain of command, it allows the president to direct that communications "between" the president or secretary and the CINCs be "transmitted" through the chairman.[48] Additionally, the act gave the chairman, at the discretion of the secretary of Defense, responsibility for oversight of the CINCs.[49] These sections were designed to diminish service influence over operational matters and give the commanders in charge of operations a greater voice in Washington. By linking CINC representation to the chairman, these provisions also further the objective by strengthening the chairman.

Finally, Goldwater-Nichols included provisions to encourage the development of joint perspectives in the officer corps. It created a new joint career track, mandated that officers in joint assignments receive the same promotion opportunities as officers on service staffs, and most importantly required joint

[44] Ibid., sec. 151.

[45] Ibid., sec. 153.

[46] Ibid., sec. 155.

[47] Ibid., sec. 162.

[48] Ibid., sec. 163.

[49] If these measures were not enough to increase CINC representation in Washington policy deliberations, the Goldwater-Nichols Act designated the chairman as "spokesman" for the CINCs, "especially on the operational requirements of their commands." Ibid.

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duty before any officer can receive his/her first star.[50] Together, these measures were designed to socialize the future senior officers in jointness.

To summarize the alleged defects of the corporate JCS system: the old system was considered by congressional reformers to be ineffective in developing policy advice while contributing to operational ineffectiveness. The services were judged to be the major culprits. Service interests dominated the corporate advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prevented the Joint Staff from formulating joint policy positions, and undermined the CINCs' efforts to conduct effective joint planning and operations. In place of this service dominated system, Goldwater-Nichols elevated and clarified the authority of the JCS chairman and the unified and specified commanders. By shifting authority away from the individual services, it sought to improve the quality of military advice and operational planning.

Goldwater-Nichols altered the advisory process between civilians and the military in two important ways. It affected the advisory process directly by establishing the chairman as the principal military adviser and making him responsible for formulating advice on a number of specific issues. It affected the process indirectly by decreasing the authority of the chiefs and their services over operational matters and increasing the power of the CINCs. By changing how the senior military leadership interacted with each other, Goldwater-Nichols changed how they would relate to civilians in the policy process.

The JCS after Goldwater-Nichols

The Goldwater-Nichols reforms have had their intended effect: a tremendous change is underway within the military. Jointness has largely supplanted service parochialism; it is now the way to get things done and for officers to get ahead. The joint arena even has its own professional journal—*Joint Force Quarterly.* While jointness may have been anathema in the past, now it has become in the words of numerous senior officers, "politically correct." Goldwater-Nichols has succeeded in empowering the joint community as intended—and perhaps even beyond the drafters' expectations. This section addresses how jointness has taken hold in the Joint Chiefs of Staff system.

Changes in the JCS system materialized slowly at first, as senior military leaders grappled with what needed to be changed, how to change it, and how the new system should operate. But the consequences of Goldwater-Nichols for the JCS depended on how each chairman decided to exercise his new powers. Indeed, there was nothing in the law preventing a chairman from simply continuing the corporate JCS system without alterations.

The first Goldwater-Nichols chairman, Admiral William Crowe, implemented the new statute cautiously. He later wrote: "I made a deliberate decision to move gradually in inaugurating the new format. Rather than baldly as-

[50] Goldwater-Nichols Act, secs. 661–664.

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serting my authority, I would allow the chiefs to accommodate to the new bill by degrees."[51] In the words of one director of the Joint Staff: "Admiral Crowe didn't take the bill and say everyone fall in line. He recognized the need for a transition period. This allowed for a smoother approach when General [Colin] Powell became chairman. Crowe laid the vines so that Powell could harvest the grapes. If Crowe had just executed the law he would have broken the glass such that it couldn't ever be put back together."[52]

Crowe was confronted with a complex system of JCS directives and procedures that had existed for decades.[53] More importantly, Crowe tried to maintain the corporate format of JCS decision making as much as he could.[54] One senior flag officer recalled when Crowe finally broke from the chiefs and offered his own advice: "Crowe sweated blood over this and didn't want to exercise his new powers. I don't think Crowe's decision was viewed as being very important but it was how he made the decision. Most saw it as the chairman was doing something improper, by parting company with the rest of the chiefs."[55]

The chiefs who served in this period were accustomed to the unanimity rule and expected it to continue.[56] But implementation of the act increased over time with the appointment of new service chiefs and especially with the next chairman, General Colin Powell. Eventually, significant changes accumulated and have been institutionalized. The result is a JCS system that is far different from the pre-1986 corporate one. We will examine the four most important changes: the socialization of the chiefs to the values of jointness; the relationship between the service chiefs and the chairman; the joint planning process; and the power of the Joint Staff.

Socialization of the chiefs in joint culture. While each chief must advocate, protect, and promote his service's respective interests, all now show a greater appreciation of the need for jointness. One reason is that the chiefs increasingly have their own strong credentials in the joint world—CINC or component

[51] Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr. with David Chanoff, *The Line of Fire* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 160.

[52] Confidential interview with a former director of the Joint Staff.

[53] One member of the JCS at the time stated that: "When Goldwater-Nichols came into effect, the Joint Staff had directives that were full of regulations that talked about the JCS in the old corporate language. To change these regulations, simply considering the clerical aspect, was an enormous undertaking." Confidential interview with JCS member.

[54] Crowe wrote: "This was no time for a heavy hand. The chiefs could circle the wagons at any time. Moving too abruptly might well inspire a destructive insiders' campaign against Goldwater-Nichols provisions that could have severe future consequences." Crowe, *Line of Fire*, 160.

[55] Confidential interview.

[56] According to General Herres, Crowe and Powell "both realized that we need to proceed cautiously; we need to keep the Services and the Service chiefs with us in the process of change. We don't need to do anything terribly dramatic because we've made great progress; so let's take this one step at a time and work our way through it." *Interview with General Robert T. Herres, USAF, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff* (13 February, 20 February 1990), conducted by Willard Webb, Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Mimeograph copy, 16.

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level—often far above the amount of joint assignment mandated by Goldwater-Nichols for flag rank. General Ronald Fogelman, Air Force chief of staff and a former CINC, said: "I will tell you that I think there will be very few service Chiefs in the future who have not served as a CINC."[57] Indeed, the strongest proponents of jointness among the senior military leadership we have interviewed acknowledged their own efforts to inculcate junior flag officers with "jointness" in the hope that they would "spread the religion" when they went to their next assignments.

Relations between the chairman and the chiefs. The statutory changes established the chairman as the principal military adviser and made him personally responsible for advice in a number of specific subjects. Freeing the chairman from the chiefs has altered JCS behavior in three key respects. First, the JCS now functions as an advisory body to the chairman and not as a decision-making body. A number of chiefs in interviews have likened the JCS to a "board of directors." The first JCS vice chairman, General Robert Herres, remarked: "What the previous Chairman [Admiral Crowe] and what this Chairman [General Powell] has picked up on and done very much the same—I see the pattern taking place exactly the same way—is transform the relationship so that the Chiefs have become advisers to the Chairman. When I explain this to audiences, I point out that, in my view, they are probably the Chairman's most important advisers, although he gets advice from a lot of places."[58] General Powell, by making full use of his authority under Goldwater-Nichols, institutionalized this change in the dynamics of the JCS. General John Shalikashvili followed suit.

Second, the relationship between the chiefs and the chairman has become more collegial. The chiefs know that the chairman can give any policy advice he wants. In his autobiography, Powell notes that "I did not have to take a vote among the chiefs before recommending anything. I did not even have to consult them, though it would be foolish not to do so."[59] It is therefore in a chief's interest to work with the chairman as much as possible to insure that his position is taken into account. In the new JCS Goldwater-Nichols system, cooperation is rewarded, whereas in the old corporate system a strong incentive existed not to cooperate in order to protect the service positions. Perhaps the best indication of the current collegial process is the fact that there is little evidence of dissent by a chief to the chairman's position or of appeals to the secretary of Defense or president. General Herres observed in a 1990 interview: "In the three years of Goldwater-Nichols there hasn't been a dissenting piece of advice

[57] *General Ronald R. Fogelman, Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command and Commander, Air Mobility Command: An Oral History* conducted by James K. Matthews and John Leland, March 1995, 25.

[58] *Interview with General Robert T. Herres*, 13.

[59] Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, *My American Journey* (New York: Random House, 1995), 447.

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provided. I think the significance there and one of the interesting things about the new system is that it requires a Chief, if he does disagree with the advice of the chairman, to make his own case. So it's now a little bit different from as before, disagreeing in the participatory process of developing *corporate* advice. When you disagree now, you're going to have to defend your views in the face of potential criticism."[60]

Third, a chairman can now shape how the chiefs interact. General Powell deliberately moved away from the formal, twice-weekly JCS sessions in the Tank, the conference room used for official meetings. He favored more informal discussions, either in the chairman's office or over the telephone. For example, the key JCS meeting for the invasion of Panama took place in Powell's living room on a Sunday morning.[61] One chief told us that Powell "quit addressing substantive issues in the Tank."[62] This change from formal to informal JCS meetings fit General Powell's personal style while extending the objectives of Goldwater-Nichols. Powell writes: "I also preferred meeting with the chiefs in my office instead of the Tank, which carried the baggage of the old corporate body. I also stopped putting out fixed agendas for the JCS meetings. . . . As a result, the chiefs did not come to my office loaded with positions that they felt they had to defend. They actually had greater freedom in speaking their minds. Since we no longer voted, they did not have to go back to their bureaucracies and defend a vote. Some will no doubt dispute me, but I believe this new style gave the chiefs more clout than they had enjoyed as a more formal body."[63] By taking the service staffs out of these JCS meetings, Powell enabled the chiefs to wear their joint hats with greater ease and to work together to develop unified military advice.

The chiefs evidently welcomed this deemphasis of the Tank format more than one might expect. Tank meetings in the pre-Goldwater-Nichols period were often unproductive. One senior flag officer who attended many sessions recalled: "During Jones and even up to Crowe, chiefs met on a lot of monotonous issues. You sit and think, 'why are we going to meet on this?' . . . If there was nothing to meet about, the Joint Staff would make something up."[64] Another chief stated that "I never heard a chief complain about not having to go into the Tank."[65] The reduction in Tank sessions gave the chiefs more time to

[60] *Interview with General Robert T. Herres*, 17. (Emphasis in original.)

[61] This meeting is discussed in Bob Woodward, *The Commanders* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 162–167; Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, *Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama* (New York: Lexington Books, 1991) 89; Powell, *My American Journey*, 422–423.

[62] Confidential interview with JCS member.

[63] Powell, *My American Journey*, 448.

[64] Confidential interview with senior flag officer.

[65] This chief went on to explain why being a chief of staff is not very enjoyable. "I don't know of a chief of staff who was sad when his term was up. I don't see that nostalgia bullshit in the office. Sitting at my retirement ceremony, I thought that what I really wanted was a giant video screen that showed Martin Luther King saying 'Free at last, free at last, thank God almighty, free at last.' No field commander would ever feel that way. Serving as chief of staff is not fun." Confidential interview with JCS member.

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devote to their service duties. Thus, the chiefs were in the words of one chief, "ready for a change" and "witting accomplices" to Powell's style.[66]

General Shalikashvili followed the same pattern as Powell with respect to JCS meetings. Some attributed this to the fact that Shalikashvili served as Powell's assistant. According to one chief, "we have meetings when needed and not when not needed."[67] Thus, driven by the personality of the chairman and the authority accorded him by the Goldwater-Nichols act, the interactions among the Joint Chiefs have changed dramatically. The old formal corporate system based on frequent Tank meetings in which each chief possessed a veto has been replaced by a much less formal collegial system in which the chairman relies on the chiefs for advice as he deems fit.

The new joint planning system. The third change is the rise over the past eight years of a Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) driven by the chairman in place of the old corporate planning system dominated by the services.[68] In January 1990, General Powell replaced Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 84 with chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) MOP 7. The new MOP called for a JSPS to produce a National Military Strategy Document (NMSD), a Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA), and a Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.[69] A revision of CJCS MOP 7 in 1992 replaced the classified NMSD with the public NMS document.[70]

The JSPS has continued to evolve as General Shalikashvili and his first vice chairman, Admiral William Owens, introduced new planning documents and processes. One of the most significant changes was the expansion of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) beyond reviewing requirements for capabilities in order to "assess the extent program recommendations and budget proposals of Military Departments and Department of Defense (DOD) components conform with established priorities."[71] The JROC's work is mani-

[66] Confidential interview with JCS member.

[67] Confidential interview with JCS member.

[68] See Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. and Thomas-Durrell Young, *U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, September 1995).

[69] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum of Policy 7, "Joint Strategic Planning System," 30 January 1990. The NMSD would include a National Military Strategy (NMS) and recommend military objectives, force levels, and assess the risks. The CPA would evaluate the service Program Objective Memoranda (POMs). The JSCP would continue to detail the planning requirements of the CINCs. See Lovelace and Young, *The Missing Nexus*, 11–13.

[70] See General Colin Powell, *National Military Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1992).

[71] Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, MCM-76-95, "Subject: Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council," 1 February 1995. The JROC is chaired by the JCS vice chairman. The other JROC members are the vice chiefs of the services. See also Admiral William A. Owens, "JROC: Harnessing the Revolution in Military Affairs," *Joint Force Quarterly* 5 (Summer 1994): 55–58; Bradley Graham, "Military Leaders Join Forces to Plan the Future," *Washington Post*, 22 August 1994.

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fested in several ways. It produces Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments (JWCA) which examine future programs in twelve areas. Production of the CPA and a new document, the Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR), relies on the JROC and JWCA. Through these instruments, the chairman is able to provide an independent, fiscally-constrained assessment of service programs to the president and secretary of Defense. By evaluating and prioritizing service programs in this way, the chairman is able to deliver advice based on joint perspectives, something not available before Goldwater-Nichols.

General Shalikashvili also placed great emphasis on the development of joint doctrine. He has approved the development of ninety-seven joint doctrine publications; production increased from two per year in 1993 to four per month in 1995. The services protested this increased emphasis on joint doctrine—requiring several Tank sessions to resolve—but General Shalikashvili remained firm in his desire to establish joint doctrine as his legacy. These efforts by Shalikashvili, as well as those by Powell, are evidence that the new JSPS is shaped by the personal style and priorities of the chairman.[72]

A real joint staff. The fourth change is that the chairman is supported in the JSPS and in his other activities by the expanded and improved Joint Staff, which has been strengthened with far better personnel and improved analytic capabilities. It no longer works for the corporate JCS but for the chairman. The Joint Staff supports the chairman in his many responsibilities and is key for developing military advice. Representation of the uniformed military in interagency policy deliberations below the NSC Principals and Deputies Committees is now primarily the responsibility of Joint Staff officers. Indeed, Joint Staff officers played important and visible roles in policy deliberations prior to the Haiti and Bosnia deployments.[73] The centrality of the Joint Staff is evident in the fact that when three CINC vacancies arose in summer 1996, all were filled by senior Joint Staff officers.[74]

The Joint Staff's strength in the post-Goldwater-Nichols period emanates also from changes in the policy coordination procedures between it and the service staffs. On 27 February 1990, only five months after becoming chairman, General Powell issued CJCS MOP 9 ("Policy of Action Processing") which

[72] General Powell's approach is evident in the development of the Base Force. Lorna S. Jaffe, *The Development of the Base Force, 1989–1992* (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, July 1993); Don M. Snider, *Strategy, Forces and Budgets: Dominant Influences in Executive Decision Making, Post-Cold War, 1989–91*, Professional Readings in Military Strategy, No. 8, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, February 1993).

[73] The joint staff director for operations, Lt. General John Sheehan, had a central role in the interagency process leading to Haiti. Lt. General Wesley Clark, the joint staff director for strategic plans and policy, represented the military in the Bosnian diplomatic efforts led by Richard Holbrooke.

[74] General Walter Kross, the director of the Joint Staff, became CINC of the Transportation Command. General Howell Estes, joint staff director for operations, became CINC of Space Command. General Wesley Clark, joint staff director for strategic plans and policy, became CINC of Southern Command. Each appointment meant a promotion from three to four stars.

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called for the Joint Staff to coordinate with service and CINC staffs "on actions in which they have an interest, in which their views would be useful, or with which they have requested the opportunity to coordinate."[75] Powell replaced the service-dominated MOP 84 with a system that put coordination at the discretion of the Joint Staff. As a result, the Joint Staff no longer needs the assent of service planners before it submits its policy recommendation. The services are no longer able to hold policy papers hostage until their positions are recognized.

CJCS MOP 9 and the Joint Staff's strengthened capacity have been sources of periodic frustration within the services in the last six years. In June 1991, the three-star operations deputies of the services complained to the director of the Joint Staff that they did not have sufficient involvement in Joint Staff policy development.[76] A study in 1992 by Lt. Colonel Christopher Yuknis found that some service planners "felt that joint action officers coordinated only when they required service-specific information they were not capable of gathering without such coordination."[77]

These concerns resurfaced in June 1995, when the retiring Marine commandant, General Carl Mundy, criticized the Joint Staff in a personal letter to General Shalikashvili. Mundy argued that the relationship between the Joint Staff and the services had deteriorated to a point where a chief might be unable to fulfill his statutory responsibility as a military adviser to the NCA.[78] Mundy claimed, according to one senior flag officer, that "what has occurred in the past 2 or 3 years is an atrophy of the synergy between the service staffs and the Joint Staff."[79] Mundy's letter touched off a vigorous debate within the Pentagon. Some Joint Staff officers believed that Mundy simply wanted to return to the old corporate system and felt he used the opportunity several weeks before he retired to attack the Joint Staff. Chiefs have echoed Mundy's views in various ways in our confidential interviews. One said, "Mundy's letter put its finger on the real issue of who the Joint Staff worked for and Shali didn't totally disagree."[80] Although the debate over the power of the Joint Staff has subsided for the time being, it is likely to arise in the future, because it cuts to relationships and roles that are intrinsic to the reformed JCS system under Goldwater-Nichols.

[75] CJCS MOP 9, "Policy on Action Processing," 27 February 1990.

[76] They wrote: "We would like to accept your predecessors offer to conduct more frequent Tank discussions on a range of issues. Many new ideas, some contentious, are on the table. In our role as OPSDEPS, we believe we can better help you if we debate these issues early and have our staffs examine the details." Quoted in Lt. Colonel Christopher Allan Yuknis, *The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: An Interim Assessment*, USAWC Military Studies Program Paper (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, April 1992), 26.

[77] Ibid., 24.

[78] "Mundy Letter Questions Relationship Between Joint Staff and JCS," *Inside the Navy*, 5 June 1995, 1.

[79] Confidential interview with senior flag officer.

[80] Confidential interview with JCS member.

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Conclusions

The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act and its subsequent implementation by Admiral Crowe and Generals Powell and Shalikashvili have transformed the Joint Chiefs of Staff system. The influence of service parochialism has receded and has been supplanted by jointness. Transforming the dominant norm within the JCS has altered the military's contribution to national policy making. Civilian decision makers, virtually unanimously, have told us that the military now provides higher quality and more timely advice as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms. Although JCS norms and procedures are now clearly rooted, the system will continue to evolve to fit the personalities of future chairmen.

The most important element is the emergence of a strong chairman, one who manages the processes for generating military advice, transmits that advice to civilian authorities, and participates in the administration's formal and informal policy-making deliberations.[81] The chairman possesses the authority to reshape the JCS, the Joint Staff, and the planning system to fit his own style and agenda. The chairman's authority overcomes the indecision, deadlock, and delay that marred the JCS during the corporate era. Instead of delivering advice based on consensus among the four services, the chairman now personifies unified military advice, drawing the best from the four services and the rest of the joint community, but presenting it on his own terms. The three post-Goldwater-Nichols chairmen, particularly General Shalikashvili, have promoted the development of a "joint" culture through doctrine, training, and other programs.[82] Although the socialization of senior officers through joint duty has helped, construction of a joint architecture remains largely a top-down process; it will likely continue, short of legislative changes or the appointment of future chairmen who want to curtail this process.

The prominence of jointness in the JCS advisory process does not mean that the influence of service perspectives is unimportant or has been eliminated. The chiefs remain dual-hatted. The chiefs' responsibilities for recruitment, training, and equipping their services carried out under their service hats insure that service views will be represented when the JCS are formulating advice. The service chiefs remain influential policy figures by virtue of their stature, experience, and the large organizations they head. As members of the larger Washington policy community, chiefs still possess the traditional tools of the news leak and the end run to allies in Congress.

Policy deliberations among the Joint Chiefs continue to seek a balance between jointness and service parochialism, despite the rise of the former. A chairman will rarely provide policy advice that sharply diverges from the chiefs or what he thinks the chiefs will support. Instead, chairmen have worked assiduously with the chiefs and the joint community to develop the best unified ad-

[81] The chairman participates in formal policy processes through his membership on the NSC Principals Committee as well as the NSC as a whole.

[82] The best overview of these efforts is provided in the pages of *Joint Force Quarterly*.

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vice. By nurturing the corporate identity and collegiality among the JCS, a chairman reduces the likelihood that any chief will protest advice that diverged from his position. Although the law provides for a chief's dissent to be forwarded to civilian authorities, in practice this does not happen frequently. The chiefs limit their dissent, for the most part, to the confines of the JCS. They seem to be satisfied so long as they believe their views are being heard and considered. The chairman benefits from candid advice from the service chiefs and enjoys multiple advocacy from both service and joint views as he develops his own advice to the NCA. This may mean that the chairman now gets much better, unfettered advice from his chiefs than the secretary of Defense or president ever did under the old system. But relying solely on the chairman for military advice may run the risk that the secretary of Defense, the NSC, and the president are less apprised of alternative options by not hearing the force of argument and differing military voices and views. Avoiding this consequence is both the responsibility of the chairman, who should convey the variety of views, and of the civilian leadership, who must demand policy options that protect their decision-making authority.

The balance between joint and service influences on the range of military activities will be the subject of intense debate within the American military. While a majority of senior officers accept and support the infusion of jointness brought by Goldwater-Nichols, some are concerned that jointness has gone too far. They assert that it has become "politically correct" and complain of "jointness for the sake of jointness."[83] Jointness might prevent the beneficial competition between the services and constrain innovation. Eliot Cohen writes that "At a time when most corporations are attempting to decentralize and reduce hierarchy, the impetus for jointness may create a more monolithic *and* unwieldy organization.[84] An operational failure might encourage opponents of jointness within the military to make their case publicly, just as defense reformers did in the 1980s. A flag officer on the Joint Staff referred to this possibility when he told us that "As long as we conduct operations successfully, we are okay. But if we fail, they will cut us up."[85] The debate over the balance between jointness and service perspectives will continue, if not intensify, as the military reorganizes and restructures to meet the post-cold war security environment with constricted budgets.

Finally, the American political process continues to politicize the military by drawing the military leadership into active participation in the political functions of government. This tendency is quite pronounced in the activities of the post-Goldwater-Nichols JCS chairmen. For example, the chairman's membership and participation on the NSC Principals Committee is often indistinguish-

[83] These concerns have been raised by officers in each of the services as well as some serving in joint positions.

[84] Eliot A. Cohen, "How to Think About Defense" in Williamson Murray, ed., *1995–1996 Brassey's Mershon American Defense Annual* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1995), 69.

[85] Confidential interview.

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able from that of the cabinet officers and other politicians who are members of that body. In this context, the chairman is a decision maker, not simply an adviser. Moreover, the chairman's support of the president's policies is now actively cultivated by the administration. Identification of the chairman with the administration has become something of an unwanted and undesirable legacy. None of these factors is unique to the post-Goldwater-Nichols period. But the strengthening of the chairman has thrust him into the political spotlight and has pushed the chiefs, whichever hat they are wearing, into the background.

In the course of civil-military relations over the past half century, the institution of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has always loomed large. A paradox of the post-cold war period is that, although the exigencies of national security have radically declined, the participation of the military in public policy making has never in peacetime been more centralized, integrated, and effective than it is today.

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Party Politics and International Economic Activism: The Reagan-Bush Years

JAMES SHOCH

Among scholars of foreign economic policy making, there is now widespread agreement on the importance of combining international and domestic factors of explanation through a synthesis of structural and systemic, society and state-centered, and ideational approaches. It is not my purpose in this article, however, to advance a full-blown synthetic theory of my own. Instead, my limited aim here is to point out and help fill an important gap in this work: inadequate attention to a domestic factor whose importance in other policy areas has been found to be considerable—party competition.

In this article I will argue for greater emphasis on the causal role of party competition in the foreign economic policy-making process through an illustrative case study of an important episode in recent American history: the trade crisis of the spring and summer of 1985 and the subsequent September turn by the Reagan administration toward international economic activism on trade and exchange rate policy. To suggest the generalizability of the argument, I will also demonstrate more briefly the continuing role of party competition in shaping American trade policy during the Reagan and Bush presidencies following the fall 1985 policy shift.

Competing Explanations

In late September 1985, with the American trade deficit soaring, the Reagan administration took a now famous turn toward international economic activism, reversing its earlier neglect of exchange rate policy and announcing an aggressive export promotion strategy. On 22 September at the Plaza Hotel in New

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York, the United States and its four major industrial allies announced their intent to jointly manage the depreciation of the value of the dollar against other currencies. The next day at the White House, Ronald Reagan signaled a new emphasis on "fair" as well as "free" trade, as he announced a plan to combat unfair foreign trading practices, including a heightened emphasis on the "self-initiation" by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) of Section 301 cases against countries unfairly closing their markets to U.S. exports.

How might various theories of foreign economic policy making explain the Reagan administration's fall 1985 turn? Proponents of "hegemonic stability theory," a purely structural approach, would argue that the decline of U.S hegemonic power—defined in various formulations in terms of the relative size or productivity of the American economy—caused the policy shift by rendering the United States less able to allow free-riding trading partners asymmetrically open access to its markets. But the degree of American hegemonic decline is disputed. It apparently occurred mostly before the 1980s, and it was most certainly too gradual in the early 1980s to explain by itself the timing of the abrupt 1985 policy turn without resort to the addition of various lags or domestic factors.[1]

Ideational theorists might argue that the shift toward a greater emphasis on market access was due to policy makers' embrace of the new "strategic trade theory," which suggests that as industries require greater economies of scale or become subject to significant learning curve effects, they become more dependent on access to foreign markets.[2] But in 1985, these arguments were new and accepted by only a minority of economists, and there is little evidence that they were as yet having any real impact on the policy debate.[3]

The strongest competing explanation comes from those analysts who emphasize the combined causal role of market conditions, group pressures, and political institutions. In this synthetic interbranch view, changing market conditions in the early 1980s—relatively declining microeconomic competitiveness or, more importantly, macroeconomic shifts including growing unemployment and especially the rising value of the dollar—led sectors of industry and labor to demand dollar devaluation and/or stronger protectionist or market-opening policies.

When the Reagan administration appeared unresponsive to such pleas, due both to its antistatist and free trade ideology and to its heterogeneous national constituency, which included diffuse consumer as well as concentrated producer interests, demands for a tougher trade policy were directed increasingly toward members of Congress, whose relatively small, homogeneous jurisdictions rendered them more susceptible to pressures from geographically concen-

[1] Michael C. Webb and Steven D. Krasner, "Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Assessment," *Review of International Studies* 15 (April 1989).

[2] Judith Goldstein, *Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 177–80.

[3] Sylvia Nasar, "The New Case for Protectionism," *Fortune,* 16 September 1985, 33–38.

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trated producer interests. These mounting demands in turn produced bipartisan congressional pressure on the reluctant executive, which finally made its fall 1985 policy shift to head off the gathering forces of protectionism.[4]

In the following account I will argue that while this last explanation has much of the story right, it nevertheless remains incomplete. I will maintain that the policy shift should also be understood in partisan terms as an attempt to quell Democratic-led protectionist pressures, to neutralize the threat to congressional Republicans from the Democrats' efforts to politically exploit the trade crisis, and to return attention to the issue of tax reform, which Reagan hoped to use to cement a Republican electoral realignment.

Parties and Policy Making: Strategic Interaction Between "In" and "Out" Parties

Many early studies demonstrating that parties matter to the conduct of public policy made the simplifying assumption that policy choices and/or outcomes solely reflect the positions of parties in control of the executive (henceforth, in parties). Because different parties with distinct constituent bases or ideological orientations support correspondingly distinct policies, a shift in the party controlling the executive will bring an accompanying shift in policy.

More recent work, however, has shown that the strategic interaction over time between in parties and their oppositions (or out parties) can also have a significant impact on public policy. I would suggest that this form of party competition played an important causal role in the case of Reagan's trade and exchange rate policy turn.

As standard theories of party competition maintain, the positions taken by in and out parties as they strategically interact will often be shaped by voter and group preferences or by their elected officeholders' policy beliefs.[5] But to understand the specific nature of the interparty dynamic at work in our case, it is necessary to recognize that as they maneuver, parties both in and out of power can more than passively reflect societal pressures or their officials' personal views. Instead, they can play a more proactive role in structuring political conflict by manipulating the political agenda.

Most interesting for our particular purposes are the activities of out parties, which have been analyzed by a number of scholars building on earlier work by

[4] The most prominent exponent of this view is I. M. Destler. See his *American Trade Politics,* 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1995); as well as I. M. Destler and C. Randall Henning, *Dollar Politics: Exchange Rate Policymaking in the United States* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1989).

[5] For various views of the role of parties in trade policy making, see Stephen P. Magee, William A. Brock, and Leslie Young, *Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Charles F. Doran and Gregory P. Marchildon, eds., *The NAFTA Puzzle: Political Parties and Trade in North America* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994); Daniel Verdier, *Democracy and International Trade: Britain, France, and the United States, 1860–1990.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); and Goldstein, *Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy.*

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E. E. Schattschneider and William Riker on what Riker termed the maneuvers of political "losers." These analysts have argued that an out party, seeking to fracture the in party's electoral coalition and shift the balance of partisan strength in its favor, will often employ rhetoric, symbols, and policy analysis in attempts to introduce new issues onto the policy agenda; to redefine the relative salience of existing issues by drawing one of them, previously confined to an insulated policy subsystem, into the realm of macropolitics through an expansion of what Schattscheider called the "scope of conflict" over the issue; or to reshape voters' perceptions of the causes of particular problems or of the incidence of the costs and benefits likely to be produced by various policy proposals. In pursuing such tactics, the out party will try to take positions that are congruent with both the preferences of its core constituencies and with the party's traditional ideological commitments, but which can also help the party to expand its base by attracting key swing voters.[6]

The actual policies that result from out party agenda manipulation will vary depending on the strategic response of the party in control of the executive. These outcomes can range from policy impasse, especially likely under unified government, when in party constituent and ideological opposition blocks the passage of out party proposals; to bipartisan cooperation; and even to competitive policy escalation or the bidding up of public policy. Both of these last two outcomes are more likely under divided government, when the in party opts to compete with its rival to claim credit with or avoid blame from the median voter or important swing constituencies.

Most relevant to us here, another common result of the strategic interaction between the parties that follows the out party's agenda-manipulating maneuvers is what Maurice Duverger called policy "contagion." In this process, because of core constituency and ideological differences, the parties retain distinct ideal positions on a given issue; but the in party is prodded into a compromise in which it essentially adopts a weaker version of its opponent's position in order to undercut the out party's electoral support among key swing groups, thus defusing the issue and removing it from the political agenda.[7]

The processes of partisan agenda manipulation and policy contagion are of particular importance in the American separation of powers system, in which the frequent occurrence of divided government provides incentives for the out party in control of all or part of Congress to introduce and actually pass laws in order to claim credit for itself and to discredit the party controlling the White

[6] See E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960); William Riker, *The Art of Political Manipulation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); Edward G. Carmines and James A. Stimson, *Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); and Bryan D. Jones, *Reconceiving Decision-Making in Democratic Politics: Attention, Choice, and Public Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

[7] See Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties,* 3rd ed. (London: Methuen, 1974).

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House. This puts especially strong pressure on the in party to adopt a weaker version of its rival's position in order to neutralize the issue in question.

These partisan dynamics can help shape a nation's economic policy, especially during periods of serious economic difficulty or hard times. The dominant economic policy paradigms characteristic of normal times are questioned, and the institutions in which these paradigms are embedded are eroded, thus disrupting the governing political coalition. This prompts a search by various societal and state actors for economically, administratively, and most important, politically viable new policies and institutions.

Out parties can play an important role in this search process, especially during the episodes of divided government that often characterize such unstable periods, by raising the relative salience of particular economic issues. Actual economic policy choices will often be the result of a subsequent process of policy contagion.

Foreign Economic Policy in the First Reagan Administration

Reaganomics and Its Consequences

During Ronald Reagan's first term of office from 1981–1984, the U.S. trade deficit climbed dramatically, thanks in part to the relative decline of American industrial competitiveness, but more importantly because of the soaring value of the dollar. The administration's unusual macroeconomic policy mix of tight money and budget deficits kept interest rates high, thus sucking in foreign capital and driving up both the dollar's value and the resulting American trade deficit to record heights.

As the deficit rose, some firms in hard-hit import-competing and export industries demanded exchange rate intervention in order to bring down the value of the dollar. But facing the collective action problem inherent in the provision of the largely public good of exchange rate policy, many more firms instead joined the hard-pressed labor movement to push the White House for the more particularized benefits of a more aggressive trade policy. Mainly for ideological reasons, administration officials steadfastly refused to acknowledge exchange rate problems. And as an ideological free trader, Reagan was also reluctant to grant trade relief, forcing trade-impacted sectors to turn to the more accessible Congress, which for years had tried to avoid just this situation.

Convinced that the protectionist Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 had helped cause the Depression and subsequent world war, beginning in the 1930s and continuing through the postwar period, Congress had institutionalized a new liberal trade policy paradigm by erecting an executive-centered trade policy system that shielded members from pressures from geographically concentrated producer interests.[8]

[8] On this system, see Destler, *American Trade Politics.*

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In the early 1980s, however, the Reagan-led executive was less inclined to play its traditional buffer role in this system and was thus reluctant to take action—unilaterally or by negotiation or extension of agreements with other nations—to curb the flood of imported automobiles, steel, and other goods or to pry open foreign markets unfairly closed to U.S. producers. Thus, entrepreneurial members of Congress saw an opportunity to strike politically rewarding postures by criticizing White House trade inaction. In particular, leading Democrats sought to exploit Reagan's perceived political vulnerability on trade.

Policy Contagion in the Early 1980s: The Cases of Auto and Steel

By the 1970s, the Republicans, with their strong ties to internationally oriented sectors of business, had torn out their protectionist roots and had emerged as the defenders of free trade. Conversely, the Democrats had begun to abandon their own historic free trade stance under pressure from their constituents in organized labor whose jobs were threatened by surging imports.

In the fall of 1982, with the trade deficit exploding, the Democrats intensified their push for a tougher trade policy. In part, they were continuing to respond to the pleas of the import-battered labor movement, but broader forces were also at work. In the hard times of the early 1980s, the Democrats were simultaneously grappling with the devastating 1980 election results, which rendered them an out party; the widespread discrediting by the stagflation of the 1970s of the Keynesian macroeconomic policy paradigm that had helped to bind the New Deal coalition together; and the doubt that had been thrown upon the postwar liberal trade policy paradigm by the rising trade deficit. Thus, as they pressed the trade issue on behalf of their core labor supporters, the Democrats were also engaging in a partisan search for a politically viable new economic strategy to help them regain lost ground in the House of Representatives, recapture control of the Senate and the White House, and put an end to the new divided government regime.

The focus of the Democrats' new trade energy in the fall of 1982 was the automobile domestic content bill, strongly backed by the embattled United Auto Workers union. This bill intended to curb car imports by requiring that a minimum share of auto parts sold in the United States must be produced in either the United States or Canada. As the November congressional elections approached, many Democratic candidates actively campaigned for the bill and the wider trade issue. Party strategists and leaders—including the party's main presidential contenders, Walter Mondale and Edward Kennedy—believed it of growing salience not just to industrial workers but to the general public as well.[9]

Shortly before the election, in a textbook case of policy contagion, the Reagan administration attempted both to head off House passage of the domestic content bill and to defuse it and the yawning trade gap as issues in the

[9] See *Business and Public Affairs,* 15 November 1982, 7–8.

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campaign by announcing that Japan would be pressed to extend the auto voluntary restraint agreement signed in the spring of 1981, and European steel producers had "voluntarily" agreed to limit steel exports to the United States.[10]

In 1983, the trade issue died down, as some Democrats feared the protectionist label that critics had hung on their party. But the issue was revived again in mid-1984 in the midst of the presidential campaign, when the International Trade Commission (ITC) ruled that imports were injuring the domestic steel industry and issued recommendations for quotas and tariffs. With 225 of the 470 electoral votes necessary for victory held by the nine major steel-producing states, Walter Mondale, the Democratic nominee, and congressional Democrats immediately called for stiff steel quotas in an effort to create a major campaign issue.

In September, in another example of policy contagion, Reagan again attempted to neutralize the threat from the Democrats by announcing his intent to seek voluntary restraint agreements with countries responsible for the surge in steel imports. Then Council of Economic Advisers Chairman William Niskanen later recalled: "[O]f course, political considerations were dominant in September, 1984, when some of the major steel-producing states were still considered uncertain. It is much less clear whether the Administration would have made the same decision in 1983 or 1985."[11]

The Trade Crisis of 1985 and The Reagan Administration's Activist Turn

In early 1985 the trade problem intensified once again, driven by the ballooning U.S. deficit, especially with Japan, whose many formal and informal market barriers were an increasing source of anger for American business interests. The White House, however, freed of reelection pressures, chose to neglect the mounting crisis, declining in particular to ask for an extension of the auto voluntary restraint agreement (VRA) with Japan. Instead, the administration decided to pursue tax reform, which it hoped to use to consolidate what it believed was an unfolding Republican realignment. In response, congressional trade activism rose again.

Now, however, with the Democrats temporarily gun-shy on the trade issue due to Walter Mondale's rout the previous November and to the apparent discrediting of the tough trade positions he had sometimes advocated, Senate Republicans momentarily took the initiative on trade by calling for White House action to open Japanese markets. It was actually the fear of a renewed Democratic effort to exploit the GOP's vulnerability on trade that prompted Senate

[10] The steel accord "will give us a boost in Youngstown and other hard-pressed steel-producing cities," presidential Press Secretary Larry Speaker said. Lou Cannon and Stuart Auerbach, "Accord Reached With Europeans on Steel Export," *Washington Post*, 22 October 1982.

[11] William Niskanen, *Reaganomics: An Insider's Account of the Policies and the People* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 43–44.

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Republicans, with twenty-two of their members up for reelection in 1986, to try to preemptively beat the Democrats to the toughness issue.[12]

In the summer, the Democrats did in fact sense a new political opportunity. In mid-July, in an effort to raise the relative salience of the trade issue, Senate Finance Committee Chairman Lloyd Bentsen, House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dan Rostenkowski, and House Democratic Caucus Chairman Richard Gephardt unveiled an import surcharge proposal as a Democratic response to the mounting trade crisis. The bill would have required the addition of a 25 percent surcharge on products from Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and Brazil—countries with excessive trade surpluses with the United States—unless they took steps to open up their own markets to U.S. products.

The three Democratic legislators introduced their proposal in part to win support from import-competing and export-oriented manufacturing sectors, which had grown increasingly frustrated with the administration's do-nothing trade policy. But buoyed by public opinion polls that appeared to show voters in a more protectionist mood, the Democrats also now believed that taking a tougher trade stance could help them break up the broader GOP electoral coalition.[13]

Such Democratic hopes were boosted the week before the introduction of the surcharge proposal by developments in a special election to fill a House seat in northeast Texas that the Democrats had held for more than a century. During the first half of 1985, following Reagan's resounding reelection victory, there was much talk in Republican circles about the prospects for a Republican realignment. Recognizing the importance of Texas to the continuing swing of the South toward the GOP and to the party's broader realignment hopes, the national Republican party had funneled resources from all over the country into the contest. The Democrats also understood the importance of holding the seat if they were to block the GOP's Texas strategy, and they, too, had poured resources into the race.

In mid-July the Democratic candidate, Jim Chapman, seized on a statement by his opponent—"I don't know what trade policies have to do with bringing jobs to East Texas"—as an opportunity to blast the Reagan administration's continuing inaction on trade. Democratic strategists were hopeful that the voters would see a tie between trade and jobs.

Senate Republicans, seeking to politically neutralize the trade issue, renewed their earlier push to open Japanese markets and urged Reagan to modify his free-trade stance. "This [trade] issue is becoming more partisan than it has been in the past," said a Senate Finance Committee staff member. "The

[12] Mark Bisnow, a former aide to Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole, recalled that in the spring of 1985, Senator John Danforth "convinced Dole that Democrats would increasingly take the lead on trade issues unless the Republicans beat them to it." Mark Bisnow, *In the Shadow of the Dome: Chronicles of a Capital Hill Aide* (New York: William Morrow, 1990), 281.

[13] See Clyde H. Farnsworth, "Most in Poll Found to Favor Import Limits to Protect Jobs," *New York Times,* 9 June 1985.

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Democrats have realized that the Administration is vulnerable, and the Republicans have realized that the Administration's vulnerability may be rubbing off on them.[14]

The White House response to the new Democratic trade emphasis was complex. Publicly, the administration attacked the surcharge measure. At the same time, in late July the Cabinet-level Economic Policy Council, chaired by Treasury Secretary James Baker, began work on a new administration trade policy to reduce the mounting pressure.

Most important, Baker accelerated quiet consultations between the United States and its industrial allies on macroeconomic and exchange rate coordination intended to reduce international economic imbalances. In early 1985, upon leaving his job as Reagan's chief of staff for his new Treasury post in a switch with Donald Regan, Baker had realized that the strong dollar, by slowing economic growth and exacerbating protectionist pressures, could damage Republican prospects in the 1986 congressional elections.[15] In April the House and Senate Democratic trade task forces had both released reports intended to influence those races that called on the Reagan administration to coordinate efforts with its allies to set up what resembled a system of "target zones" for currencies.[16] In partial response to these statements and to the subsequent Democratic trade initiative described above, Baker quietly began to plan a retreat from the administration's hands-off exchange rate policy. Negotiations toward this end were begun with the Japanese finance minister just before a late June meeting of the G10 in Tokyo and were intensified after a mid-summer rise in the value of the dollar.[17]

The salience and divisiveness of the trade issue were ratcheted up dramatically in early August when Jim Chapman eked out a win in his Texas special election race. Pronouncing Republican realignment hopes dead, many Democratic officials and strategists also agreed that trade had played a key role in deciding the race and could do so again in future contests. This conviction was reinforced for many Democratic members of Congress by their experiences during the August recess, when they found their constituents clamoring not for Reagan's cherished tax reform but for action on the trade front, and by Reagan's late August rejection of an International Trade Commission recommendation for quotas on shoes, which created a storm of congressional outrage.

[14] "Protection or Retaliation?" *National Journal*, 7 July 1985, 1765.

[15] Steven Solomon, *The Confidence Game: How Unelected Central Bankers Are Governing the Changed World Economy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 296.

[16] Clyde H. Farnsworth, "Democrats Seek Currency-Intervention Policy," *New York Times,* 25 April 1985.

[17] For accounts of exchange rate policy making in 1985, see Destler and Henning, *Dollar Politics;* and Yoichi Funabashi, *Managing the Dollar: From the Plaza to the Louvre* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1988), 65–86.

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The Democrats' Fall Push

As Congress returned from its recess in September, trade was the hottest issue on its agenda, with several hundred more or less protectionist trade bills pending in both houses. While congressional sentiment for a tougher trade policy was bipartisan, the Democrats were driving the issue.

By the mid-1980s the Democratic party was suffering from at least two major problems: it had lost its postwar mantle as the party of jobs and growth, and since the Vietnam era it had become widely perceived as soft on defense. Now the Democrats were hopeful that the trade issue could give them a way to symbolically fuse popular concerns over economic and national security into a new synthetic appeal—economic nationalism.

Mounting popular anger over trade-created unemployment remained the principal factor behind the rising political salience of the trade issue. But Democrats hoped that more general fears of national economic weakness would allow their party to attract votes from well beyond the ranks of those whose jobs were directly threatened by imports, especially in areas of Republican growth. "It's a powerful issue for us," said a Democratic congressional official. "It impacts on the areas that the Republicans have been expanding in—the South and the West. It's a jobs issue—we're protecting jobs. And at the same time, it's a nationalist issue."[18]

The Democrats made a concerted effort to construct symbolically the trade issue as one of national "strength," partly in order to appeal to voters on the conservative end of the ideological spectrum. Democratic votes for "fair trade" would be interpreted as votes "for American strength," Richard Gephardt said. Tony Coelho, calling trade "a Democratic macho issue," declared, "We're for American strength."[19]

Meanwhile, many Republicans, while still inclined toward free trade by their links to internationally-oriented sectors of business and by their own pro-market ideogical convictions, were nonetheless fearful of being outflanked by the Democrats with swing voters and even GOP loyalists on a popular issue in the 1986 elections. Thus, they reluctantly toughened their own trade policy positions. Representative Edwin V. Zschau ruefully observed that his GOP colleagues were being driven "to adopt the Democrats' approach. They said, 'yeah, we know this is wrong, but we can't be viewed as doing nothing.'"[20] To protect their members, congressional Republican leaders threatened to draft their own trade legislation and pressed the White House to take more aggressive trade action. "Republicans are not going to stand by and be rolled over by Democrats on trade issues," Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole declared.[21]

[18] Margaret Shapiro, "Calls for Protectionism Put Republicans on Defensive," *Washington Post,* 16 September 1985.

[19] Andy Plattner, "Democrats See Political Gold in Trade Issue," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report,* 21 September 1985, 1856.

[20] Shapiro, "Calls for Protectionism Put Republicans on Defensive."

[21] "Dole Sees Congress Passing Import Curbs," *Los Angeles Times,* 31 August 1985.

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The Administration Turn

In the first half of September, the congressional parties continued to spar over trade policy, calling on the administration to toughen its trade posture and drafting and holding hearings on various pieces of legislation of their own.

Finally, the Reagan administration moved to slow the protectionist momentum and defuse the Democratic trade threat. First, on 7 September, Reagan announced the self-initiation by the USTR of some new Section 301 unfair trade cases against Brazil, South Korea, and Japan—not coincidentally, three of the four countries explicitly targeted in the Democrats' import surcharge bill. This was the first time the USTR had ever used its authority to initiate such 301 cases.

Two weeks later, the White House officially announced its change of course in international economic strategy. White House officials were unwilling or politically unable either to attack the macroeconomic roots of the trade gap through tax hikes or spending cuts or to compromise ideological commitments to free trade forged during the period of uncontested U.S. hegemony. The Reagan administration thus decided on a nearly ideal two-track political response for a gradually declining hegemon now less able or inclined to provide the international public good of asymmetrical openness: "forcing others to adjust" through a reduction in the value of the dollar and market-opening pressures in sectors in which U.S. firms remained competitive.[22]

First, on 22 September, after James Baker had overcome internal administration opposition, the United States and four key economic allies—West Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Japan—agreed at a meeting at the Plaza Hotel in New York to work together to lower the value of the dollar.[23]

The next day, after James Baker had again prevailed in an intra-administration dispute, President Reagan outlined a plan which called for the creation of a $300 million "war chest" to help countervail foreign export subsidies; the formation of a government strike force to uncover and combat unfair trading practices; and most important, a new emphasis on the self-initiation by the USTR of more Section 301 cases against countries unfairly closing their markets to U.S. exports.

Partisan considerations in part prompted the administration's two-pronged initiative. This was indicated by the addition of a "fair trade" emphasis to the stress on "free trade" in the final draft of Reagan's trade speech. The change was made, according to a GOP adviser to Donald Regan, in order to provide "political cover" for congressional Republicans who were under constituent

[22] See Peter B. Evans, "Declining Hegemony and Assertive Industrialization," *International Organization* 43 (Spring 1989): 224.

[23] The decision was also influenced by continuing pressure from leaders of the Business Roundtable, the National Association of Manufactures, and other trade-impacted industrial interests on the need to reduce the value of the dollar.

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and Democratic pressure to back a tougher U.S. trade posture.[24] As *Business Week* reported: "The Administration now believes that the one-two punch of a slightly more aggressive trade policy and a prospective dollar devaluation has given the Republicans a shield to fend off Democratic attacks."[25]

In announcing its plan, however, the White House had a still larger partisan goal in mind. Administration leaders also "wanted to get trade behind them," one trade official explained, in order "to get back to taxes," the issue the White House was convinced could help cement a Republican realignment.[26]

Explaining the Turn

As noted earlier, the Reagan administration's fall 1985 dollar and trade policy turn has been most commonly viewed as an attempt by ideological free traders in the White House to defuse bipartisan congressional protectionism. This, however, is only part of the story; partisan considerations were also at work.

First, it is certainly true that the administration's policy shift was intended in part to blunt the protectionist cry emanating from Congress. It is also true that members of both parties in Congress were under pressure from various constituents and donors to assume tougher trade policy positions. But while congressional trade militance may have appeared fully bipartisan, it was actually at least partly a product of the strategic interaction between two parties whose ideal trade policy positions were only partially convergent. This continuing partisan distinctiveness was due in part to ongoing pressure on the Democrats from the labor movement and on the Republicans from internationally-oriented sectors of business; and to the evolution since the 1960s of the Democrats' and Republicans' ideological commitments to fair and free trade respectively, which brought the parties' trade policy views into greater congruence with their broader pro-government and pro-market ideologies.

But party differences over trade were also due to Democratic efforts to differentiate themselves from the Republicans on the issue in order to win wider swing voter support. In the summer and fall of 1985 the apparent dual failure of the dominant postwar macroeconomic and trade policy paradigms combined with Ronald Reagan's neglect of international economic policy to produce a crisis in the trade sphere, which the Democrats sought to exploit for partisan advantage.

In an effort to fracture the Republican coalition, the Democrats—an out party in a period of divided government—tried both to heighten the importance of the trade issue and to alter popular perceptions of the incidence of the effects of a tougher trade stance. Instead of stressing only the concentrated geographic or group benefits of a tougher policy in the form of preserved jobs,

[24] Robert W. Merry, "Reagan' Aides Split Over His Trade Speech and Altered it Sharply," *Wall Street Journal,* 24 September 1985.

[25] "The New Trade Strategy," *Business Week,* 7 October 1985, 94.

[26] Bruce Stokes, "New Players Taking Center Stage," *National Journal,* 9 November 1985, 2528.

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the Democrats emphasized the general benefits to be derived from using government power to restore American national strength, while downplaying the possible general costs of such a policy in the form of increased consumer prices or reduced economic efficiency.

The Democrats tried to expand the scope of conflict over trade beyond concentrated economic interests, including their core labor constituents, to include key swing voters, while mapping that conflict onto the prevailing left-right cleavage between the parties. In this way the Democrats hoped to reach across the old lines of party division to attract swing and even regular GOP voters without driving away existing Democratic support.[27]

This Democratic pressure in turn forced congressional Republicans to reluctantly harden their own positions lest they lose support among these same key swing constituencies. Thus, the seemingly bipartisan protectionist pressures in Congress that the pro-free trade Reagan administration eventually tried to undercut actually had partisan origins to an important degree.

As we have seen, however, the White House initiative was partisan not only in its origins, but also in its goals. It was intended to protect not just free trade, but also congressional Republicans, who might otherwise have been electorally vulnerable on the trade issue had no administration response been forthcoming. And beyond this, by defusing the trade crisis, the administration's exchange rate and trade policy shift were also intended to allow the White House to resume its pursuit of tax reform and the partisan realignment that the tax issue was thought capable of producing.

Thus, the fall 1985 White House shift on exchange rate and trade policy was in part a product of partisan interaction and policy contagion at both the congressional and executive levels. Party competition, by threatening to expand the scope of conflict over the trade issue, amplified the protectionist pressures then emanating from trade-impacted sectors of the economy. This forced the Reagan administration to move to lower the value of the dollar and to adopt a portion of the Democrats' trade program, albeit in weaker form, in an attempt not only to quell rising congressional protectionism, but also to defuse the trade issue as a threat to both congressional Republicans and to Reagan's longer-term partisan agenda.

Generalizing the Argument

As with other single case studies, this one suffers from the familiar problem of generalizability. In sketching the background to my case, I have already shown how party competition in part determined the Reagan administration's decision to extend or impose curbs on the import of cars and steel in 1982 and 1984. In this section I will briefly demonstrate that following the fall 1985 White

[27] On this tactic, see William G. Jacoby, "Variability in Issue Alternatives and American Public Opinion," *The Journal of Politics* 52 (May 1990): 599.

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House dollar and trade initiative, Ronald Reagan and his successor George Bush continued to try to undermine Democratic efforts to exploit the trade issue by regularly announcing or promising import-limiting or market-opening actions, often as elections approached or on the eve of congressional votes on trade bills that the Democrats hoped to use as campaign issues.

Looking toward the 1986 Congressional Elections

In the spring of 1986, despite Reagan's policy shift of the previous fall, the trade deficit was still soaring. Because the Bentsen-Rostenkowksi-Gephardt import surcharge proposal had been roundly attacked as protectionist by Republican, media, and expert critics, House Democrats now began to draft an omnibus, nonproduct-specific or generic trade bill intended to strengthen the basic procedures and standards undergirding U.S trade policy. But the Democrats also hoped to use their control of the House under divided government to pass a bill that could then be used as a campaign issue in the November elections.

In late March, in order to both undercut the momentum behind the bill and to help Farm Belt Republicans in an election year, the administration took some new actions, including curbs on imports from the European Community (EC), an investigation of whether a new EC meat directive would hurt U.S. exports, and an investigation of Taiwan's export performance requirements.

Just before the House vote on the omnibus bill in early May, the administration, increasingly concerned about the Democrats' intent to use the bill as a campaign issue, took still another spate of actions intended to head off passage of the legislation.[28] Reagan announced in a major step that he would ask Japan, West Germany, Taiwan, and Switzerland to voluntarily cut their exports of machine tools to the United States; slapped a 35 percent tariff on certain Canadian lumber imports; blasted Brazil's protection of its computer industry; and threatened to place a tariff on European pasta and cheese.[29] These actions and continued veto threats, however, failed to prevent House passage of the trade bill.

The next battle was in early August, when the House attempted to override Reagan's veto the previous December of a textile quota bill that Democratic leaders hoped to use to lure southern Reagan Democrats back to the party.[30] In the month and especially the week before the override vote, the administration took a number of actions designed to see the veto sustained, discourage

[28] Both Reagan and Donald Regan said in early May that they believed that every Democrat in the House was going to use trade as an issue in the November elections. *International Trade Reporter,* 7 May 1986, 627.

[29] George Bush later explained that these actions were intended "to derail the protectionist juggernaut now sweeping through the United States Congress." Gerald M. Boyd, "Bush Urges Restraint By Canada," *New York Times,* 13 June 1986.

[30] Edward Walsh, "The Democrats Are Banking on Trade," *Washington Post National Weekly Edition,* 9 June 1986, 13.

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the Senate from passing its own version of the omnibus trade bill, and provide political cover on the trade issue for GOP incumbents up for reelection.

The White House announced that Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea—the three primary targets in the textile bill—had agreed to limit exports to the United States of fabric and apparel goods not previously restricted by bilateral agreements. The administration also took several nontextile trade actions to help defeat the override effort, the most important of which was the 31 July announcement of a market-sharing agreement with Japan to enhance the sale of U.S. semiconductors in that country and to prevent dumping of chips by the Japanese.

These administration efforts paid off, and the override was narrowly defeated. The Democrats then attempted to turn the failed override into a campaign issue in the South.[31] But while some Democratic candidates did run hard on trade during the late summer and fall, the issue never really caught fire. Not leaving anything to chance, however, in October, the administration took yet another set of election-eve trade actions. First, the White House threatened to restrict certain Japanese textile imports unless the Japanese government agreed to voluntarily reduce its shipments. Then the administration slapped a preliminary 15 percent tariff on some Canadian lumber imports, the biggest such tariff in decades.[32]

Jousting Over and Completing the Trade Bill

The Democrats did very well in the November elections, taking back control of the Senate and netting five House seats. As the new Congress convened in early January, trade was at the top of the Democrats' agenda. Many party member still felt that despite its limited role in the fall elections, the issue might yet emerge as a major one by the time the 1988 presidential race rolled around. Thus, new House Speaker Jim Wright introduced HR3, mirroring the omnibus trade legislation passed by the House the previous May.

In order to preempt the Democrats on trade, the White House again undertook a number of initiatives of its own. It announced the imposition of duties on various European products, pressured Canada to impose a 15 percent export tax on lumber shipments to the United States to replace the previous October's tariff, and decided to end the duty-free status on certain imports from various newly industrialized countries.

[31] "There will be another trade vote on November 4," House Speaker Tip O'Neill declared. Richard Alm, "Death of a Bill, Birth of an Issue," *U.S. News & World Report,* 18 August 1986, 6. This was actually the outcome sought by many nontextile state Democrats, who were personally opposed to the bill, which they believed was overly protectionist, but who saw a good campaign issue in the measure. See Jonathan Feuerbringer, "Anti-Import Bill Sent to President: Veto Expected," *New York Times,* 4 December 1985.

[32] As William Niskanen explained, the determination "was clearly timed to save several Republican Senate seats in the timber-producing states." Niskanen, *Reaganomics*, 149.

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Congressional Democrats' resolve to pass an effective trade bill was strengthened, however, by mounting evidence that Japan had failed to abide by the semiconductor pact negotiated the previous summer and by a top Japanese trade official's statement that his country would not open its doors to U.S.–made supercomputers.

After much fretting, the Reagan administration was forced to act. In late March 1987, the White House announced its intention to place 100 percent tariffs on $300 million worth of Japanese products in retaliation for Japan's failure to abide by the semiconductor pact. These were the harshest trade sanctions that the United States had slapped on the Japanese since the end of World War II. While the White House decision was prompted by a number of considerations, including bipartisan congressional anger at Japan, the administration once again acted in part to undermine Democratic efforts to exploit the trade issue.[33]

Contrary to administration hopes, however, the sanctions against Japan again did not prevent the House from passing its version of the new omnibus bill in late April. With the Democrats continuing to press the bill for electoral advantage, forty-three Republicans, fearful of being outflanked on a politically popular issue by their rivals, joined all but six Democrats to approve the bill.[34] In July, culminating a process that was less partisan than was the case in the House, the Senate passed its own version of the measure.

Conference committee work on the bill was not completed until spring 1988. The legislation remained atop the Democratic leadership's list of priorities, one of a number of leftover agenda items that Jim Wright and Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd hoped would assist their party's eventual presidential nominee.

The final bill emerged as a bipartisan compromise, both between the congressional parties and between the Reagan administration and the Democratic congressional leadership. At its heart was the so-called Super 301 provision, which spelled out procedures for identifying countries with unfair trade barriers, for negotiating an end to those barriers, and for U.S. retaliation when negotiations failed.

During the summer, the House and Senate passed the trade bill by substantial bipartisan majorities. With the 1988 elections fast approaching, former Republican opponents of the legislation were now afraid of being blamed by the electorate for doing nothing to reduce the trade deficit. Partisan convergence was not complete, however; Democrats continued to give stronger support to the legislation in both houses.

[33] Hobart Rowen, "Chip Shot at Japan," *Washington Post,* 31 March 1987.

[34] House Majority Leader Tom Foley of Washington observed that as with the textile bill, some Democrats were not seeking to pass a reasonable omnibus measure, but rather to provoke and sustain a Reagan veto of a tough bill "in order to sustain the issue into a driving force for the 1988 election." Hobart Rowen, "Japanese Warned on Trade," *Washington Post,* 20 April 1987.

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In late August, Ronald Reagan, after threatening to veto the bill over a plant closing provision, was finally persuaded to sign the legislation in order to avoid doing damage to George Bush's presidential campaign and to those of other Republican congressional candidates.

Thus, in yet another case of strategic partisan interaction and policy contagion, Democratic pressure on congressional and White House Republicans finally produced the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.

With the omnibus trade bill finally out of the way, trade issues played only a modest role in the rest of the 1988 presidential campaign, contrary to earlier Democratic hopes. However, the late turn by Democratic nominee Michael Dukakis toward the advocacy of what was increasingly termed "economic nationalism" did force George Bush, like Reagan before him, to reluctantly pledge to renew the steel VRAs in order to help himself in the steel-producing states.[35]

Bush Confronts Japan

The limited role of trade in the 1988 race notwithstanding, when the new Bush administration took power in early 1989, trade was by no means dead as a political issue. The main focus of attention remained Japan, which continued to run a $50 billion annual trade surplus with the United States. Congressional sentiment to get tougher with Japan was bipartisan, but the Democrats, still sensing political potential in the trade issue, were as usual more vocal in expressing their concerns.[36]

Of the several trade disputes pending with Japan in early 1989, the most contentious was the implementation of the Super 301 provision of the 1988 trade act. A fierce internal debate among Bush's advisers was resolved in late May in favor of citing Japan, along with India and Brazil, as unfair traders after congressional trade hawks angrily pressured for such action. The administration announcement also included the so-called Structural Impediments Initiative (SII), which proposed top-level negotiations with Japan on the two countries' respective structural barriers to trade. Once again, partisan considerations were prominent, as Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady and Secretary of State James Baker helped tip the debate within the administration with their argument that not citing Japan would result in even worse Democratic-sponsored legislation and might cost Republicans seats in the 1990 elections.[37]

Modest Japanese concessions in the Super 301 and SII negotiations in the spring of 1990 and a decline in the trade deficit resulting from the falling dollar helped to reduce the political salience of the trade issue until the fall of 1991,

[35] A pledge that President Bush would fulfill in July 1989 by renewing the VRAs for another two-and-one-half years.

[36] Bruce Stokes, "Mr. Horton's Neighborhood?" *The International Economy,* March/April 1989.

[37] Hobart Rowen, "Away From Free Trade," *Washington Post,* 8 June 1989.

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when a new rise in the deficit, especially with Japan returned the issue to the forefront of American political debate.

The Democrats once again saw a political opening. They introduced several new bills calling for tougher action against unfair foreign traders, while almost all of the declared Democratic presidential candidates trumpeted economic nationalist themes.[38]

Already facing public criticism for his preoccupation with foreign policy while the country remained in recession, and panicked by an unexpected Democratic victory in a special Pennsylvania Senate race in which economic concerns, including trade, figured heavily, Bush rescheduled a trip to Japan. Originally, he intended to highlight security issues; Bush refocused his trip on export promotion to create "jobs, jobs, jobs," as he put it.

Accompanying Bush were a score of corporate CEOs, the most prominent of whom were the chief executives of the Big Three auto companies, who were invited because nearly three-fourths of the trade deficit with Japan was in autos and auto parts. But more important, if Bush hoped to carry key midwestern industrial states in the 1992 presidential election, now only a year away, he would need the votes of hard-pressed workers in sectors like auto.[39] As Bush explained just before he left, "I'll do whatever I have to do to be re-elected."[40] In Tokyo, Bush was able to negotiate a number of modest but politically useful market-opening arrangements with the Japanese, the most important of which was an agreement by Japanese auto manufacturers to buy more American auto parts.

In the spring and summer of 1992, House Democrats moved one last time during the Reagan-Bush years to exploit the trade issue when they introduced and then passed the first large-scale trade bill since the Trade Act of 1988. The legislation, again aimed at Japan, was also again expressly intended by party leaders to score election-year points against the Bush administration by connecting trade to the sluggish economy.

A USTR proposal to impose some sanctions on Japan in order to undercut the Democrats was overruled this time by a White House that worried that any action would only remind voters that a Japan problem still existed. In the summer and fall of 1992, however, the Bush administration did take a now typical set of election-year trade actions, intended in part to defuse Democratic trade pressure. It announced decisions to slap penalty duties on beer brewed in Ontario, threaten retaliatory duties against China to force that country to open its markets to U.S. goods, sell fighter jets to Taiwan, and subsidize wheat exports.

[38] Bruce Stokes, "The Democrats Find a Hot Topic," *National Journal,* 19 October 1991, 2571.

[39] Don Oberdorfer, "Trading in Mistrust," *Washington Post National Weekly Edition,* 9-15 March 1992, 6.

[40] Michael Duffy, "Mission Impossible," *Time,* 20 January 1992, 14.

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Conclusion

The conduct of U.S. trade policy throughout the Reagan-Bush era was heavily influenced by the strategic interaction between the parties under the prevailing conditions of divided government. The Democrats persistently attempted to exploit the trade issue, most often by using their control of one or both houses of Congress to pass tough trade bills that could then be used as campaign issues. In a process of policy contagion, Republican presidents were regularly forced to take administrative actions both to suppress threats to the liberal trading order but also to neutralize the political threat from the Democrats. This contributed to a moderate toughening of U.S. trade policy during the period.

Although the cases briefly reviewed in the previous section do indicate the generalizability of my argument for the importance of party competition in the foreign economic policy-making process, the legitimacy of such generalizations remains limited. These are all cases of trade policy making, under conditions of divided government, in which the less protectionist party controlled the presidency. A more thorough study would necessarily look at other policy areas under different configurations of party power.

Nonetheless, the evidence presented in this article should be sufficient to suggest that party competition can have significant effects on the making of foreign economic policy. It also suggests that scholars should pay more attention to this neglected topic.*

* Thanks to Michael Mastanduno and Kenneth Sharpe for careful readings of earlier drafts of this article.

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

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Book Reviews

Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation *by Michael Schaller. New York, Oxford University Press, 1997. 320 pp. Cloth, $30.00.*

Michael Schaller has written an informative and insightful history of United States relations since World War II. Focusing on the period between the end of the U.S. occupation of Japan in 1952 to the "Nixon shocks" of 1972, the book chronicles the often tortured relationship between the two nations—tortured because of the legacy of the war and the occupation, the assymmetry in their power, and the steadily rising friction in economic affairs. The author particularly emphasizes the persisting gap that existed between a Japan—thoroughly chastened by the war and determined to abide by the spirit of the "nonwar" constitution—and an America, the new global power with a tendency to consider all bilateral relations in a geopolitical framework.

This tendency may at times have helped the U.S.–Japan relationship. The fear of "losing Japan" to the communist side was so pervasive that American leaders were willing to treat the former enemy more generously. For instance, President Dwight D. Eisenhower and many officials wanted to make sure Japan did not go communist for lack of food, raw materials, and markets; they were willing to help them find these in Southeast Asia. Whether Japan would really have gone communist in dire economic circumstances is a question Schaller does not discuss. But he cites ample evidence to show that Japanese leaders skillfully exploited such fears to bargain for Washington's understanding, for instance, of their trade with the People's Republic of China, which they considered of critical importance even as they went along with the U.S. policy of nonrecognition of the communist regime.

The book also shows that geopolitical calculations were so pervasive among U.S. policy makers that they could not easily conceive of Japan playing a nonmilitary role in international affairs. The book is filled with statements by U.S. officials, worried over the possibility of Japan and China combining their resources to challenge the United States, or over Japan's adopting a neutralist foreign policy. In retrospect, these appear to have been exaggerated fears, but they suggest a fixation with balance-of-power calculations that may have produced more misunderstanding across the Pacific than trade disputes. Geopolitics was and is a poor guide to a stable partnership between nations. The alleged partnership between Tokyo and Washington, even if it existed in rhetoric if not in reality, evaporated when power-political considerations induced the Nixon administration to effect a rapprochement with China without notifying Japan. Indeed, the book is filled with so many instances of mutual misunderstanding, clashes of interest, and mistrust between the two governments that it is a wonder that the 1951 alliance survived. To understand this phenomenon, it would

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be necessary to go beyond geopolitics and trade, to discuss propaganda, cultural exchange, grass-roots contact, etc. The author does not undertake this systematically—except for a fascinating discussion of secret CIA financing of some Japanese politicians, which is revealed perhaps for the first time in a scholarly monograph.

The book's focus is on the twenty-year period, 1952–1972, both because Schaller has published excellent volumes dealing with the Occupation and because documentation becomes scarcer after the 1970s. Even so, the last pages tracing some themes in U.S.–Japanese relations in the last quarter century are quite well done, demonstrating Schaller's skills as an imaginative historian. It is to be hoped that as more material becomes available he will write a sequel to this volume.

AKIRA IRIYE
Harvard University

Strategic Assessment in War *by Scott Sigmund Gartner. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1997. 248 pp. $32.50.*

In war as in all endeavors, individuals and organizations must find—or construct—a way to measure the success of their policies. Consistent with the main thrust of modern cognitive psychology, Scott Gartner argues that people must simplify what they look at in order to do so; indeed, they rely on one or at most two "dominant indicators." Furthermore, and more controversially, he expects them to look at these indicators not only in absolute terms, but also at increases or decreases, and even at the acceleration or deceleration of change. Judgments of how well the organization is doing in these terms will override biases that other scholars (for example, Jack Snyder, Stephen Van Evera) have located, such as the military's supposed preference for the offensive. Indeed, whereas some perspectives would suggest that preferences for a desired strategy would lead decision makers to change indicators when the current ones point in an undesired direction, Gartner argues that the preference for a given indicator is more stable than the preference for a strategy. It also follows that different individuals or organizations are likely to evaluate the situation differently if they use different indicators or that they may agree for different reasons: thus while British civilian leaders favored the use of convoys at the beginning of World War II because they expected them to hold shipping losses to a minimum, the Royal Navy agreed (which would surprise those who would have expected the organization to repeat the opposition it had displayed in World War I) because it thought that convoys would maximize the sinking of U-boats.

For evidence, Gartner looks at the British response to German submarine warfare in both world wars and the American attempts to measure progress in Vietnam, supplemented by a briefer discussion of the factors that led Jimmy Carter to authorize the hostage rescue attempt in Iran. These cases establish at least the plausibility of Gartner's arguments. Thus, contrary to those who would argue that in a complex world people must look only at the simplest signs of success or failure, he shows that when examining data like casualty figures or ship losses, decision makers look not only at absolute levels, but also at the rate at which they are rising or falling. Even in a situation in which trends are unfavorable, a strategy may be maintained if the rate of the unfavorable change is decreasing, thus indicating that eventual success is likely. As he notes, if British leaders tracked only the absolute level of ship-

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ping losses in World War I, they would have pressed for a change much earlier and more insistently than they did. (The value of nonevents is something that most scholars realize but few act upon.)

There are some problems, however. On occasion, Gartner oversimplifies. Thus the claim that members of Congress reacted so strongly to the Tet offensive because the indicator they were tracking was American casualties downplays the extent to which they interpreted this event against the background of claims that the American forces had broken the back of the enemy. He also fails to discuss anomalies such as Robert McNamara's coming to believe that the United States could not win the war before the body count pointed to defeat. More importantly, the study should have been shorter or longer. Little would have been lost in compressing it into a lengthy article. Even better, the book could have been made more convincing by more detailed historical analysis. By only looking at the standard secondary sources, Gartner is not able to demonstrate convincingly what information was in fact most influential. Research in primary sources and a more textured narrative might have revealed several smoking guns, as well as raised interesting questions. Thus he presents graphs showing changes on what he argues were the dominant indicators, but does not reproduce the graphs the decision makers themselves received. More extended treatment could also have included discussion of the crucial question of what determines the indicators that organizations select.

In summary, this is an interesting book that could have been even better.

ROBERT JERVIS
Columbia University

The Reluctant Superpower: United States' Policy in Bosnia, 1991–95 *by Wayne Bert. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1997. 296 pp. $35.00.*

This book is one of the first to focus exclusively on U.S. policy toward Bosnia. Although many popular and scholarly articles have been written on the topic, the author provides a valuable service by distilling the debates into one readable volume.

The author's main argument is that the United States had no compelling security interest in Bosnia, but did have strong humanitarian interests. Given this fact, U.S. public opinion and elite attitudes toward Bosnia were split. While most supported the goal of a united, independent, and multi-ethnic Bosnia, many refused to support the use of force to thwart Bosnian Serb territorial gains. As a result, U.S. policy foundered, settling on the worst possible alternative: U.S. administrations torpedoed European-brokered peace plans, arguing they rewarded Serb aggression, but refused to lead a military campaign to impose a different solution. In 1995 Bill Clinton finally switched tactics, enforcing a settlement through air assaults on Bosnian Serbs and through support for Bosnian and Croat military offensives. The United States could have stopped the war much earlier, the author argues, had it been willing to try air strikes at the beginning of hostilities. A determined and self-confident president could have mobilized domestic support had he been willing to risk failure.

One of the book's most important contributions is its effective refutation of the all-or-nothing doctrine prevalent in the United States following the Gulf War. This policy, the author argues, is little more than a recipe for helplessness and inaction, since few foreign

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policy challenges will justify a massive, all-out U.S. effort. A second crucial contribution is the evidence demonstrating that Bosnia splintered the U.S. policy-making elite along nontraditional lines. Conservatives and liberals found themselves on the same side of the fence, breaking with cold war-era coalitions. This account would have been strengthened, however, had the author analyzed this new domestic situation in greater depth. Which groups pushed which policies, when, and why? What interests, ideological or bureaucratic, were being served?

The book has several other problems. It is weak on Balkan affairs, offering a simplistic analysis of the Serb camp. It glosses over domestic challenges to Serb President Slobodan Milosevic's rule, erroneously portraying him as an all-powerful leader in full control of rump Yugoslavia as well as Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia. The book thus loses sight of important regional differences between Serb entities as well as key internal struggles within Serbia proper between former communists and radical nationalists. Another drawback is the book's failure to fully discuss the effects of U.S. policy on Bosnian Muslim positions. The administration's anti-Serb rhetoric often provided false encouragement to the Bosnian leadership, complicating European efforts at finding a settlement.

Some of these weaknesses stem from the author's tendency, freely admitted, to see Serbia as the root cause of all Bosnia's difficulties. This analysis provides intellectual justification for the author's preference for U.S. air strikes against the Serbs. The text would have been stronger, however, had it retained its support for U.S. effectiveness while acknowledging important Bosnian complexities.

The author makes a rare, good-faith effort to deal with a particularly thorny question: Why, given the existence of far more terrible wars, should the United States focus on Bosnia? Why did the same wrenching debates not take place about Liberia, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, and the Sudan? The answer—that the U.S. has historical interests in the Balkans—is unsatisfying, however, given the book's advocacy of an ethical foreign policy.

I recommend this work to generalists interested in U.S. foreign policy in the post-cold war era, as well as those with a more specific interest in the U.S. Bosnia policy. It should be used in courses on the Bosnian war only in combination with more nuanced studies, however, to avoid offering a simplified picture of the conflict.

JAMES RON
The Brookings Institution

Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress *by Barbara Sinclair. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1997. Cloth, $33.95; paper, $19.95.*

A gaping chasm exists between the legislative process observed on Capitol Hill and the legislative process described in U.S. government textbooks, argues Barbara Sinclair. Where the route to enactment used to be linear and predictable, now it is "flexible and varied" (p. 31). To this end the author explores new procedures and practices in the House and Senate, the factors that have contributed to their emergence, and their consequences for the lawmaking process and the legislation produced. She illustrates her analysis with several case studies. National service legislation, regulatory overhaul, and the omnibus drug bill highlight the variability of the contemporary legislative process. President Bill Clinton's economic program and the 1995 Republican budget demonstrate how the contemporary

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lawmaking process provides congressional actors with more choices, and how the alternatives they choose lead to different legislative paths.

Sinclair reminds us of an important characteristic of Congress: the institution is inventive with regard to process. Practitioners of politics are goal-oriented individuals who will use nearly any process, however lofty or crass, to achieve their ends. Over the years Congress has been a remarkably adaptive institution, finding different means to address and formulate legislation. The author uses the term "unorthodox lawmaking" to distinguish the extent of change in the contemporary legislative process (p. xii). She focuses on procedures and practices that are either new or much more frequently employed than they used to be.

The use of task forces that bypass the regular committees and postcommittee adjustments (substitute bills that frequently supersede committee bills and become the version taken to the House floor) are just two examples of creative tools that have been fashioned in response to different problems and opportunities. Members as individuals and as part of an institution have confronted adjustments in institutional structure. These include internal reform that altered the distribution of influence in both chambers in the 1970s and the institution of the congressional budget process. Members faced challenges in the political environment in the 1980s and early 1990s, such as divided control of Congress, deficit politics, and ideological hostility to the legislative goals of the Democratic party. Sinclair argues that these changing patterns in congressional practice and procedure have worked to facilitate lawmaking. Leadership in the House is afforded more flexibility in shaping the legislative process to suit the specific legislation at hand, in advancing policy agendas, and in accomplishing other goals. "When climbing a ladder," Sinclair notes in reference to the textbook lawmaking process, "there isn't much one can do if a rung is broken" (p. 31). The contemporary process is comparable to climbing a tree with many branches, "if one route is blocked there is always another one can try" (p. 31).

Despite successful legislative outcomes with unorthodox lawmaking, Sinclair cautions the reader about pitfalls associated with too much innovation and modification. Congressional government may or may not be committee government, as Woodrow Wilson held. But much of Congress's deliberation takes place in the committee and subcommittee rooms of Capitol Hill, and when these traditional channels of lawmaking are manipulated or bypassed, deliberation and the quality of legislation suffer.

That Sinclair writes such an ambitious work is a tribute to her understanding of Congress and its elaborate maze of subtleties. She views politics as an art, as networks of personal relationships, as informal agreements, and as accumulated practice that is not captured by many rigid theoretical frameworks. This sophisticated and insightful book should be on the shelves of specialists and nonspecialists interested in understanding how the congressional process really works. Teachers of upper-division undergraduate and graduate courses will find the book to be a useful addition to their students' readings.

COLTON C. CAMPBELL
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The Political Economy of Regionalism *edited by Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner. New York, Columbia University Press, 1997. 274 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $19.50.*

A new collection of acronyms—including NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), APEC (Asian Pacific Economic Council), and EMU (European Monetary

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Union)—has crept into policy makers' vocabularies, causing economists and political scientists to reconsider a variety of questions about the causes and consequences of regionalism. The essays collected by Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner usefully address recent developments while revisiting and sometimes revising earlier studies of regionalism's economic, monetary, and security dimensions.

For example, consider the inconsistency between standard theories of currency relations and actual developments. Optimum currency area theory treats monetary arrangements as rational decisions made by governments involving trade-offs between microeconomic efficiency and macroeconomic flexibility. But Benjamin Cohen observes that private market forces often preempt such political decision making: a de facto hierarchy among national moneys results, allowing the issuers of widely employed currencies to derive both enhanced efficiency and greater flexibility.

Likewise, the optimal number of participants in international institutions has intrigued analysts for two decades. The literature suggests that as numbers increase so will (typically) diversity, and with it related collective action problems. But as Pier Carlo Padoan points out, even homogeneity can hinder the expansion of existing regional institutions. Focusing on past as well as potential future expansions of the European Union, Padoan argues that existing members have incentives to block the entry of applicants with similar comparative advantages, since they will be competing for the same markets or for scarce redistributive funds.

Several of the chapters focus on regional trade liberalization. Helen Milner maintains that differences in the economic characteristics of specific industries help account for the shape of particular agreements, although she is less persuasive in suggesting that such structural characteristics explain the timing of initiatives. Focusing on the role played by bargaining power, Stephan Haggard observes that trade agendas in the Western Hemisphere have been shaped by important changes in American trade strategy, including a shift (beginning in 1985) toward efforts to secure concessions on a bilateral basis. Because of their high dependence on American imports, Canada and Mexico were especially vulnerable to this new approach; the ensuing negotiations resulted in NAFTA. Beth Yarborough and Robert Yarborough discuss regional dispute settlement mechanisms, which Haggard argues were a major objective of Canadian trade negotiators.

Joseph Grieco advances what initially appears to be a powerful and succinct explanation of variation in patterns of regionalism in Europe, the Western Hemisphere, and Asia. He argues that since declining states fear linking their economic fortunes to a rising local hegemon, regional economic liberalization is least likely when disparities in capabilities are in flux. Later, however, he introduces an auxiliary argument—in effect maintaining that Europe is a special case in which the general tenets of this "relative disparity shift hypothesis" are reversed—to account for the otherwise anomalous negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty in the wake of German unification (pp. 179–183).

While hardly a triumph for parsimony, the ancillary thesis introduced by Grieco does provide food for thought. The postwar institutionalization of intra-European trade began when West Germany, though still relatively weak, was regarded by its neighbors as a potential hegemon; one of the aims of European integration was to contain and direct that potential. NAFTA was negotiated in part because America's neighbors feared a sudden shift in the threat associated with relatively constant U.S. market power. APEC, originally intended as an Asian trade group to balance NAFTA, was soon transformed—at American insistence—into a pan-Pacific bloc including the United States. The contrasting trajectories of

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these efforts suggest that the relationship between hegemony and regionalism might be usefully reexamined in terms other than comparative statics.

DAVID M. ANDREWS
Scripps College

Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958 *by Thomas J. Christensen. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996. 319 pp. Cloth, $49.50; paper, $19.95.*

Why should the United States and the Chinese Communists have become bitter enemies in the first dozen years of Mao Zedong's rule over mainland China? Thomas Christensen contends that the primary explanation was the need shared by American and Chinese leaders to mobilize the support of their own people for massive projects that would otherwise have been rejected as too costly and too unorthodox. This interaction between foreign and domestic policies makes up his two-level analytical structure for the book. On the American side, President Harry Truman sought to gain approval for the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which not only violated long held traditions of independence from peacetime alliances, but also meant huge expenditures for the reconstruction of Europe instead of meeting American needs at home. Truman found it impossible in the face of cries for consistency from Christensen's well-named "Asialationists" to rally support for such a costly stand against communism in Europe and ignore the problem in Asia. As a result, he could not extend diplomatic recognition to the new China at a time when Mao would have welcomed it.

Mao faced parallel problems in trying to generate enthusiasm and financial reserves for a domestic strategy designed to strengthen and enrich China rapidly so that the United States could not try to dominate it and the Soviet Union would not abandon it. This controversial strategy, the Great Leap Forward, ran into just as much skepticism and resistance as the Marshall Plan and similarly required creation of an exaggerated foreign threat. Thus Mao did not launch the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis to capture the offshore islands, or to probe the depth of the U.S.–Taiwan alliance, or even to ward off a national security threat. Rather, he wanted to distract his people from domestic hardship and instill greater discipline and a willingness to sacrifice. Opposition to American imperialism, in effect, would permit accelerated economic growth.

Christensen also turns his attention to the Korean War, a topic that of late has been analyzed extensively as Russian and Chinese documents have been released from previously sealed archives. He explains that the failure to recognize China deprived Washington of direct contacts that might initially have prevented miscommunication and war. He asserts the fatefulness of the 38th parallel decision in Mao's calculations, after which Mao could not be deterred from attempting to drive the Americans off the Korean peninsula. Truman's placement of the 7th Fleet in the Taiwan Strait given his January pledge not to do so made Americans too dangerous and duplicitous to have along the Yalu River. Once in the war, moreover, Mao sought to inflict the highest casualties possible; his November disengagement was designed to lure an arrogant Douglas MacArthur to greater slaughter. Somewhat less convincingly, Christensen alleges that political mobilization in the United States dictated an unbending commitment to National Security Council (NSC) 68 with its call for

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a substantially increased defense budget. To preserve it, Truman allowed the war to drag on and the casualties to mount, refusing to try for an early negotiated peace.

Thomas Christensen's basic explanation of these events is not new. The connections between Europe and Asia in American thinking and between the Great Leap and the Straits Crisis have been made by scholars before. Christensen's contributions, and they are important, are to bring theoretical sophistication to the analysis and to explain what happened clearly and concisely in an extremely persuasive and highly readable book. He had made excellent use of new sources, and his juxtaposition of the Chinese and American cases is an enlightening exercise in cross-cultural understanding.

NANCY BERNKOPF TUCKER
Georgetown University

Who Deliberates? *by Benjamin I. Page. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1997. 117 pp. Cloth, $29.00; paper, $10.95.*

Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro demonstrated in *The Rational Public* (1992) that the American public's policy preferences are by and large reasonable and responsive to information, events, and public deliberation. Considering that contemporary decision makers frequently hold up their wet fingers to figure out from what direction the wind of public opinion is blowing, those findings were comforting—even though the authors warned that the public can be manipulated. Now, in this thoughtful, well written book, Page takes a closer look at the information citizens receive through the news media and examines whether mass-mediated policy debates reflect a wide or narrow range of views and opinions. The idea here is, of course, that citizens need to be fully informed in order to make educated policy choices.

In the first of three interesting case studies, Page examines the debate over war and peace in the months preceding the Persian Gulf War of 1991 as reflected in the editorials, letters-to-the-editor, and op-ed pieces in *The New York Times*. "Few ordinary citizens—and virtually no radicals, pacifists, or other outsiders—were heard" (p. 36) according to Page. Instead, there were signs of "a constructed [and fairly narrow] deliberation at the *Times*" (p. 37) that was dominated by mainstream elites.

In the aftermath of the 1992 riots in Los Angeles, White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater cited the welfare programs of the 1960s and 1970s as a major cause of the destructive civil disturbances. In his second case study, Page analyzes the following blame-for-the-riots debate in a variety of newspapers, news magazines, opinion journals, and television news and discussion programs. Once again the mediated deliberation was dominated by elite voices and, as Page concludes, often tilted in favor of individual news organizations' own positions on the issue.

In the final case study, Page deals with the mass-mediated debate surrounding the revelation that Zoe Baird, President Bill Clinton's first choice to be U.S. attorney general, had employed a Peruvian couple living illegally in the United States. While the mainstream media's elite voices offered little serious criticism and predicted Baird's confirmation, Page describes a "public uprising" (p. 88) and a "talk show rebellion" (p. 89) in the alternative media that forced out-of-touch elites to retreat. For Page, this episode was "a victory for democracy, a demonstration that, under certain circumstances, unrepresentative surrogate

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deliberators can be overcome by direct, *populistic deliberation*" (p. 100). To be sure, talk radio at its best engages ordinary citizens in public debate. But after listening to a cross-section of talk radio programs, I am convinced that Page underestimates the ability of many hosts and their guests to spread disinformation and manipulate their audiences.

Ending on an upbeat note, the author submits that the three cases "can be read as embodying substantial deliberative success" (p. 122), a rather surprising assessment with respect to his first case study. But as far as Page is concerned, the shortcomings of individual news organizations and media types do not matter all that much. He argues that mass-mediated debate works as long as a broad range of relevant views are expressed in the totality of the marketplace of ideas. And the American public's rational policy preferences suggest in the author's view that "mediated deliberation, despite its flaws, must be largely successful" (p. 123). Given the megamergers in the media industry, the uniformity of the news presentations, and modern man's lack of time or inclination to survey the marketplace of ideas, I am not persuaded that contemporary democracy is adequately served by the libertarian press model. Along the lines of the social responsibility press ideal, we must insist that each individual news organization offers a broad marketplace of ideas. That was, after all, the rationale when op-ed pages and expanded letters-to-the-editor sections were introduced.

Nevertheless, this is a stimulating work throughout. According to the preface, the book was written for general readers, students, social scientists, and those interested in democratic theory and political communication. I recommend it to all of them.

BRIGITTE L. NACOS
Columbia University

Why People Don't Trust Government *edited by Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Philip D. Zelikow, and David C. King. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1997. 339 pp. Cloth, $39.95; paper, $18.95.*

During the fall 1997 Senate hearings on campaign fundraising, a former chairman of the Democratic party testified that he could not recall contacting the CIA to help a large donor. This was despite his own handwritten notes plus the testimony of the donor and the CIA officer. That same week the president's national security adviser swore that large campaign contributions by a foreign national had nothing to do with setting up a meeting with the contributor and arranging briefings for him. Among the press, this dissembling produced little surprise. The assumption was that both gentlemen were conducting government business as usual.

These hearings provide a context to a collection of essays provocatively titled *Why People Don't Trust Government*. The book is part of a project of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government on problems of governance, specifically the widespread loss of confidence in how government functions. It brings together leading scholars of politics examining aspects of the problem.

There's little doubt that distrust of government has grown over the last thirty years. In the early 1960s, three out of four Americans trusted Washington all or most of the time. Today it is just the opposite, three out of four no longer trust the government. Rather than solve problems, the public thinks that federal involvement makes them worse—a stunning turnaround for a government that was once credited with protecting people from the Great Depression and winning World War II.

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While there is an easy, perhaps too easy consensus on the problem, there is little agreement on its causes. One or another of the essays finds a connection between the rise of cynicism and almost every political development of post-World War II America. From the expansion of the public sector to the break up of the family, from the decline of voluntary associations to gender and ethnic conflicts, from the rise of political consultants to the weakening of political parties, from globalization to television, from negative advertising to the rise of anti-authority attitudes. The result is an insightful tour de horizon that never quite answers the question in the title.

In his essay on government performance, Derek Bok examines several decades of federal programs and finds that the negative perceptions are not supported by large-scale waste and corruption. Yet America has failed compared to other democracies in reducing poverty, providing health care and personal security, and reaching a host of other objectives. Gary Orren looks at public trust in the more subjective light of citizens' expectations of government. Here skeptical media coverage has combined with the anti-authority culture of our educated classes to produce a deep alienation from most public institutions, whatever their performance.

Richard Neustadt sees a perverse relationship between politicians who are sophisticated in manipulating the populace (through polls, advertising, etc.), yet end up with a citizenry that thinks less and less of these politicians. With historical roots in the culture of the 1960s and 1970s, the distrust persists as politicians promise to solve ever more complicated problems without quite delivering. Neustadt concludes with the restrained hope that this ebbing tide of confidence will ease as it has in the past.

The editors labor to pull things together by pointing to some responses as more fruitful than others. World War II raised unrealistically optimistic expectations about what government could accomplish. The changed role of media and its intrusive coverage reinforced libertarian views among the affluent. Add to this economic changes that increase insecurity, government taking on intractable problems of families, race, and crime, and the universe of possibilities begins to narrow.

But at journey's end there remains a slight suspicion. The authors are esteemed, the musings are thoughtful, and the questions are important. And yet like listening to experts from Fidelity Funds complain about Americans' low savings rate, one can sympathize with the diagnosis while wondering about the agenda. After all, these are members of America's governing elite asking why the American public distrusts their government.

What makes this question important? The editors point to the dangers in low political participation, in the difficulties of recruiting young people for government jobs, and the potential lack of popular response to leaders in a future crisis. Distrust weakens government. Therefore, this disillusionment needs to be diagnosed and ultimately remedied. For, though not stated this baldly, public cynicism is treated as a pathology.

And yet to slant the question differently, why should people trust government. Do those of us who claim to understand politics think that greater information would produce more trust? Are anti-authority attitudes, or media framing, or unrealistic expectations distorting public perceptions? Have American government officials proved unworthy of trust? The American public, while lacking a complete picture of official behavior, have made up their minds on that score.

Recalling the testimony at the Senate campaign hearings raises a last question: If those of us who follow government closely can't believe what officials say, why should our fellow citizens?

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Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns, and Africans *by Siba N'Zatioula Grovogui. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press. 1996. 282 pp. Cloth, $54.95; paper, $21.95.*

Within the context of Africa's collapsed states and the "recolonization" of the continent by international financial institutions, the concept of sovereignty has become increasingly a topic of discussion among scholars of African politics. Siba N'Zatioula Grovogui offers a theoretically rich and innovative contribution to this debate, which forces the reader to consider the implications of the concept's Western origins and the imposition of the terms by which African states became sovereign.

As Grovogui's title suggests, his book is a response to Robert Jackson's argument that the survival of Africa's "quasi states" is due to their juridical sovereignty derived from international recognition by other states. Grovogui, however, argues that the degree to which African states are quasi states is a reflection of the quasi sovereignty they received at independence.

Grovogui maintains that the quasi sovereignty of African states is the result of manipulation through a Western discourse of international law that permitted the transfer of rudimentary political powers without transforming the colonial structures of domination. Rejecting the notion that international law is politically neutral, Grovogui argues that there is no distinction between the juridical sphere of international law and the political sphere of international power politics. Consequently, independence was not an unconstrained exercise of the universally applicable right to self-determination, but a strategy to perpetuate Western hegemony and the marginalization of Africa.

As quasi sovereigns, African leaders are described by Grovogui as having been denied absolute authority over political institutions that serve the requirements of Western economies rather than self-defined national interests. To demonstrate his claim, Grovogui presents the Namibian case as illustrative of colonialism and decolonization in Africa.

In the first half of the book, Grovogui identifies four juridico-political regimes that have defined Africa's position in the international order—from the papal bulls of 1493, which mark the creation of "the Other" to justify imperialism in European international law; to the Berlin Conference (1884–1885), which limited the juridical capacity of Africans to the right to "consent" to colonization; followed by the Versailles Treaty, which established the dualism of European self-determination and the paternalism of the Mandate System; and, finally, the post-World War II trusteeships under the auspices of the United Nations. Drawing upon a wide array of Western political theorists, these chapters present a convincing argument against the alleged neutrality of international law.

In his discussion of the Namibian case, Grovogui focuses on the period from annexation after World War II by South Africa until its negotiated withdrawal in 1989, coordinated by the Contact Group composed of five Western countries. Grovogui is critical not only of the international structures that have their origins in Western legal processes, which denied the Namibian colony standing in the International Court of Justice, but also the dominant role of Western countries in international institutions such as the UN Security Council. As a result, Grovogui argues that African countries were forced to preserve the privileged status of the former colonizers after independence. In Namibia, this is illustrated by the imposition of an electoral system that made it nearly impossible to change preexisting property rights that favor the interests of the white minority, South Africans, and Western businesses.

Grovogui's critique of decolonization could be further strengthened by incorporating a comparative dimension. While the potential application to other African and possibly Third World countries is clear and exciting, few African countries were as integrated as Namibia

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into the mandate or trusteeship system. While his recommendation that African countries resolve their quasi sovereignty through disengagement ignores political and economic realities, Grovogui offers an important contribution to the study of international law and African politics.

LINDA J. BECK
Barnard College

Africa and the International System: The Politics of Survival *by Christopher Clapham. Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press, 1996. 352 pp. Cloth, $59.95; paper, $19.95.*

Late in 1996, a dramatic and unexpected civil war erupted in the great lakes region of Central Africa, and the world watched in amazement as the rebels swept across a country the size of Western Europe. By May 1997, the continent's longest running dictatorship had collapsed in final ignominy. Many questions and puzzles surrounded these dramatic events. Although written before them, this very fine book about the rise and fall of quasi-states in Africa helps to make sense of the complex local, regional, and international processes at work in the Zairian civil war. Quasi-statehood is "the recognition and support by the international system of states that are unable to sustain themselves internally" (p. 271). Extending the work of Robert H. Jackson, Christopher Clapham shows how an international regime of "juridical sovereignty" led to the creation and maintenance of weak states that lacked " empirical sovereignty" and that simply would not have continued to exist in earlier historical eras. This international regime was reinforced by the cold war. For African rulers, the order of the day was what Jean-François Bayart has called "extraversion"—dependence on external resources and support to survive. African rulers proved very adept at manipulating external actors to get what they needed to survive, at least until their form of rule led to collapsing economies. Powerful agencies such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank tried to get failing African states to reform their economies, with very modest results given the efforts of subversion used by many African regimes. Efforts to transform inefficient and authoritarian forms of politics into viable democracies produced similarly weak results.

More and more African states became shadow states, where rulers found it in their interests to undermine the formal structures of their own states. The result was the spread of informal markets, popular mechanisms of survival, and forms of privatization that relied on the carpetbaggers of global capitalism, outcomes far different from what the World Bank had in mind. A privatization of international relations was also underway, as other nonstate actors, particularly nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), stepped into the gap between the myth of African statehood and nasty everyday realities. With the end of the cold war and the declining interest of major states in Africa, these new international actors were far less respectful of the conventions of juridical sovereignty as they attempted to cope with famine, massive refugee flows, and terrible human rights violations. This extension of Western civil society into the realm of quasi-states has not been without its practical and moral ambiguities, however. As Clapham notes, "The encounter between Africa and the Westphalian assumptions of sovereign statehood . . . has been an awkward, ambiguous, unsatisfactory, and often indeed tragic combination" (p. 267), but one without a clear alternative.

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An international relations of increasing statelessness is surely upon us, and this marvelous, carefully written and cited book delves nicely into the nature and causes of these complex processes. Not just a book about Africa's international relations, it provides a coherent view of Africa's condition at the end of the millennium. While covering all aspects well and vividly, it has particularly fine sections on France's "special relationship" with Africa, the impact of the end of the cold war, the international politics and economics of insurgencies, the rise and consequences of shadow states and informal economies, and the ambiguous efforts of international organizations and NGOs.

THOMAS M. CALLAGHY
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Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War *by Edwin E. Moise. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1996. 324 pp. $39.95.*

On 2 August 1964, the *Maddox*, a U.S. Navy destroyer patrolling the Tonkin Gulf, was attacked by three North Vietnamese torpedo boats. Despite poor gunnery, the *Maddox* drove off the torpedo boats, which were further damaged by American carrier aircraft as they returned to their bases. During the night of 4 August, the crew and officers of the *Maddox*, now joined by the U.S. destroyer *C. Turner Joy*, reported that they were under attack from North Vietnamese coastal patrol vessels. The Johnson administration, spring-loaded to demonstrate U.S. military might and its determination to counter Hanoi's pressure against the regime in Saigon, launched retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnamese naval bases and petroleum storage facilities.

Additionally, the Johnson administration used the alleged 4 August attack to obtain congressional support for U.S. military action in Southeast Asia. Although most members of Congress failed to realize it at the time, the Tonkin Gulf resolution constituted a virtual declaration of war against the North Vietnamese and their Viet Cong Allies, providing carte blanche to both the Johnson and Nixon administrations to conduct the "big-unit" war in Vietnam.

As Edwin Moise notes in this exhaustive study, most observers agree that the 4 August attack never occurred. Indeed, Moise persuasively argues that atmospheric anomalies, overly excited and inexperienced crews, and bad weather led to a wild melee between U.S. destroyers and spurious radar and sonar contacts. What continues to rankle Moise, however, is that the press and most Americans accepted the Johnson administration's claims about the incident at face value, even though doubts about the administration's initial version of events quickly surfaced. Naval officers suspected that initial on-scene reports were either widely exaggerated or simply mistaken; U.S. aircraft that loitered on the scene saw no enemy vessels. The claim that the attacks were unprovoked was dubious. The United States had been supporting covert South Vietnamese raids against North Vietnam. Indeed, as the *Maddox* entered the Tonkin Gulf on 31 July, it passed four patrol boats returning to South Vietnam after conducting an OPLAN34A raid against North Vietnamese coastal facilities.

Moise is at his best in describing attitudes toward the brewing conflict in the summer of 1964. So eager was the Johnson administration to flex its military muscle against Hanoi, that the president went on television to announce the retaliatory air raid before U.S. warplanes

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were in the air. Johnson's announcement provided useful warning for some North Vietnamese installations. In Hanoi, communist leaders seemed relieved that their troops had directly engaged Americans; bloodied, U.S. forces no longer seemed invincible to the rank and file.

Moise's work illustrates that both sides knew little about their opponents. Americans believed that the North Vietnamese would be cowed by the demonstration of U.S. military might. Members of the Johnson administration seemed to think that once Hanoi realized that the United States was determined to support South Vietnam, it would stop its efforts to destabilize the Saigon regime. Leaders in Hanoi seemed uncertain about the real extent and effectiveness of America's military capability. Maybe the United States was a paper tiger; one had to pull the tiger's whiskers to find out for certain. Remarkably, the miscalculations and uncertainties that led to the Tonkin Gulf incidents would ultimately be resolved by ten years of brutal fighting in Vietnam. Americans would discover that the North Vietnamese would not be intimidated and were willing to endure unimaginable suffering to obtain their objectives. The North Vietnamese would learn that the tiger was real, but not before they had climbed aboard its back.

JAMES J. WIRTZ
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Anatomy of Mistrust: U.S.–Soviet Relations During the Cold War *by Deborah Welch Larson. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1997. 329 pp. $35.00.*

Deborah Welch Larson's second book is a welcome addition to revisionist explorations of cold-war history. Using the lens of social psychological theories on trust and suspicion, she reinterprets several episodes of that history, arguing that both the United States and the Soviet Union repeatedly missed opportunities for agreement that might have ended the cold war earlier. Especially in times of leadership transition, each side made conciliatory moves that could have overcome their long history of mutual suspicion.

Larson finds five such branching points and laments the failure of one side or the other to follow through on the logic of GRIT, or Gradual Reciprocation in Tension Reduction. This strategy for overcoming mutual hostility, codified by Charles Osgood, uses a series of unilateral, progressively more costly concessions to convince one's adversary of one's benign intentions, thereby building a climate of good will that undermines imbedded distrust. In her final case, examining the conciliatory actions of Mikhail Gorbachev, Larson argues that reciprocation of Soviet concessions by Ronald Reagan and George Bush could have led to more significant strategic arms reduction treaties and a more supportive domestic climate for Gorbachev's reforms.

Larson documents her points well, using both her own work in U.S. archives, and secondary reports from the East German and partially opened Soviet archives. She demonstrates that both U.S. and Soviet leaders often allowed their cooperative gestures to be derailed by hard-liners at home; it was easy to fall back into old patterns of distrust, even with the best of conciliatory intentions. She also shows that leaders frequently failed to step back and consider the effects of their own actions on their opponents' perceptions, or at least to follow through on such considerations when domestic political battles loomed.

Larson's historical interpretation is well grounded and well connected to the social psychology perspective she lays out in the first chapter of the book. What is less convincing are

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her efforts to dismiss the relevance of realism as an explanatory framework for her findings. She recognizes that what she calls "soft realism" portrays international conflict as a result of states' needs to defend themselves against potential aggressors in an uncertain system, where distrust is prudent and where complacency can lead to victimization. Yet she dismisses the explanatory value of realist arguments as a whole by identifying them with the abstract models of game theory, where states are portrayed as unitary actors and where conflict resolution proceeds in a straight evolutionary line, not subject to the fits and starts of domestic politics and personalities. Later she abandons the soft realists and seems to say that realism only works as an explanation when there are real conflicts of interest between states, not when mutually beneficial outcomes are theoretically possible if distrust could be overcome. In these passages, Larson turns the rich and varied realist tradition into an easily destroyed straw figure, and her arguments on this point lack conviction as a result.

This is just a quibble, however. It does not detract from the value of Larson's work, which is not in her arguments against realism, but instead in her arguments on behalf of integrating social psychology theory into the analysis of international relations. This book is the perfect follow-up to Larson's earlier work on the social psychology of America's cold-war containment strategy. Beyond their clear academic value, the findings of this book should serve as a lesson to policy makers: those who wish to build trust in a hostile climate must first build a reputation for conciliatory consistency in the eyes of their opponents.

KIMBERLY MARTEN ZISK
Barnard College

Making Crime Pay: Law and Order in Contemporary American Politics *by Katherine Beckett. New York, Oxford University Press, 1997. 168 pp. Cloth, $27.50.*

This book provides some new insight into possible political and media involvement in manipulating public opinion regarding the "crime problem." Katherine Beckett's main argument is that it is not the "increased incidence of criminal behavior [that] has led Americans to demand that their political representatives crack down on criminals" (p. 4). Rather, politicians, with the help of reporters who depend on politicians for handouts, have led the public to appear to be demanding this of the politicians. Beckett argues that the main beneficiaries of this manipulation are the politicians who inflame the passions and at times help activate underlying racist inclinations of the public in an attempt to win elections.

In Chapter two, Beckett presents survey results of public concern about crime between 1966 and 1974, as well as public concern about drugs between 1986 and 1992, and compares this concern with actual crime rates and drug usage, as well as media coverage and state initiatives to combat drugs and crime. The results are quite illuminating: public opinion does not track actual crime rates or drug abuse; rather, public concern regarding crime and drugs directly tracks media reporting and state initiatives regarding crime and drugs.

In later chapters, Beckett argues and offers evidence that politicians ranging from Barry Goldwater to Daniel Patrick Moynihan linked the crime problem to lack of self-responsibility, the rise of the welfare state, and the passage of civil rights legislation. She argues that both parties resorted to these tactics to appeal to floating white southerners who were left without a party following the passage of civil rights legislation in the 1960s. To help link the issues of crime, drugs, welfare, and race, politicians packaged the issues of crime and drugs

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when serving as news sources for members of the press, using different labels for issues. Crime issues were packaged under the rubric of "respect for authority": "respect for authority has broken down because individuals are not being held responsible for their behavior" (p. 66). Drug issues were packaged under the rubric of "get the traffickers" and "zero tolerance." Members of the media carried the stories in this fashion to satisfy their own interest in "dramatic and sensationalistic news" (p. 77). In other words . . . ratings!

Beckett's conclusion leaves much for us as a society to think about. Because of the ability of the politicians, with an assist from the media, to successfully frame the crime issue as a problem that requires more prisons and fewer social programs, politicians and citizens alike no longer feel the need to fight the root causes of crime. According to the "new penology," we fight crime as we would manage a business. Those who are in the decision-making process within the criminal justice system argue that "the language of probability and risk supersedes any interest in clinical diagnosis, social context, or even retributive justice" (p. 103). There is no consideration of the individual, the facts that led to the commission of the crime, or any plan regarding the rehabilitation of the individual. Unfortunately, while this new penology has taken hold, the prison population has increased sixfold, including a threefold increase in nonviolent offenders. In addition, the budget allocated to corrections has increased from $4 billion in 1970 to $30 billion in 1994. Could this money be better spent on education and possibly help us avoid the need to spend as much on corrections? Beckett argues that as a society we must attempt to reintegrate and rehabilitate these individuals or we must question our very existence as a democracy.

Despite the excellence of the book, the lack of seriousness given opinions that are not in line with the author's is troubling. Is it impossible for one to rationally believe that imprisonment is the answer for nonviolent crimes or drug usage, since individuals who commit these crimes eventually move on to commit more serious offenses? Is one necessarily morally lacking if he/she believes that society is spending enough on social programs? Beckett could have, at least, explored the alternatives, even if only to rebut them.

Above mentioned criticisms aside, I believe that this book is a useful supplement for both undergraduate or graduate students who are interested in both political or media manipulation, as well as a general introduction to the current state of criminal justice theory.

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The Legitimization of Violence *edited by David E. Apter. New York, New York University Press, 1997. 416 pp. Cloth, $50.00; paper, $20.00.*

This is a collection of detailed, analytical case histories of violent social and political movements of the late twentieth century. The cases are mostly quite predictable—Peru's Shining Path, Italy's Red Brigades, Germany's neo-Nazis, the Tamil rebellion in Sir Lanka, the Shiite movement in Lebanon, Republican Nationalism in Northern Ireland, Basque separatism in Spain and France, and an array of more-or-less related insurgencies in Colombia.

Editor David Apter has encouraged the contributors to adopt, or at least address, a distinctive conceptual framework. Indeed, to judge from his introduction, it is safe to say that he intends for the work as a whole to make a specific theoretical point. That is that militant

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insurgencies like these can only be adequately understood as expressions of discourse—systems of meaning that shape the violent actions of participants and which they seek to impose on other parties by those actions. Thus the contributors have evidently been encouraged to identify things like "discourse communities" and "inversionary discourses" in their materials. The intent seems to be to establish two things: first, that movements like these, once launched, respond to self-generated "logics" that are not simply manifestations of their material or strategic situations; and second, that ideas originating with figures like Jean Bernard Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and other discourse thinkers provide the basis for a theory of such logics.

The first of these assertions appears better supported by the case studies than the second. Consider Michel Wieviorka's excellent, highly detailed study of ETA, the Basque separatist movement—an insurgency much in the public eye for its highly publicized assassination of a Spanish political hostage. Wieviorka shows that ETA has grown more militant and more uncompromising in its violent aims, after many observers would consider the original aims of its constituency have been attained. Thus as Spanish politics have grown more liberal and open, and as restrictions on political activity in its Basque country have lightened, the movement has grown more destructive.

Wieviorka makes a compelling case that the evolution of ETA can only be understood in terms of a world view that is largely sui generis in terms of its own myths, narratives, or logics. Other contributors make similarly convincing cases, though more compellingly for some of the movements than others. As Carlos Desgregori shows in the case of Shining Path, for example, the fact that movement ideology might always have been reckoned far removed from empirical reality never seems to have made much of a dent in the determination and direction of that movement.

Whether discourse thinking furnishes a theory for such important interpretive processes is problematic. Perhaps this depends on what one means by theory. The case studies certainly make it clear that militant, embattled activist groups develop and propagate ideologies that morally revalue established political relations, often revising history in the process; and that these reinterpretations shape actions by leaders and followers alike, even to the extent of justifying what would otherwise be morally outragous conduct. Such essential analytical ideas have been available to students of militant political action at least since Vilfredo Pareto. But one does not find in the work under review much specific guidance as to what sorts of militant ideas to expect under what political conditions—or when such ideas represent a force in their own right and when they are apt to be reshaped by other circumstances.

Perhaps the editor and contributors would not be pleased, but I view the strength of their work as lying more in the richness of its empirical detail than in its theoretical accomplishments. The authors have shown how a variety of highly destructive phenomena unfold in response to rich and complex local influences—idiosyncratic ideas and evaluations very much included. Perhaps the most productive conclusion from such material is that we are better at describing such variety than at coming up with explanations to account for it.

JAMES B. RULE
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The Gorbachev Factor *by Archie Brown. New York, Oxford University Press, 1996. 406 pp. $30.00.*

This useful book is the culmination of many years of Archie Brown's work on Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the last general secretary of the Communist party of the Soviet Union. Brown

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explains in the preface that *The Gorbachev Factor* is "neither a history of the Gorbachev era nor a biography of Mikhail Gorbachev" (p.ix). Instead, Brown sets as his main task "to examine how important Gorbachev was as a mover or facilitator in the Soviet Union's transition from Orthodox Communism to a different kind of political system" (p. ix).

Brown wants the book to serve as a corrective to those accounts of Gorbachev that paint him as merely reactive to the institutional pressures wrought by the declining Soviet system. Instead, the Gorbachev in Brown's analysis is a lifelong reformer who ascended to the highest heights of the Communist party in order to save that institution as well as to improve life for the people of the Soviet Union. Brown's admiring portrait of Gorbachev is one of a serious and sophisticated reformer, not a hapless provincial apparatchik, nor a victim of events he neither completely understood nor could control.

Although Brown insists that the book is not intended as biography, the author does spend a good amount of time in the second and third chapters examining Gorbachev's early life and his gradual rise to power. Brown's main argument in covering this territory (often drawing heavily on previously untapped sources) is that, although Gorbachev played within the confines of the Soviet system, his reformist tendencies arose nonetheless. In chapter three, Brown quotes Andrey Grachev in identifying Gorbachev as "a genetic error of the system," whose program, when he became general secretary in 1985 was "much more radical" than his colleagues could have envisaged (p. 88 and p. 80 respectively). Chapters four through seven then paint Gorbachev's proactive role in appointments, economic and political change, as well as foreign policy. Chapter eight examines the coup attempt against Gorbachev by his own appointees and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The ninth and final chapter draws the book to a close as Brown drives home his point that Gorbachev should not be thought of as a political failure, despite the demise of the Communist party and the ensuing collapse of the Soviet Union (two unintended outcomes of his reform efforts) during his tenure as general secretary. Instead, Brown attributes many positive developments to the Gorbachev factor—the introduction in 1989 of contested elections, thus laying the foundations for political pluralism in the Soviet Union; an attempt to move the Communist party away from its previous orthodoxy toward social democracy; and the end of the cold war.

Brown's sympathetic portrayal of Gorbachev and his rule sets the book apart from many of the memoir accounts of Gorbachev's rule published recently by his former close associates, as well as many popular Western accounts of Gorbachev's role in the reform and demise of the Soviet Union. Brown's argument regarding Gorbachev's role in establishing the path to reform in the Soviet Union (and now in its successor states—however crooked that path has become) is useful in balancing the increasingly negative image one gets of Gorbachev in other recent books about him, as well as from his standing in current popular opinion polls within Russia today. Brown reminds us of the fact, for example, that until about the summer of 1990, Gorbachev was the most popular and respected politician in the Soviet Union—more popular even than his chief rival at the time, Boris Yeltsin.

While Brown's promotion of Gorbachev is one of the biggest contributions this book makes to current research on the Gorbachev period, this strength at times clouds the analysis. Undeniably, Brown is right: the Gorbachev factor is a crucial one in understanding the politics of the late Soviet era (although, as Brown himself would concede, it is of course, not the only factor). To the extent that Gorbachev's role is important, however, Brown tends to focus more on Gorbachev's successes rather than his failures. One can get the impression from reading this book that all good ideas emanated from Gorbachev, while policy failures

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and bad decisions came as a result of Gorbachev's misplaced trust in incompetent or spiteful cadres.

Aside from this, I have a few less substantive criticisms of this book. First, I find it curious that Brown did not interview Gorbachev himself for this project. The author apparently has frequently met his subject, and the list of those close to the former general secretary who were interviewed in the course of this project is both impressive and exhaustive, yet I could find no reference to any interviews with Gorbachev himself. Perhaps there was a compelling reason for this, but I was left wondering what it might be. Second, while one of the strengths of this book is the very detailed accounts Brown provides of various incidents during Gorbachev's rule, at times these descriptions become so thick that one can get lost.

For a student of high politics, and particularly for the Gorbachev enthusiast, however, there is much here to digest and admire in what Brown has done.

KATHRYN STONER-WEISS
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How Russia Votes *by Stephen White, Richard Rose, and Ian McAllister. Chatham, NJ, Chatham House Publishers, 1997. 352 pp. Paper, $24.95.*

Since Russia shed its communist political system and transformed the process of electing its leaders, the study of elections has been used to measure progress toward democracy. The authors posed four main objectives in writing the book: to analyze elections as part of the transition away from communism; to examine what goes on in the minds of Russian voters; to analyze voting behavior and the political context that shapes behavior; and to examine how politicians and voters have responded to the new regime. This book is a testament to how challenging it is to combine detailed area studies with theoretically guided political analysis. The fact that the authors were successful in their endeavor is testament to their analytical skill and judicious judgment.

The strengths of the book far outweigh its shortcomings. The book is comprehensive, starting with a background chapter on noncompetitive elections during the Soviet period. The first competitive elections under Mikhail Gorbachev also are analyzed. The bulk of the book, however, is spent analyzing Russian elections during the post-Soviet period. The authors admit that both optimists and pessimists will find evidence to support their respective views about the Russian transition to democracy. Optimists will point to the occurrence of competitive elections. Pessimists will find ample evidence that democracy is not yet consolidated, and many fundamental aspects that are taken for granted in the West still do not exist in Russian politics.

The pessimistic interpretation seems weighted somewhat more heavily throughout the book. For example, Russian society has yet to fully integrate and abide by a rule of law (pp. xiii, 269). Further, the base of support for the Yeltsin regime is narrow and largely future based (p. 44). Russians continue to feel that they have little input and influence on their government (p. 49). The 1993 parliamentary election was tainted by probable fraud and voting irregularities (pp. 126–128). Russians do not trust parties and do not identify with them; the largest bloc of voters are uncommitted (pp. 134–137). The populace is not informed about election laws (p. 190). The media is not neutral and instead tends to favor parties and candidates closest to positions of the administration (pp. 212–213). Election re-

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sults to the State Duma (the lower house of parliament) in December 1995 were not representative of the electorate and were characterized by disproportional distribution of seats (p. 227). The 1996 presidential election was characterized by violations of the campaign law (pp. 250–251). All of these factors are important in assessing the progress that has been made and what still remains to be accomplished.

Without a doubt, this book sets the standard for subsequent studies to match or exceed. However, there are minor shortcomings that need to be addressed when the second edition is published. One should hasten to add that these minor problems do not detract significantly from the contribution this book makes to our understanding of Russian politics. For example, we are told (on p. 43) that party and nonparty members did not differ significantly in their views toward capitalism and Marxism-Leninism. Surely, this surprising statement deserves at least a paragraph or two of explanation in a book that runs over 300 pages. The larger need is for a conclusion that ties the chapters and themes together, addressing the big question of whether Russia will make the transition to democracy successfully.

Based upon a detailed knowledge of Russian politics and a broad knowledge of the theoretical literature in comparative politics, this book is obligatory reading for area specialists and comparativists. It will also be useful for graduate seminars, but probably too advanced for undergraduates.

STEPHEN WEGREN
Southern Methodist University

Living with Peril: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Nuclear Weapons *by Andreas Wenger. Lanham, MD, Roman & Littlefield, 1997. 461 pp. Cloth, $69.50; paper, $26.95.*

The nuclear policies of the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations have been subjected to extensive analysis. Numerous studies, based on documents and interviews, reconstruct administration thinking about nuclear weapons—in general, presidents did not want to think much about them—and the very different and more prolonged thinking about these weapons by some military leaders, planners, and civilian strategists. Other studies have examined the policies of the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations in the context of a broader treatment of nuclear weapons and their role in post-1945 international relations. McGeorge Bundy's, *Danger and Survival*, is the most prominent example. There is also a burgeoning Soviet-American and Sino-American literature on cold war crises that analyzes the impact of nuclear weapons, the strategic balance, and leaders' beliefs and feelings about these weapons for the onset, resolution, and consequences of these confrontations. Increasingly, these works utilize Soviet and Chinese documents, and those of relevant third parties, to reconstruct these confrontations from the different and clashing perspective of the actors involved. Some of these works offer general lessons about the role of nuclear weapons in Soviet- and Sino-American relations.

The Wenger study, although based on extensive archival research, adds little to this literature. It limits its focus to the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations and reconstructs the evolution of their thinking about nuclear weapons and their responses to the Berlin and Cuban missile crises. Wenger finds that these crises taught the political leadership of the United States that the strategic balance and nuclear threats no longer conferred bargaining leverage in a world where their adversary also possessed nuclear weapons and the means

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to deliver them. The strategic balance, or at least perceptions of it, remained critically important, psychologically and politically, for maintaining alliance cohesion. Nuclear weapons were on the whole stabilizing, especially after the Cuban missile crisis drove home to both sides the dangers of confrontation.

Wenger's treatment of the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations is generally supportive of the conventional wisdom. His chapter-long treatments of the Berlin and Cuban crises also cover well known ground. He examines those crises almost entirely from the American perspective. Even in a book about the United States, it is essential to develop a wider understanding of the events in question to provide the basis for an independent and insightful evaluation of the lessons American policy makers learned from those confrontations. Wenger's observations about the role of nuclear weapons for Soviet-American relations have no standing in the absence of any comparative study.

With some important omissions, Wenger cites most of the relevant literature in his bibliography. His narrative is nevertheless written largely *in vacuo*. He makes no attempt to compare and contrast his interpretations with those of other scholars, or to use his narrative to address controversies that have arisen among them. Finally, there is the price of the book—$69.50 in hardback. This is outrageous, and neither scholars nor libraries should reward such rapacity.

RICHARD NED LEBOW
The Ohio State University

Welfare As We Knew It *by Charles Noble. New York, Oxford University Press, 1997. 210 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $18.95.*

This book is driven by two purposes, one of which is to explain why the American welfare state is less generous and more market conforming than those in other capitalist democracies, the other of which is to provide a political history of social welfare policy in America. The book succeeds at the first of these but fails at the second.

In taking on the first task, author Charles Noble considers three influences on the size and shape of America's welfare state—the balance of power between business and labor (favoring business), the organization of American political institutions (decentralized, fragmented, dominated by two political parties), and the nature and extent of racial and ethnic cleavages in America (deep and often hostile). Tracking these influences and interactions between them across the twentieth century, Noble argues persuasively that they have created substantial, permanent constraints on the extent to which America's welfare state can grow.

Two aspects of this part of the book are especially useful. First, there is the emphasis on interactive relationships. Noble points out, for example, that business strength alone might not defeat major social welfare initiatives, but business strength coupled with federalism, under which businesses can threaten to leave hostile political jurisdictions, has seriously constrained policy making. Second, there is Noble's discussion of race and ethnicity. Racial and ethnic identities have divided potential welfare beneficiaries and have attenuated class consciousness among workers. This has lessened demands for social provision.

If Noble succeeds in explaining why there has been relatively little action in American welfare state building, he fails in his efforts to explain what action there *has* been. He de-

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votes a chapter each to the Progressive Era, the New Deal, the 1960s, and the post-1960s period. Unfortunately, no theory drives these discussions, few empirical propositions are offered or tested, and no model structures the analysis. Instead, Noble disgorges a sloppy mishmash of ad hoc explanations, unsupported causal assertions, and explanatory variables appearing in purely cameo roles. Every development is seen as sui generis. At p. 93, for example, the reader learns that the expansion of the welfare state in the 1960s was driven in large part by Lyndon Johnson's "ambitious vision" of government. This may or may not be, but the author offers no evidence to support the claim, and even if he did, it would not help the reader understand events in the 1930s or 1970s. As for the 1970s, Noble attributes the continuing expansion of welfare programs to a bidding war between Congress and the president over working-class voters. That is fine as far as it goes, but it does not help us make much sense of the Progressive Era, the 1960s, or the 1980s. This resort to ad hoc, nonfalsifiable explanations is a serious shortcoming of *Welfare As We Knew It.* Such an atheoretical, nonempirical approach might be commonplace in historical scholarship, but political science ought to be better.

Also disconcerting is the frequency with which the author's political predilections color his work. In Noble's view, conservative complaints about the size of America's welfare state are simply "wrong" (p. 3). He writes that in 1995, "the right challenged the very idea of public provision" (p. 118), a claim that is unsourced because it is untrue. At p. 141 he tells the reader, "there is little evidence that conservative policies actually work." Failures by the Left to seek a more expansive welfare state are "mistakes" (p. 152). And so on. Such ideologically driven claims belong in an opinion piece, not in a major scholarly work.

DAVID DODENHOFF
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Israel, Jordan, and the Peace Process *by Yehuda Lukacs. Syracuse, NY, Syracuse University Press, 1997. 258 pp. $39.95.*

Despite a formal state of war, over the years shared interests have led to extensive functional (interest-driven) cooperation. This is the picture that Yehuda Lukacs paints of Jordanian-Israeli relations from 1967 to the present. While this is not a new argument, it is one that has not been fully explored, and Lukacs provides a detailed recounting of the development of the relationship, especially the Open Bridges policy and its implications from 1967 to 1988.

Two of the author's initial contentions are particularly noteworthy. The first is that the degree of functional cooperation between Israel and Jordan in fact delayed progress in the peace process, because it enabled the two sides both to control the West Bank and to avoid the most difficult issues associated with the Israeli occupation. The second contention is that among Israeli decision makers, the so-called functionalists triumphed because they managed to address the concerns, but not upset the designs, of the other three schools of thought regarding the West Bank: the territorialists, the annexationists, and the reconciliationists. However, the first contention is more asserted than continually argued, although it is intuitively appealing. As for the second, on several occasions Lukacs does show that policy decisions were the result of compromises among the schools, but it is not a major theme of the book. This is unfortunate, since Lukacs' strength is clearly with Israeli sources, and it would

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have been useful to see this line of argument applied specifically to the history of the Israeli-Jordanian relationship.

More important to the larger point the author seeks to make is that the years of functional cooperation and continuing overlap of interests in key areas like water, the environment, and the like have laid the foundation for a "warm" peace. This situation is contrasted by Lukacs and others with the Egyptian-Israeli peace, which was not preceded by such cooperation and which has remained cold. Such a thesis has several problems. First, Egypt's treaty signing was initially greeted with great domestic enthusiasm, while Jordanians have been generally unhappily resigned or apathetically opposed to their accord. Second, Egyptians simply do not have the same stake in the conflict as do Jordanians, about 50 percent of whom are Palestinian and who therefore directly feel the impact of the continuing Israeli occupation. In sum, the functional ties the author touts as paving the way for a warm peace have generated good will or understanding at the leadership level, not among the population at large.

The book would also have greatly benefited from one additional round of editing and fact checking. There are paragraphs and sections where events are presented out of chronological order for no apparent reason related to argument. There are also numerous mistakes or inconsistencies: Mafraq is in northeast, not southeast Jordan (p. 172); the same body of water is referred to as the Sea of Galilee and the Lake of Galilee (p. 88); Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser died in September, not December 1970 (p. 110), to cite a few examples. There is also, with the exception of a brief mention in the section on the United Arab Kingdom Plan, little to suggest that there is a Transjordanian population in the kingdom, whose interests are not necessarily coincident with those of the Hashemites and whose presence must be taken into account.

These criticisms and concerns notwithstanding, Lukacs's work represents a solid attempt to tell the story of the Jordanian-Israeli relationship. To the extent that it falls short of the mark, the explanation appears to lie more in the author's desire that Jordanian-Israeli peace become a reality, than in faulty analysis. Unfortunately for all Middle Easterners, in the 1998 regional climate, real peace seems as distant as ever.

LAURIE A. BRAND
University of Southern California

Varieties of Transition: The East European and East German Experience *by Claus Offe. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1997. 249 pp. Paper, $18.00.*

This book is a collection of nine essays from 1991 to 1993 on postcommunist transition, particularly in East Germany, written by a German professor of political science. The author's perspective is left-wing and German, focusing on the German Democratic Republic.

Offe is at his best in two substantial essays on the disqualification and retribution of the old communist elite and restitution to others. He excels in moral philosophy and deduction, and he is well read on these issues. These two chapters are among the best I have seen on these difficult topics. Similarly, Offe is at ease dealing with ethnic politics in East European transitions. Here as well, his deductive methodology brings out a number of interesting points.

Offe devotes three chapters to the East German transition, but they are rather disappointing. First, he ignores the communist dictatorship and reduces the collapse of the GDR

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to economics: "The transformation of the GDR is essentially a project of economic reorganization . . . " (p. 12). Similarly, he declares that the "slogan 'We are one people' . . . was inspired by the obvious intent to provide a meaningful commitment to desperately needed economic support from the Federal Republic" (p. 15). "The decisive factor that brought about the definitive end of the GDR was not democratic protest, but . . . desire for economic prosperity . . . " (p. 22). None of these assertions is accompanied by any evidence. The reader is left with the impression that the author thinks that the GDR was not bad politically. Second, he tries to say that the East German case is not so different from other postcommunist transformations, but he fails to make the point. Indeed, "the GDR's case had less to do with a transformation 'from above' or 'from below' and more with a change 'from the outside'" (p. 148). His third major point is that "the post-1989 case poses the more difficult problems of transition" than the post-1945 transition. His argument is simply that the war harmed the hardware, while the GDR damaged the software, which is the standard view.

While Offe sees the problems of the East German transformation, he does not really criticize the West German policy, although he points out the great political alienation of East Germans. This alienation was further aggravated by a privatization benefiting West Germans and the worst social welfare trap of all times. Economically, the West German unions forced the wage level up to an noncompetitive level, causing mass unemployment, which Offe blames on industrial structure, external shocks, and the currency union. My suspicion is that in the future we shall discuss the mistakes during the German unification as the undoing of the social democratic model.

Two general chapters on postcommunist transition are pretty disappointing. Offe argues that socialism was not all that bad, making a number of false statements, for instance: "the very few countries in which poverty is known as a mass phenomenon are all capitalist countries" (p. 4). What about China to this very day and the Soviet Union under Stalin? The author only refers to secondary sources and seems ignorant of real socialism. The last chapter deals with the issue that seems closest to Offe's heart, namely what the collapse of communism means to the Left. His key point is that "German social policy in the fifties would not have taken the dynamic and 'progressive' form it did had it not been for the challenge of the opposition system behind the Iron Curtain" (p. 194).

Consequently, he regrets the weakening of Western social democracy that resulted from the collapse of communism.

ANDERS ÅSLUND
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Democracy, Security, and Development in India *by Raju G. C. Thomas. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1996. 182 pp. $49.95.*

In an era when much academic research consists of following the data, rather than asking important questions, this book comes as a pleasant surprise. It is not without defects; it grew out of a series of lectures delivered between 1990 and 1995 in India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and the United States and suffers from some disorganization and overlap. However, the defects pale before its strong qualities: it asks the right questions and tentatively offers some answers to one of the great emerging questions of the late twentieth century: the survival of a democratic India.

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The Indian experiment has generally gone unnoticed. It contradicts much of our received wisdom about a strong association between development and democracy. As Thomas notes, India inherited a number of "imperial" institutions, better suited to an authoritarian state than to a modern democracy. The state apparatus, especially the civil service and the military, have their own interests, especially security, order, and control. Yet these bureaucracies cannot create wealth or ensure the smooth operation of a democratic political system. So far, they have not intervened in politics, unlike neighboring Pakistan, which fell under military rule early and often. The armed services have been content to stay in the background, leaving development and democracy to the politicians. But the past few years have seen the collapse of this arrangement. The Congress party, the grand coalition of high castes, Muslims, and lower castes, with an all-Indian base (although not an all-India majority) has, like a wobbly top, slowed down to the point where it has lost its center of moral and political gravity.

Thomas's central theme is that because of Congress's failure to manage India's transition to a productive market (that is, capitalist) economy, and its more notable failure to cope with significant separatist groups, India has entered into a permanent state of crisis. This, in turn, raises the once-ludicrous question (for India, at least) as to whether India will survive or whether it will fly apart. This would be a Bosnian catastrophe on a much greater scale; it could be one of the major human disasters of our lifetime, not least because it would entangle a nuclear-armed Pakistan.

This situation has led many of India's security managers and the new crop of economic reformers to contemplate steps that would prevent the disintegration of the state, and Thomas is not that certain that they have the right answers. The pace of economic reform moves in fits and starts, without a clear sustained central direction and without popular support in some sectors of society. The military has become bloated, unsuited to facing what Thomas and many others regard as the more critical security task: internal disorder. There is no call yet for a man on horseback, in part because Indians are aware of the disastrous consequences of military rule in Pakistan.

In the end, Thomas argues that the cure for an absence of democracy is more democracy; democratic politics, which give vent to regional, caste, and ethnic grievances, are the only way to detect and meliorate the "million mutinies" (to use V.S. Naipaul's phrase) now underway in India. This book makes a strong case for democratic decentralization, a substantial economic growth rate, and regional détente, as well as improved relations with the United States, as the optimum path for this megacountry. Thomas may be right, but others are asking the same questions and are beginning to come to somewhat different and more troubling answers.

Regardless, Thomas's book is a fine introduction to the complex interaction between democratization, economics, and force in this most complex of all countries. No student of the country can ignore it, and anyone with a more than casual interest in India would do well to consult it.

STEPHEN PHILIP COHEN
University of Illinois
Brookings Institution

"We Ain't What We Was": Civil Rights in the New South *by Frederick M. Wirt. Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1997. 286 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $16.95.*

Ambitious in scope, diverse in methodology, and targeting issues that are central to American politics, Frederick M. Wirt's latest book is the type of research that is much appreciated

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and too often neglected in political science. Beginning with the thesis that "Law when enforced can change reality, which can change perceptions, which can alter behavior, which, in time, can alter attitudes" (p. 5), Wirt returns to Panola, Mississippi in an effort to discover the social, political, as well as the behavioral and attitudinal effects of civil rights legislation. Building upon his earlier study of this northern Mississippi county, *The Politics of Southern Equality* (1970), Wirt's research grows from description to explanation. By fortuitously selecting a county that was and continues to be polarized by the two dominant white cultures of the traditional South—the planters in the delta and the "hill people" in the southern part of the county—this study attempts to examine and clarify the range of possible reactions to civil rights legislation. For example, the delta, which was dominated by planter mores, responded to desegregation with white flight resulting in two distinct school systems, one all white (private) and the other all black (public). In contrast, south of the Tallahatchie River, integration has largely been achieved. These differences not only afford Wirt the opportunity of comparing the flight versus accommodationist strategies but also provide three diverse survey populations—one all white, the other all black, and one mixed. Given that his thesis is focused as much on attitudinal as behavioral shifts, this is a crucial advantage.

Relying on personal interviews, content analyses of local newspapers, examinations of political and electoral results, as well as a survey given to 1,240 students in all three school districts in grades 6, 9, and 12, Wirt attempts to answer a perennial question in southern politics: Has there been change or continuity in the South? The fact that his conclusion, that it has been both, is traditional does not diminish the significance of this work. Patiently allowing more than thirty years to pass before returning to Panola, Wirt hopes to find evidence of slow but significant change. Ultimately, this work goes a long way toward answering one of the most elusive of American political questions.

It is both intriguing and promising that while there were differences—the southern section was far ahead of northern Panola in terms of actualizing civil rights—Wirt finds improvements in both dominant cultures. From concrete advancements, such as educational, employment, and political opportunities, to the less tangible behavioral and attitudinal shifts, Wirt detects change. Indeed, Wirt contends that while differences in perceptions certainly exist "at the local level it was clear that major changes had taken place. It is in these details that we have learned the meaning of 'the old order changeth' . . . Confirmation of these legal and social changes appears in the reports of local observors. Black and white leaders agree that without legal intrusion there would have been little change in the traditional culture" (p. 235).

Such optimism about the transformative role of law from a scholar with as much integrity and sagacity as Frederick Wirt is hopeful. Nevertheless, while it is clear that there is merit to his interpretation, contradictory evidence exists as well. For example, during a social engagement with the most progressive leaders in Panola, the wives responded to the offhand observation that Martin Luther King, Jr.'s birthday is approaching "in a diatribe against him, using Old South racist language to describe his alleged shortcomings ('Martin Luther Coon') (p. 205). Arguing that this type of racism is a byproduct of interpersonal relationships, that men deal with African-Americans in a public forum whereas women are traditionally constrained to private interactions, Wirt dismisses the event as unimportant. More disappointing, however, is that Wirt rejects the most likely interpretation—that whites use different language in public than in private—as not being important "because if public behavior were to reflect that private racist language" (p. 205) then sanctions would follow and correct behavior. Given his thesis, that law, if enforced, will not only alter behavior but also change attitudes, this public/private distinction is unpersuasive. Indeed, the anecdote sug-

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gests that deep seated attitudes are highly resistant to legal transformations. This problem aside, this is a work that will prove fruitful for students and scholars of civil rights, southern politics, and the power and limitations of law.

PETER PETRAKIS
Southeastern Louisiana University

Budgeting Democracy: State Building and Citizenship in America, 1890–1928 *by Jonathan Kahn. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1997. 222 pp. $42.50.*

The story of how public budgeting evolved in the United States has been told primarily in terms of process and technique, where the purpose of budgets is to allocate resources subject to the decisions, interests, and power of various politicians, administrators, and recipients of government benefits. Jonathan Kahn successfully extends that tale into one of political culture and philosophy, where budgeting serves the profounder tasks of promoting democracy, citizenship, and nation building.

Kahn traces the modern budget to the Progressive movement, specifically to the efforts of Frederick Cleveland, William Allen, and Henry Bruere, the leaders of the New York Bureau of Municipal Research. Prior to the bureau, what passed for a city budget was little more than the collection of lump sum, uncoordinated departmental requests, leaving the public and even political leaders confused about the nature of city finance. Influenced by scientific management and aided by newly developed accounting practices and the rise of survey research, the bureau sought to use a reformed budget to centralize political authority and to bring efficiency to government. More important, Allen in particular saw a reformed budget as a way to educate the public in the affairs of their government. Publicizing lists of public programs, their costs, and sources of city revenues through well-attended budget "exhibits" and seminars, the bureau hoped to raise the level of public, and especially business class, discussion and oversight of government activities. The budget would assist in public planning, assign responsibility for government action, help define the proper functions of the public versus the private sector, and limit the power of corrupt machine politics. New York's business community proved to be very supportive of these reforms, and by the early 1910s the bureau and its business allies had persuaded the city to adopt the recommended new budget accounting formats and classification schemes.

Cleveland then took the impetus of budget reform with him when he served as chair of President William Howard Taft's Commission on Efficiency, thereby bringing Progressive reform to the national level. The commission, among other things, produced the first thorough organizational chart of the federal bureaucracy and in 1912 submitted a report calling for an executive budget. Though rejected by Congress, the commission's report acted as the genesis for the 1921 Budget and Accounting Act, which established the presidential budget and the Bureau of the Budget.

Cleveland's role as chief reformer, however, was superseded by William Willoughby, who became director of the Institute for Government Research. Willoughby's approach to budgeting differed greatly from Cleveland and Allen. Less interested in social reform, educating the public, and enhancing citizen participation in the budgetary process, Willoughby distrusted such popular involvement in government. Public opinion was only an outside force to be used to promote bureaucratic efficiency directed by increasingly remote adminis-

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trative experts. Kahn is highly critical of Willoughby's transformation of budgeting as an educative tool for democratic purposes into one where budgeting became an end onto itself. Moreover, the institute that Willoughby directed evolved into the Brookings Institution, an example of "the modern think tank, which disdained public opinion and sought only the attention of policymakers" (pp. 172–173).

Kahn closes by arguing that despite Willoughby's flaws, budgeting and particularly the 1921 Act have proved to be a central element in the formation of national and executive power and in the building of the American state. Through such administrative practices as central clearance, where the Bureau of the Budget acted on behalf of the executive to coordinate agency activities, for example, Franklin Roosevelt could respond to economic calamity by way of the New Deal. Before the act, the executive branch simply lacked any coherent policy-making ability.

This book makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of both the historical and political significance of budgeting in the United States. Kahn is at his best when describing the formative years of reform budgeting in New York, the personalities who made it possible, and especially how the budget was publicized to surprisingly large numbers of interested citizens. When examining the 1921 Act, Kahn touches on material that is necessarily more familiar to most students of budgeting; and he draws similar conclusions about its importance in state building as does Stephen Skowronek. Nevertheless, this is a very well written and readable study that also implies that modern public confusion about budgeting has its origins in an earlier debate over just what the public needed to know about government finance.

JAMES D. SAVAGE
University of Virginia

Public Policy and Program Evaluation *by Evert Vedung. New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Publishers, 1997. 336 pp. Cloth, $34.95.*

Program evaluation is a well developed field of scholarship with its own journals and an academic history of more than three decades. Using a common systems approach and defining evaluation as a retrospective assessment of public interventions, Vedung's contribution to this literature is essentially an undergraduate textbook. The text contains the standard chapters on evaluation as policy feedback, research design, threats to validity, process evaluation, the use of evaluation, etc. At the same time it contains no original research, few new insights on program evaluation, and does not have sufficient technical detail to serve as a core text for the normal graduate class in program evaluation.

On the plus side, the text makes no errors and has a relatively consistent epistemology that might be characterized as pragmatic postpositivist. The book is logical and ordered around a set of evaluation questions. A graduate student not in the field could learn enough of the basics from reading Vedung to wing a decent answer to a comprehensive exam question. There are some interesting examples of Swedish program evaluations, especially the frequently repeated example about government efforts to get Swedish car dealers to list fuel efficiency ratings. The really interesting question—why corporatist Sweden has such a dismal record of compliance on this when the individualistic United States has virtually total compliance—is not addressed. The further subdivision of the policy instruments of regulation, incentives, and information also provides the start for some useful policy thinking.

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The limits of the text grow out of its sources for information; the book is essentially library research. Few original evaluations are presented. Much of the book is sprinkled with quotations from the leading figures in program evaluation. Unfortunately, some of these are secondary quotations, that is, Vedung quoting an author who is quoting another author.

To a scholar who reads the current literature on program evaluation, the text will have a dated feel to it. Missing are any citations to some of the more creative recent thinkers on policy analysis and program evaluation—Lawrence Mohr, Hank Jenkins-Smith, Linda and Peter deLeon; and nothing written by Paul Sabatier after 1983 is included. The result is disconcerting. The conclusion ends with a call for relating program evaluation to democracy, a topic that Peter deLeon has addressed frequently and well.

On the broader playing field of policy analysis, similar problems exist. An extended discussion of capture theory of regulation fails to discuss or even note the wealth of empirical literature that has discredited this intellectual idea.

Another obvious weakness is the short shrift given to economic modes of analysis. Cost-benefit analysis, or even the concept "cost," is not even raised until close to the end and then only in a perfunctory manner. Like it or not, the language of program evaluation is the language of applied economics, and a serious program evaluator can ignore it only at great peril.

KENNETH J. MEIER
Texas A&M University

Iberia and Latin America: New Democracies, New Policies, New Models *by Howard Wiarda. Lanham, MD, Rowman and Littlefield, 1996. 118 pp. Cloth, $52.50; paper, $21.95.*

Political scientists have long debated which defined categories and which comparisons will generate the most persuasive and useful conclusions. Howard Wiarda is irreverent and provocative on both counts: in the face of long-standing dichotomous conceptualizations of "democracy" and "authoritarianism," he reminds us that real-world political regimes lie on a continuum and urges the use of corporatism as a halfway-house regime category. And at a time when debates rage between universalistic theories and regional approaches bounded by geography, Wiarda continues to recommend a "common culture-area approach" (p. 8) transcending geography. Iberia and Latin America are his paradigmatic example, united, he argues, by common history, language(s), religion, and state-society relations.

These previously published essays are linked conceptually by a new introduction and conclusion, which pose questions of perennial regional and theoretical interest. Some, concerning corporatism, Iberian-Latin American relations, and a common Iberic-Latin American "model of development" are only passingly addressed, in part because chapters devoted to them are very brief entries reprinted from an historical dictionary and two magazines. The two questions addressed in more depth are nonetheless substantial: Are Spain and Portugal new societies, and how complete have their transitions to democracy been? In chapters reprinted from Wiarda's *Politics in Iberia*, he argues that Spain and Portugal have undergone large-scale change but continue to be linked to their pasts by important cultural and institutional residues; consequently, their transitions to democracy are impressive but also incomplete.

Spain's democratic transition took place in the wake of mass industrialization, urbanization, and middle-class growth; and Wiarda's analysis reflects the orientation of many Iberian

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specialists toward an emphasis on structural conditions (as opposed to elite "crafting"), in particular cultural and socioeconomic factors that appear more as prerequisites than mere bases for democracy. The deterministic quality these factors have for Wiarda is striking. After noting that Iberian income levels and literacy are 65 percent of the European average, he states: "If Spain and Portugal are only two-thirds European, they are one-third something else" (p. 4). Ultimately, he does not advance conditions-based theorizing regarding either economics or culture. If the problem of actor-based theories has been inadequate causation, the handicap of conditions-based theorizing has always been a lack of microfoundations persuasively linking structural factors to actors' choices, and that problem goes unaddressed here. Wiarda's discussion of political culture is at times intriguing but runs the risks of overestimating both homogeneity within cultural units and differences between them. These shortcomings are part of a pervasive lack of specificity—democracy needs to be adapted to "local realities" (p. 110); why exactly, and which realities? Wiarda acknowledges that more research is needed on many of his core points. His analysis would have been enhanced by detailed cross-regional comparisons, but ironically this appeal for a common culture-area approach is divided into two volumes, this one on Iberia and another devoted to Latin America. The utility of comparison is visible in what is easily the most interesting essay in this volume, which applies lessons from Latin America and Iberia to Russia and Eastern Europe. Noting the East's weaker civil society and sparser social safety net, Wiarda draws cautiously pessimistic conclusions about democracy's prospects under strain.

This volume falls short of the ambitious goals Wiarda has set for his agenda of heterodoxy within comparative politics, including his long-standing themes of Iberian-Latin American commonality, political culture as a causal variable, and corporatism as an analytic category. Nonetheless, it raises nagging questions about continuities where others see clear breaks, identifies problems where others see only success, and emphasizes common links where others see only boundaries on the map.

GERARD ALEXANDER
University of Virginia

Designs within Disorder: Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Economists, and the Shaping of American Economic Policy, 1933–1945 *by William J. Barber. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1996. 178 pp. $44.95.*

The Great Depression traumatized our nation. It initiated a period of experimentation in economic policy and an expanded conception of the responsibility of the federal government for the management of the economy. Not surprisingly, economists became influential political advisers during this period, and debates among economists about the causes of the Depression and its policy remedies became matters of public importance. William Barber tells their story. His account begins with the marginalization of orthodox economics and its predisposition to laissez-faire economic policy; it traces the clash between rival heterodox schools of economic thought in the early New Deal and their relationship to New Deal economic policy; and it concludes with the partial triumph of an Americanized Keynesianism in the later New Deal. Usefully, Barber extends his analysis of the influence of economic paradigms through the war years and into the emergence of a new postwar economic order. Barber's subtitle indicates the period of concern is from 1933 to 1945, but the importance

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of the Employment Act of 1946 for the conclusion of his story suggests a slightly expanded time-frame.

As an economist, Barber is at his best in describing the rival heterodox schools of economic thought. Structuralists like Rexford Tugwell and Adolph Berle argued that the rise of the large modern corporation had transformed oligopolistic markets and allowed firms in such markets to set prices administratively rather than through competitive relations. Rational public policy entailed public planning, the replacement of market controls by regulatory governmental controls, and a sectorally-specific approach that took account of differing firm structures in differing industries. According to Barber, the National Recovery Administration (NRA) and the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) basically reflected the imperatives of these structuralists.

The structuralists' analysis of America's economic plight was challenged by monetarists like Charles Warren and Irving Fisher, and later by their foremost political representative, Henry Morgenthau, Jr. Monetarists argued that the collapse of prices was the crucial variable in our Depression woes and that reflation was the remedy. The influence of the monetarists can be seen in the collapse of the London Economic Conference and in the abortive gold buying program during the early New Deal.

Finally, Barber describes the rise of an Americanized version of Keynesianism championed by Marriner Eccles, Lauchin Currie, and Alvin Hansen. The Keynesians only became influential later in the New Deal, after analysis revealed that the 1937–1938 recession coincided with a decline in deficit spending by the federal government, thereby eroding Roosevelt's commitment to eventually balancing the budget.

Barber's history of economic schools and their relationship to public policy is a refinement of received wisdom rather than a fundamentally new approach. The clarity of his descriptions of the rival economic camps and the archival research that establishes a link between economists and New Deal decision makers are important contributions. To fully substantiate Barber's claim that ideas influence policy we would have to examine the interplay of ideas and interests, and the latter have only a fleeting appearance in Barber's account. But what is most regrettable about Barber's treatment is his aversion to evaluative judgments of the economic doctrines whose influence he traces. Is Irving Fisher's monetarism pseudo-economics? If Barber had elaborated on the relationship of Fisher's monetarism to the monetarism of Milton Friedman, we would be better prepared to answer this important question. Barber does cryptically suggest in his conclusion that domesticated Keynesianism has flaws, but his analysis of economic policy in the New Deal era seems to confirm the traditional wisdom that policies derivative from Keynesianism were the proper response to the Depression. Barber's work would be more path-breaking if he could show that post-Keynesian economics provides a new vantage point from which to examine New Deal economic policies.

DONALD R. BRAND
College of the Holy Cross

Against the Death Penalty: The Relentless Dissents of Justices Brennan and Marshall *by Michael Mello. Boston, Northeastern University Press, 1996. 331 pp. $45.00.*

On 31 February 1997, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association called for a moratorium on imposing the death penalty in all jurisdictions that were unable to ensure

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the fair and impartial administration of capital punishment. This was not a statement of moral opposition to the death penalty. Rather it reflected growing concern among the bench and bar that our criminal justice system has failed to prevent prejudice from influencing the decision-making process that selects those who are marked for death, and does not adequately safeguard the innocent from wrongful conviction and execution.

The overwhelming percentage of those accused of capital crimes are unable to afford counsel and must rely upon state-provided legal services. While the list of offenses for which the death penalty is authorized continues to expand, an increasing number of jurisdictions are finding that they lack the resources to provide the accused with adequate representation. (See Richard Klein and Robert Spangenberg, *The Indigent Defense Crisis*, American Bar Association, 1993). Studies have also documented the failure to eliminate the perverse impact of race upon the discretionary decision-making process that determines life or death. (See D. Baldus, et al., *Equal Justice and the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis.*) This troubling uneasiness with our system of capital punishment has been further aggravated by recent restrictions upon federal habeas corpus review of death sentences and by Congress's refusal to renew funding for programs that provide legal assistance to death row inmates at the postconviction stage.

These events suggest that Justices Thurgood Marshall and William J. Brennan Jr. were correct in their belief that it is beyond our capacity to exercise fairly and objectively the awesome discretion inherent in any human system for choosing who should be condemned to die. *Against the Death Penalty* seeks to provide an historical, theoretical, and philosophical justification for the justices' "relentless dissents" against capital punishment. The prologue states that "[t]his is a book about the rarefied world inhabited by the justices of the United States Supreme Court and about the judicial craft of a pair of jurists . . . " (p. xii). The reader seeking a comprehensive treatment of Brennan and Marshall's battle against the decisions that shaped the Court's death penalty enabling decisions, however, will be disappointed. Rather, the mission of this book is to answer a narrower question: Was it legitimate for the two justices to continue to dissent on grounds that had been rejected by a majority of the Court?

Brennan and Marshall believed that the death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in all cases, regardless of the circumstances. Brennan maintained that state-sanctioned killings violate the underlying moral principle that animates the Constitution: each individual has intrinsic worth as a human being. He believed capital punishment was incompatible with the very idea of human dignity and worth, because it treated those defendants selected for execution as worthless refuse to be discarded. The pragmatic Marshall argued that the death penalty was unconstitutional because it was unnecessary. In his view, since life imprisonment without parole adequately served both the deterrent and incapacitation goals of punishment, the only justification for killing a defendant was vengeance.

Notwithstanding these arguments, the Supreme Court, by a seven to two majority, upheld death sentences in Georgia, Florida, and Texas in a series of cases decided in 1976. By validating the structured death-sentencing discretion in these schemes, a clear majority thus rejected the argument that the death penalty was per se cruel and unusual punishment. Nevertheless, in subsequent cases, both justices continued to adhere to this rejected position in what has been termed "sustained" dissents.

After giving a brief description of the careers of Justices Brennan and Marshall and providing a useful, if equally brief, synopsis of their positions on the death penalty, Mello surveys the history of dissenting opinions in the Supreme court, highlighting some of the

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Court's great dissenters, including Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., Louis Brandeis, and Hugo Black. This eloquent justification for a Supreme Court justice's right to dissent in general, however, fails persuasively to establish the cover jacket's promised historical "underpinnings" for Brennan and Marshall's sustained dissents following 1976.

Mello next examines jurisprudential justifications for the sustained dissents, briefly sampling natural law, positivism, sociological jurisprudence, legal realism, and critical legal studies. While he occasionally scores a telling point, the proffered justifications as a whole prove somewhat dissatisfying. This perhaps stems from the book's failure to develop a coherent theory of precedent in constitutional cases. The Supreme Court is, of course, not legally bound by its own precedents in matters of constitutional interpretation. Likewise, an individual justice is free to vote to overturn a prior precedent. The critical question is when is a departure from previous precedent justified? In a joint opinion issued in the landmark abortion case, *Planned Parenthood v. Casey*, Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony M. Kennedy, and David Souter suggested that the answer to this question should be determined by focusing upon the impact a departure from precedent would have upon the Court's legitimacy. They point out that the exercise of judicial power must be legitimate, both in terms of substance and perception, if public acceptance of the judiciary and the nation's commitment to the rule of law is to be maintained. The Court's legitimacy in their view thus hinges upon the ability to articulate justifications for its decisions which will be seen by the public as principled. Looked at in this light, the sustained dissents of Justices Brennan and Marshall were legitimate, because they were principled and their principled character was readily apparent to the public. As Mello recognized, the continuing dissents of these jurists thus served as a source of institutional criticism that allowed a conversation about the constitutional validity of the death penalty to continue.

Against the Death Penalty is a useful primer for the novitiate seeking to test the jurisprudential waters surrounding capital punishment. Unfortunately, it is poorly edited throughout and relies heavily upon secondary sources. It undertakes an ambitious and worthy task, but in the end delivers less than it promises.

LAURENCE A. BENNER
California Western School of Law

Reducing Unemployment: A Case for Government Deregulation *by Garry K. Ottosen and Douglas N. Thompson. Westport, CT, Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996. 171 pp. $49.95.*

Beginning in the mid-1960s and lasting for nearly three decades, the average level of unemployment in the United States rose. This fact was accepted by many policy makers and economists as the cost of avoiding accelerating inflation. By the 1990s, the NAIRU—the minimum unemployment rate attainable in the United States consistent with stable, nonaccelerating inflation—was believed to be between 6 and 7 percent. The authors of this volume contend that the relationship between unemployment and inflation can be changed and the NAIRU reduced. Most of the book is devoted to an exploration of a variety of potential causes of the rise in the NAIRU. The authors' analysis rests upon a review of already published literature, mainly in economics. The principal culprits, Ottosen and Thompson argue, are government policies pursued since the 1960s that raise business costs. If they were

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changed, unemployment could be reduced without incurring the cost of accelerating inflation.

Before offering their own diagnosis of the higher unemployment, the authors consider explanations that stress a mismatch between job skills required and job skills available in any location. This is particularly important because it is the one favored by the Clinton administration and the Group of Seven major industrialized nations. The authors conclude that strong empirical evidence does not exist to support the mismatch theory, and, therefore, major increases in training and retraining programs are not justified.

Ottosen and Thomson's own diagnosis begins with nonlabor business costs. Although the oil price shocks contributed to a higher NAIRU in the 1970s, these were temporary and largely reversed. However, government "social regulation" (in the area of environmental protection) did not abate but increased greatly up to the present.

The authors next consider taxes and welfare policy. While increases in payroll taxes may have contributed to the increase in the NAIRU, the authors do not cite taxes or unemployment insurance as a principal culprit. They suggest that other social welfare programs (excluding Social Security and education), probably worsened the NAIRU, although they point out that the value of many of them has eroded. The smaller and less generous welfare state in the United States is a blessing, according to the authors, because the larger and more generous programs in many European nations largely account for why those nations have higher NAIRUs. The biggest surprise is the authors' applause for Swedish labor market policy. The United States can learn much from the Swedes in the areas of improving information flows concerning workers and vacancies, strictly enforcing job search requirements for unemployment insurance and welfare recipients, and improving education and on-the-job training.

The portion of this study that readers will probably find least persuasive is that which argues that labor unions have increased the NAIRU. Although they acknowledge that the strength of unions declined significantly over the period they examine, they contend that the "union wage premium" and "wage spillover" (that is, that large nonunion firms are compelled to go along with unionized firms) are still important.

To help reduce the NAIRU, they endorse several antigovernment and antiunion policy reforms. These include making it more difficult to impose and maintain social regulations (mainly by subjecting them to cost-benefit analyses); reducing welfare benefits and making eligibility and work requirements stricter; and repealing major portions of the National Labor Relations Act and the Davis-Bacon Act.

For those looking for a well written survey of the extensive literature on this topic, this book is a good place to start. It is not clear, however, how the authors would account for the very low levels of unemployment and inflation in the mid-1990s. Reflecting limitations in our existing knowledge, much of their argument rests upon data and analyses that are suggestive rather than definitive. The authors largely ignore the fact that some social regulation may have important economic benefits: environmental regulation may save costs on health care. Even if the authors' economic analysis is correct, economic growth and employment compete with other values such as equality, security, health and safety. Deciding how to reconcile and make acceptable trade-offs among these desirable goals is primarily a political task and a difficult one at that. Remedying unemployment by reimposing market discipline and mandating cost-benefit analyses may turn out to be impractical, politically impossible, or morally objectionable.

GARY MUCCIARONI
Temple University

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When Dreams Came True: The GI Bill and the Making of Modern America *by Michael J. Bennett. McLean, VA, Brassey's Publishing Co., 1996. 352 pp. $27.95.*

Few public programs in the twentieth century had as broad, immediate, and long-lasting impact as the GI Bill of Rights (aka the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944). It helped millions of World War II veterans go to college, buy a home, and establish themselves and their families firmly in the middle class. Despite these accomplishments, the GI Bill has received less scholarly attention than comparably historic legislation of that era such as the Social Security Act of 1935 or the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. Michael J. Bennett aims to redress this oversight.

The author, a professional journalist, places the GI Bill in context by describing how badly veterans were treated from the Revolutionary War through World War I. He devotes considerable attention to the personal backgrounds of key players, showing how a variety of sometimes obscure and sometimes antagonistic individuals came to support the Bill. And he chronicles in detail the often tortuous route taken by the bill on its way to enactment. Although the book largely employs a narrative structure, the author does a good job of illustrating the bill's impact before describing its origins, thereby demonstrating its significance, and periodically flashes back in time to explain individuals' motives.

To this reviewer, the most striking parts of the book concern the bill's impact. According to Bennett, the GI Bill made home ownership the norm among middle- and many working-class families—"a social revolution even greater than Henry Ford's" (p. 25). The resulting surge in economic activity, especially in building construction and manufacture of durable goods, minimized the potential for a postwar slump. In the process, the bill helped underwrite suburbia and forever altered the nation's landscape. It also filled the nation's colleges and universities with scores of less privileged but more motivated and mature students. Its broad scope prevented a repeat of the bitter ethnic and class conflicts that followed World War I and improved both race relations and the nation's general sense of community. The bill's generosity may have even weakened the labor movement by reducing workers' incentive to unionize. Bennett draws compelling portraits of America before and after to substantiate these claims.

This is a work of history, not political science. The author does not seriously consider alternative explanations for these developments that might qualify his conclusions. Seldom does he link his findings to the relevant academic literatures. The instrumental role of the American Legion, for instance, fits well with Theda Skocpol's claims about the power of federated interest groups spread throughout the country. Those interested in policy legacies can see how the architects of the bill consciously tried to avoid the pitfalls of programs for Civil War and World War I veterans. Students of U.S. social policy will be interested in conservatives' support for and liberals' opposition to the GI Bill. Finally, those who view the GI Bill as a model for current welfare state expansion may be sobered by Bennett's frequent reminder that benefits were distributed based on what individuals did rather than who they were. The aim was not to help some group like the poor or elderly; it was to recognize the efforts of people who risked their lives for their country.

While some readers may find the book too detailed and unfocused, others will consider it an interesting social history of the 1940s and 1950s. All readers will come away impressed with the author's unyielding admiration for the GI Bill. Amid numerous studies of policy failure and general distrust of government, it helps to have someone point out a model of good public policy.

CHRISTOPHER HOWARD
College of William and Mary

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Banishing Bureaucracy: The Five Strategies for Reinventing Government *by David Osborne and Peter Plastrik. Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley, 1997. 397 pp. $25.00.*

David Osborne of *Reinventing Government* fame (co-authored with Ted Gaebler) has joined with political strategist Peter Plastrik in this follow-up to his 1992 book. There are ten mentions of that book in chapter 1 of *Banishing Bureaucracy* and liberal references to it throughout the rest of the book. *Banishing Bureaucracy* is another book of success stories, which purports to give strategies of how public provision of goods and services might be banished. If in *Reinventing Government* Osborne and Gaebler argued to make government more effective and productive through entrepreneurship, in *Banishing Bureaucracy* Osborn and Plastrik herald the withering away of public bureaucracies. Early on, the authors state that *Banishing Bureaucracy* is prescriptive and was written for "those who want to end the nightmare" of bureaucracy (p. 18). They offer cases of success to show it can be done. From these cases they derive strategies others might use in banishing bureaucracy.

The case studies extend across the United States, England, New Zealand, and Australia. All three levels of government are portrayed—from the fundamental restructuring by New Zealand's Labor party that abolished, corporatized, or privatized many government departments to Indianapolis Mayor Steve Goldsmith's privatization success. The case studies also vary across functions, from the increased efficiency of the United States Air Force Tactical Command to the implementation of school choice in Minnesota.

Osborne and Plastrik offer a five Cs schema to label their reinvention strategies. They define strategies as the "use of key leverage points to make fundamental changes that ripple throughout government, changing everything else" (p. 64), or more simply "change efforts that rewrite the genetic code" of organizations (p. 64). They distinguish among the Core, Consequences, Customer, Control, and Culture strategies. The Core Strategy seeks to clarify organizational purpose. The Consequences Strategy promotes consequences for performance. The Customer Strategy makes organizations accountable to their customers. The Control Strategy advances organizational and employee empowerment. Lastly, the Culture Strategy attempts to change the habits and values of employees.

For each of the five strategies the authors suggest tools. In a case of perfect symmetry, or explication by formula, they present three text boxes of disparate tools in each of the five chapters devoted to explaining the strategies. These tools are presented as laundry lists and none are new. Many are problematic and have a literature of their own (for example, vouchers, devolution, decentralization, collaborative planning). Further, the tools are wide ranging in breadth, but the authors' explication has little depth. The tools include such techniques as performance budgeting and devolution (Core Strategy), user fees and competitive benchmarking (Consequences Strategy), public choice and ombudsmen (Customer Strategy), chartering and work teams (Control Strategy), job rotation and learning groups (Customer Strategy). Some tools, like sunset review, benchmarking, and competitive bidding are suggested under multiple strategies.

One of the major weaknesses of the book is that it is full of biological, farming, and other metaphors that offer little of substance on how to banish the bureaucracy—for those who are persuaded by the authors that is the appropriate course of action. In perhaps the most overused metaphor of the book, that government organizations should separate their steering and rowing functions, the authors note that the Core Strategy "uncouples steering from rowing" so each organization can focus on one purpose (p. 40). The other four strategies are about rowing. This row/steer distinction sounds suspiciously like the resurrection of Woodrow Wilson's policy-administration dichotomy. Getting public organizations to "con-

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centrate on achieving one clear purpose" (p. 96) may be just as unobtainable and unrealistic a goal as was the prescriptive dichotomy or Frederick Taylor's one best way.

There is also little generalizability to be gained from this book. For instance, being told that "there are many lessons to be learned from the British experience" (p. 26) does not make it so. Whereas *Reinventing Government* was informative, provocative, and in many ways a must read, *Banishing Bureaucracy* is neither. While an interesting read, it does not deliver on its stated purpose to "put routes on that map" for reinventing government (p. 6). The book is too simplistic, slogan ridden, and contradictory to be the road map the authors intend.

CHERYL M. MILLER
University of Maryland, Baltimore County

The Time Bind: When Work Becomes Home and Home Becomes Work *by Arlie Russell Hochschild. New York, Metropolitan Books, 1997. 306 pp. $22.50.*

Arlie Hochschild begins her study by seeking to answer why more parents don't take advantage of the "family-friendly" policies at Amerco, a Fortune 500 company headquartered in a small town in the Midwest. The answers to the question include social trends that exist far beyond the confines of Amerco, involving changes in economic organization, gender roles at work and home, and the impact these changes have upon the use and conceptions of time.

Based upon interviews with and observation of hundreds of workers at Amerco, Hochschild masterfully outlines the factors causing many working parents to experience a "time bind." This lack of time reflects more than just an increasingly harried lifestyle; over the last decade, fairly radical changes have occurred in the way that people feel about work and home. Much as home was once a haven for the tired male worker to return to at the end of the day, the workplace has become a refuge from a demanding family life for many working parents, especially working mothers.

While many authors have chronicled the increasing hours worked by Americans and speculated upon their impact upon the family, Hochschild's real contribution lies in her demonstration of the ways in which the rewards and camaraderie of work pull people to work more hours, while the lack of recognition and emotional stresses of the home push parents to work even more than is needed. The reasons for this role reversal are several, with the most prominent being a cultural climate in which long hours and dedication to a career are looked upon with admiration, while the toilsome job of raising children is given low priority. Parents have devised a number of ways of coping with this set of priorities, such as believing that their children need to learn to be independent (even as early as three months of age) and developing a "potential self" that plans quality time with children, while leaving an "actual self" to toil long hours at the office.

During her conversations at Amerco, Hochschild repeatedly heard working parents express regret over the "time bind," yet their actions told a different story. Very few workers adopted part-time schedules, and a small minority took advantage of flextime and other programs designed to be family friendly. This reluctance was complicated by gender: women faced more intense scrutiny of their commitment to work than did their male counterparts, and "with a gender war on, shorter hours felt like surrender" (p. 107). Based upon her re-

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search, programs offered by progressive corporations are unlikely to make much headway against a corporate culture that demands total commitment to "Total Quality," expressed chiefly by logging as many hours a week as possible.

Instead, Hochschild proposes a social movement targeting issues of time; change must occur in the ways that work is organized and in norms regarding the amount of "leisure" or "family" time that is needed. However, she also notes that there are problems that are much deeper than those that can be solved by reorienting our approach to time. As she notes, "work seemed to function as a backup system to a destabilizing family" (p. 201); not only is there a time bind, but there is also a cultural lag. Both men and women adhere to traditional ideas about the amount of housework and childcare that men should perform, and both sexes live in a society where work outside the home is more valued than housework. There is, of course, no quick fix for a value system that is mismatched with the demands of the marketplace, although Hochschild's discussion of the family-friendly policies of Sweden provide a useful direction in which to head.

The Time Bind's greatest virtue is its thought-provoking treatment of the relationship between economic organization, cultural values, and the plight of individual families in Middle America. However distorted our temporal priorities may be, one can say with certainty that reading *The Time Bind* is time well spent.

MONICA MCDERMOTT
Harvard University

Private Lives, Public Conflicts: Battles over Gay Rights in American Communities *by James W. Button, Barbara A. Rienzo, and Kenneth D. Wald. Foreword by Representative Barney Frank. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1997. 223 pp. Cloth, $35.95; paper, $22.95.*

Political scientists looking for books on gay and lesbian politics in the United States have few good choices. Fortunately, this gap in the literature is slowly filling as scholars are beginning to apply conventional political analysis to the development, aspirations, and accomplishments of the American gay rights movement. *Private Lives, Public Conflicts* represents the most ambitious such work to date. James Button, Barbara Rienzo, and Kenneth Wald examine the gay and lesbian movement's struggle for protective legislation at the local level from the 1970s to the present. The analysis focuses on the addition of "sexual orientation" as a protected class to existing ordinances barring discrimination in government employment, private housing, public accommodations, and other areas.

The book is a study of policy adoption. Communities with and without protective legislation are compared along dimensions of urbanism and social diversity, resource mobilization, political opportunity structure, and community protest. The analyses also incorporates identity politics and cultural theory. Seven chapters briefly chronicle the history of gay and lesbian political emergence; describe gay politics in Iowa City, Philadelphia, Santa Cruz, Cincinnati, and Raleigh; analyze communities with (and without) ordinances protecting gay civil rights; assess the impacts of such laws; discuss gay rights struggles in the schools; and evaluate opposition to gay rights, especially among the religious Right. The book concludes with a discourse on identity politics, policy innovation, and the role of law in social change.

The authors demonstrate attention to detail and conduct a thoughtful, if conventional, analysis; 127 communities with antidiscrimination ordinances protecting sexual orientation

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were compared to randomly selected communities without such laws; officials were then interviewed about the politics of the laws' adoption and implementation. In five case study cities, sixty-five elite respondents including officials, activists, and religious leaders were interviewed.

The findings are thus well supported, if unsurprising. Antidiscrimination ordinances are more common in larger, more diverse cities of the North and West, including six of eight U.S. cities with populations over one million, and half those larger than 250,000. Compared to communities without the laws, these cities also have higher growth rates, more African American and nonfamily households, and younger, better educated, more affluent citizens. Conversely, communities without gay rights ordinances tend to be smaller, less affluent, and more homogeneous, with more families, fewer gays and lesbians, and more fundamentalist Protestants. The authors conclude that protective legislation has been effective, because discrimination against gays and lesbians declines where ordinances exist, while feelings of security and safety among gays and lesbians increase.

Woven through the analytical narrative, the book also provides an overview of issues confronting the gay and lesbian rights movement, including discrimination in housing, employment, and public services, domestic partnership benefits, marriage rights, and police violence.

To their credit, the authors acknowledge the major weakness of the analysis: all evidence about the laws' effects came from officials responsible for enforcement, or from knowledgeable respondents in five case study cities, not from surveys of affected gays and lesbians themselves. Other limitations may disappoint some readers, who will find no information about racial and ethnic composition, class structure, partisanship, or ideological diversity within the gay and lesbian population. Surprisingly, there is no discussion of gay and lesbian issues from a feminist perspective. Some readers may also find the authors' conceptualization of political opportunity structure to be limited. The analysis of urban context includes no indicators at all for electoral system, regime type, participation rates, or partisan structure, generally considered important aspects of any community's opportunity structure.

Nonetheless, this is a unique, important, and useful book, sure to find a place in many urban studies, public policy, gay and lesbian studies, and social diversity courses.

TONY AFFIGNE
Providence College

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Reference Books and Other Publications of Interest Received

American Legislative Leaders in the Midwest, 1911–1994 *edited by Nancy Weatherly Sharp and James Roger Sharp. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1997. 358 pp. $99.50.*

The Cambridge Companion to Mill *edited by John Skorupski. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1997. 591 pp. Cloth, $59.95; paper, $18.95.*

Child Poverty and Deprivation in the Industrialized Countries, 1945–1995 *edited by Giovanni Andrea Cornia and Sheldon Danziger. New York, Clarendon Press, 1997. 430 pp. $85.00.*

Documents on Reform of the United Nations *edited by Paul Taylor, Sam Daws, and Ute Adamczick-Gerteis. Aldershot, England, Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1997. 575 pp. $99.95.*

Human Rights Watch World Report 1998 *by Human Rights Watch. New York, Human Rights Watch, 1997. 465 pp. Paper, $25.00.*

James A. Garfield: A Bibliography *compiled by Robert O. Rupp. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1997. 216 pp. $65.00.*

Key Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, 1946–1996 *edited by Dietrich Rauschning, Katja Wiesbrock, and Martin Lailach. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1998. 600 pp. Cloth, $125.00; paper, $59.95.*

Nonviolent Action: A Research Guide *by Ronald M. McCarthy and Gene Sharp. New York, Garland Publishing, 1997. 720 pp. $99.00.*

The Papers of Robert A. Taft. Volume I, 1889–1938 *edited by Clarence E. Wunderlin, Jr. Kent, Ohio, The Kent State University Press, 1998. 667 pp. $60.00.*

President Reagan and the World *edited by Eric J. Schmertz, Natalie Datlof, and Alexej Ugrinsky. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1997. 552 pp. $85.00.*

The Recall: Tribunal of the People *by Joseph F. Zimmerman. Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 1997. 208 pp. $55.00.*

Toward Democracy: A Journey, Reflections: 1940–1997 *by Robert A. Dahl. Two Volumes. Berkeley, CA, Institute of Governmental Studies Press, 1997. 1130 pp. $95.00.*

Tricks of the Trade: How to Think About Your Research While You're Doing It *by Howard S. Becker. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1998. 243 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $13.95.*

Woodrow Wilson: A Bibliography *compiled by John M. Mulder, Ernest M. White, and Ethel S. White. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1997. 488 pp. $95.00.*

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Correspondence

To the Editor:

Morris Morley and Chris McGillion are to be commended for their perceptive discussion of recent U.S.–Haiti relations in "'Disobedient' Generals and the Politics of Redemocratization: The Clinton Administration and Haiti," *PSQ* 112 (Fall 1997). Recent events continue, sadly, to demonstrate the accuracy of one of the article's main concluding points: in deciding to use force in 1994 to return Jean Bertrand Aristide to office, "Washington wanted a government of civilians who could lay claim to an electoral mandate but who, more importantly, would know their place and have little power or opportunity to move beyond it. Not surprisingly, this objective has contributed to instability and uncertainty in Haiti" (p. 383).

At a few points, the record of events differs slightly from the authors' summary in ways that serve to underscore, rather than contradict, their findings: First, we are told that in its effort to discredit President Aristide "soon after his election in 1990" the CIA forged close links with his domestic opponents, including "Emmanuel Constant, the head of the Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH), a violent paramilitary organization with close links to the armed forces." In 1990, however, FRAPH did not yet exist. It was formed only in the summer of 1993, probably at the behest of the CIA, for whom, as the article notes, Constant was a paid asset. FRAPH was specifically designed to forestall the 1 July 1993 Governor's Island agreement for Aristide to return in October of that year. After he did return in October of 1994, Constant escaped to the United States, which has refused the Haitian government's request for his extradition in spite of a U.S. court order that he be sent back. The United States also refuses to return to the government of Haiti the unexpurgated FRAPH documents that its armed forces lifted from FRAPH headquarters in Port-au-Prince in September 1994. The article thus fails to make clear the extent to which FRAPH was a tool of the United States, its bloody history still being covered up by Washington.

Second, the article recounts Bill Clinton's denunciation during his 1992 presidential campaign of the George Bush policy of forcible repatriation of Haitian refugees, Clinton's promise to overturn it, and his subsequent backtrack on that pledge. The authors say that Clinton's reversal took place "within days of his

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inauguration" (p. 367). In fact, it occurred within days of his November election. The speed is perhaps significant, as it suggests that Clinton never intended to reverse the Bush policy. In other words, U.S.–Haiti policy took no turn at all with Clinton's election.

Third, discussing the eventful summer of 1993, the authors refer to Aristide's agreement under pressure from the United States to appoint Robert Malval as prime minister and the subsequent suspension of sanctions against Haiti in late August. "Almost immediately," they add, "the tempo of military-authored violence accelerated" (p. 369). In fact, the tempo of that violence rose in July, just as soon as General Raoul Cedras returned from the Governor's Island meeting, where he had agreed to Aristide's return by the end of the following October. If the United States had been serious about the implementation of that agreement, it would have moved in July to force the Haitian army to comply. But the Governor's Island affair was never anything but window-dressing. It is probable that the United States did not decide to help Aristide return until August of 1994, when he at last agreed to an economic package desired by the United States. Without mentioning the August 1994 meeting in Paris, where this agreement was reached, the authors do correctly observe that Aristide's "acceptance of IMF-World Bank-AID development blueprints . . . had become, in effect, one of the preconditions for his return" (p. 378).

Finally, it is widely supposed that the United States approved, if its agents did not help to plan, the coup d'etat against Aristide in September 1991. Although this has perhaps not been proved, it is of such likelihood that the authors would have done well to mention the possibility. They do indicate that President Bush's support of Aristide was lukewarm and promptly became very qualified. One, therefore, has to assume that in the fall of 1991, the coup was deemed fortunate by Washington.

As I write, Haiti sinks into a period of anarchy. It is the result of a deep conflict between U.S. intentions for Haiti and the aspirations of the vast majority of its people.

TOM F. DRIVER
Union Theological Seminary

To the Editor:

Morris Morley and Chris McGillion argue that the U.S.–UN intervention in Haiti confirms that the United States still preserves coercive institutions in unstable regimes, overshadowing U.S. efforts to promote democracy ("'Disobedient' Generals and the Politics of Redemocratization: The Clinton Administration and Haiti," *PSQ* 112 (Fall 1997). They write, "Washington's concern over challenges to the state have been "incomparably greater than over changes in regime because the state, especially its coercive institutions, is perceived as the ultimate arbiter of power" (p. 363). The authors err in concluding

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that the United States was "overriding Aristide's initial desire to abolish the military" (p. 383). The Haiti case shows that the United States would not stop a reinstated, freely elected president from abolishing the main agent of coercion, if that was his preference.

The authors ignore what most analysts of Haiti have concluded has been Operation Uphold Democracy's greatest success—the abolition of the Haitian Army and the creation of the Haitian National Police (HNP) reporting to the justice minister. In December 1994, two months after the U.S.–UN mission reinstated him as president, Jean Bertrand Aristide announced the elimination of the army, which he formally decreed the next month. Following the advice of Nobelist Oscar Arias, Aristide sought to emulate Costa Rica's example by abolishing Haiti's main source of human rights violations, agricultural predation, contraband smuggling, and drugs trafficking.

The authors cite that Haitian security forces were purged in September 1996. But this was the HNP presidential security detail that was personally selected by Aristide and was accused of political assassinations of Duvalierists.

U.S. support for foreign militaries was common during the cold war. The Morley-McGillion hypothesis still is true in cases like Mexico and Peru, where the United States supports allied governments fighting Marxist armed insurgencies or "wars" on drugs. Haiti is not so large a large source of narcotics trafficking that the United States needs a corrupt Haitian army to police itself. Like in El Salvador, the United States has had to tolerate a major reorganization of the country's military, because the democratizing government has wanted to. Not only is there no communist insurgency to oppose, CIA warnings notwithstanding, the United States has had strong incentives to cooperate with Haiti's government to avoid an explosion of refugees. Unfortunately, this cooperation involves the illegal interdiction of boat people on the high seas, which has continued despite Aristide's renunciation of the Reagan-Duvalier agreement.

Instead of realpolitik, the prime incentives for the U.S. mission have been liberal-multilateralism and U.S. domestic politics. The United States had wanted to reorganize the Haitian army, but yielded because of Haitian and worldwide preferences for allowing the nascent Haitian democracy to decide for itself. Secure that Aristide would not object that the United States would continue to return boat people back to Haiti, the Clinton administration tolerated Aristide's decision on this less important issue during the post-cold war era. Clinton's approval ratings, threatened by CNN images of boat people, trumped the U.S. Defense Department's preferences to preserve but reorganize the Haitian Army.

Liberal multilateralism was initiated in Haiti to obtain greater legitimacy and cooperation to oppose the coup. The use of sanctions required all Organization of American States (OAS) countries to enforce it. To obtain and maintain that support of over forty OAS states, the United States had to invoke the 5 June 1991 OAS Santiago resolution to defend democracies, not client or puppet states. Haiti's democratization began with the U.S.-OAS-UN effort to hold

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the 1990 elections in Haiti as part of the broad effort to end dictatorships in Latin America. This multilateralism was supported by Canada, Germany, Venezuela, and ultimately France.

The United States also obtain multilateral sanction from the United Nations in Security Council Resolution 940. If this were "bilateralism with a multilateral face," then the United States would have opposed Aristide when he abolished the army. The United States also needed the armed support of twenty-five other countries' peacekeeping forces in Haiti to remain present and support the Aristide government.

Though Aristide's authority to make this decision unilaterally might be called into question by strict constructionists of the Haitian constitution, any U.S. questioning of Aristide's authority to abolish the army would have returned the Haiti mission to the front pages of U.S. newspapers. This attention to Haiti would have cost the Clinton administration the political capital it had accrued from claimed successes of Operation Uphold Democracy, which was critical to Clinton's reelection strategy, an incentive in post-cold war politics.

Most of this pressure to stop the flow of Haitian boat people came from refugee advocates, who feared the deaths of tens of thousands of boat people, about half of those in pathetic, overcrowded boats, and to a lesser extent, from ugly racists opposed to admitting these black refugees. President Clinton's reputation for issue flip-flops and weak foreign leadership had to be reversed to obtain potential votes in the personality-intensive, post-cold war presidential elections. Clinton had already switched, by criticizing the Bush policy on interdiction of refugees and then adopting it. Following Somalia killings of U.S. Army Rangers and the failure of the U.S. *Harlan County* to land in Haiti one week later in October 1993, the Clinton administration began planning an armed invasion, partly to prevent Clinton from being perceived as a Bush-like "wimp."

The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the development of a forcible invasion plan. Task Force 180 was formed almost a year before Aristide was reinstated as president. It developed Plan No. 2370 in January 1994 to destroy the Haitian Army and all its paramilitary links. Following TransAfrica President Randall Robinson's "hunger strike," President Clinton could not take the criticism from refugee advocates opposed to the U.S. interdiction policy and the CNN images of boat people. A week before the invasion, after the junta had failed to capitulate, the president authorized commencement of Plan 2370, whose initial intent was to destroy the Haitian Army. This immediate fate was avoided by de facto Haitian President Emil Jonaissant's last-minute submission, as sixty-one U.S. jets were in the air ready to destroy Haiti's Army.

HENRY F. CAREY
Rutgers University

The authors reply:

Driver's comments on our article are perceptive and well taken. Moreover, as he himself notes, they tend to strengthen rather than weaken our basic argument about Bush-Clinton policy toward the restoration of democracy in Haiti.

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Carey's rambling, ofttimes incoherent and irrelevant, and even error-prone response is another matter altogether. First, his letter reveals little, if any, understanding of those factors that shaped and drove U.S. policy toward Haiti between 1991 and 1994. The significance of our "state vs. regime" conceptual argument, for instance, completely eludes him. Washington's anxiety over eliminating rather than refurbishing the "old" state structures, including the military/security forces, is translated into a "hypothesis" about "U.S. support for foreign militaries," which is then critiqued with reference to some garbled nonsense about drugs and refugees.

Second, rather than address the cluster of short and long-term policy concerns/objectives that dictated the shifts and changes in U.S. policy, Carey would have us believe that all can be explained by "liberal-internationalism"—one of those amorphous and waffly terms much beloved by some political scientists but which have little explanatory value when it comes to understanding U.S. policy.

Third, Carey makes astonishing assertions about specific events in the face of documented evidence to the contrary. How else to explain, for example, his laughable assertion that it was interim President Jonaissant's role, not that of the Carter mission and the ruling generals' decision to cooperate with it, that was the key to the U.S. decision not to unleash its air power against the gangster regime.

Finally, the secretary-general of the OAS will be surprised to learn that his organization now numbers "over forty [member] states" and not the thirty-five (excluding Cuba) he believes he currently represents.

MORRIS MORLEY
CHRIS MCGILLION
Macquarie University

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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